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Executive summary 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Employment generating public works (EGPW) are an important part of Royal Government of 
Cambodia’s (RGC’s) strategy being developed through Council for Agriculture and Rural 
Development (CARD) to develop a comprehensive social safety net (SSN) to provide a measure 
of protection from shocks for the poor and vulnerable and to contribute to poverty alleviation 
through short-term unskilled employment. The term EGPW is used in this report as a generic 
term to encompass labour intensive (LI) and labour-based (LB) approaches. The LI approach is 
proposed for smaller village level and sub district works (e.g. village roads and communal 
ponds) and the LB approach for larger rural infrastructure works (e.g. tertiary roads, small scale 
irrigation and flood protection) requiring more technical input. Both LB and LI approaches and 
projects have their places in a public works component of an SSN. In setting wage rates for SSN 
public works, it is necessary to take account of: (a) the nature of benefits they offer (e.g. the 
balance between employment creation and effective use of labour); (b) the beneficiaries to be 
targeted, and (c) any adverse impacts on other economic activities. 
 
The purposes of this assignment are: (a) to make recommendations on appropriate wage rates 
for unskilled casual employment on public works programmes performing the SSN function, and 
(b) make a broad assessment of the labour supply response to employment opportunities 
created by EGPW programmes. The latter would help in gauging the scale of such activities 
required and the amount and type of protection that is feasible within the available resources. 
 
The study has been conducted by the Rural Economist in collaboration with the Cambodia 
Development Research Institute (CDRI). Following an appraisal of issues and study design, 
CDRI conducted focus group discussions (FGDs) and a household survey of a sample of 
households in the Moving Out of Poverty Study (MOPS) database. Table ES1 briefly describes 
the characteristics of villages representative of the four natural regions in which the study 
fieldwork was done. 
 
2. Cambodian economy and labour market context  
 
The population of Cambodia in 2008 was about 13.4 million of which about 80 per cent was 
rural. About 34 per cent of the population is under the age of 15 years and about 46 per cent is 
aged 19 years or less. This demographic profile implies high numbers of young entering the 
workforce in coming years. About 72 per cent of the employed are engaged in the primary 
sectors of agriculture, forestry and fishing. Levels of open rural unemployment are low, as most 
persons capable of working engage in some productive activities to earn a living. 
 
Much of agriculture is on family smallholdings and rural households supplement their livelihoods 
through harvesting common resources (fishing and forest products) and wage employment 
locally, in other parts of Cambodia and outside the country. Agriculture on family smallholdings 
and on commercial farms is characterised by low productivity and slow growth of employment. 
The rapid growth of Cambodia’s economy and related employment generation between 1994 
and 2007 were led by garment manufacture, tourism and construction. While these activities are 
largely urban, they are important for many rural households since incomes from their members’ 
employment in these sectors makes an important contribution to their livelihoods. Because of the 
global financial crisis, growth in all three sectors slowed down in 2008 with an adverse impact on 
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the rural economy. One outcome of the rapid economic growth between 1994 and 2007 has 
been a decline in poverty with the headcount falling from 34.8 per cent in 2004 to 30.1 per cent 
in 2007. The rural poverty headcount fell from 39.1 per cent to 34.7 per cent and 91 per cent of 
the poor live in rural areas.  
  
Table ES1: Villages in which FGDs and household surveys were conducted 
Region  
and 
Village 
Province Features Household 
survey sample 
size
2 
Tonle Sap   200 
Andong Trach
1 
Battambang Wet season rice. High resettlement of returnees 
from border camps. 2 km from National Road 5. 
52 
Krasaing Battambang Wet season rice. High emigration. 500 metres 
from National Road 5. 
74 
Khsach Chiros Kampong 
Thom 
Floating rice plus fishing in flooded Tonle Sap. 
No road access for six months of the year. 
74 
Mekong 
Plains 
  200 
Babaong
1
 Prey Veng Substantial dry season rice. 14 km from Neak 
Loeang market town. 
100 
Prek Khmeng Kandal Dry season rice and substantial fishing. No road 
access for six months of the year. 
100 
Plateau / 
Mountain 
  100 
Khhan Chor
1
 Kratie Dry season rice and substantial forest 
dependence. Improved road access since 2002. 
50 
Dang Kdar Kampong 
Thom 
Low yield wet season rice and substantial forest 
dependence. 20 km from National Road 6. 
50 
Coastal   100 
Kompong 
Thnaot
1
 
Kampot Low yield wet season rice, coastal fishing and 
salt panning. On National Road between Kep 
and Kampot 
100 
Source: Adapted from Fitzgerald and Sovannarith et al (2007).  
Notes:  
1 -  Locations of FGDs. 
2 -  The total sample size was 600 households with 200 households each in Tonle Sap and Mekong 
regions and 100 each in Plateau / Mountain and Coastal Regions broadly reflecting the relative 
population sizes in the four Regions.  
 
Underemployment and low productivity employment are important explanation of the high rural 
poverty incidence. Because of lack of skills, the poor are less able to pursue more productive 
non-farm employment opportunities. Thus, land becomes the most critical asset for many rural 
poor though not all landless are poor. Landlessness (defined as no access to cultivable land) 
increased from 12.6 per cent in 1997 to 15.8 per cent in 1999 and 19.6 per cent in 2004. The 
rural poor are those who have to sell all or part of their land because of debt or shocks and 
therefore have limited or no land and for whom other income opportunities are limited. The 
public works component of SSN would provide income support through short-term employment 
in creating or preserving infrastructure assets. 
 
3. Setting wage rates for SSN public works: Aspects to be considered 
The aspects which need to be balanced in setting wage rates for public works programmes as 
SSNs are: (a) targeting poorer sections of the population to the extent possible through the 
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wage rate; (b) minimising adverse impacts on other economic activities; (c) providing an 
acceptable level of social protection, and (d) ensuring that the wage rate offers incentive to work 
productively where asset creation and preservation through public works have a high priority.  
 
In order to arrive at recommendations on the wage rate, taking into account the considerations 
outlined above, available evidence on wage rates in comparable unskilled work (e.g. farm work, 
other rural economic activities and urban unskilled wage employment accessible to rural 
households). The prevailing market wage rate for comparable work is a good guide but the 
conventional recommendation is to set the public works SSN wage rate below the relevant 
market wage rate. However, if the wage rate is set too low, the consequences are low welfare 
benefits for participants and poor performance in creating and maintaining assets. 
  
The balance between the objectives of EGPWs of providing social protection and creation of 
assets varies between programmes. The proposed programme intends to include components 
which will have differing emphasis on the two objectives. Some components, referred to here as 
labour-based (LB), will have greater emphasis on using labour combined with appropriate 
equipment for effective and efficient creation or maintenance of more important rural 
infrastructure assets. Others, referred to here as labour intensive (LI) will have a greater 
emphasis on social protection targeted at the poor and people in areas which suffer from 
economic or natural shocks.  
 
Other aspects considered are any wage regulations with implications for the wage rate for public 
works and whether the public works wage rate offers an adequate level of support for 
households of participants. The only sectors for which a minimum wage has been set are textile, 
garment and shoe manufacturing. The current minimum wage set in January 2007 is $50 per 
month with an additional cost of living allowance of $6.00 per month from April 2008. For a six 
day week, the minimum wage and the daily allowance are roughly equivalent to $2.33 or just 
over 9,800 riel per day. The average earnings of garment workers are about 25 per cent higher. 
There is no existing minimum wage rate which would be applicable to public works projects 
whether as part of a SSN or otherwise. 
 
Public works projects will typically provide employment and earnings at a time when other 
employment opportunities are limited and households may be suffering food shortages. 
Therefore, in setting the wage rate, account has to be taken of the contribution earnings from 
project employment make to the living standards of poor households on an annual basis and 
whether they make an adequate living wage contribution to household during the period of 
project employment. 
 
4. Evidence from CARD / ILO FGDs and household survey 
 
FGDs in four villages support the conclusion that members of most households engage in a 
range of economic activities and have multiple sources of income. Those with land are typically 
busy in ploughing and rice planting and transplanting between June and August and harvesting 
during December to February though there are regional and local variations. Even for 
households without land there is work in rice fields during these times. Generally people are 
available for off-farm work between October and April though they may be required for 
harvesting for some time during this period and there are regional variations. 
 
Economic activities and cash earning opportunities other than in farming vary between villages 
reflecting the features of their regions. For members of poor and average households, 
employment outside farming is essential for supplementing their livelihoods. For average and 
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better-off households, it provides cash to improve their livelihoods by acquiring livestock, 
productive assets and stock for trading. Unemployed youth and lack of opportunities for women 
were identified as problems. Three out of the four villages had experience of public works under 
the World Food Programme (WFP) in the 1990s. In all four villages, there appeared to be 
willingness to participate in a public works programme near the village during the slack 
agricultural season.  
 
According to FGD participants, in Andong Trach (Tonle Sap) and Kompong Thnaot (Coastal), 
the wage rate for agricultural labour was 10,000 riel per day. In Khhan Chor (Plateau / 
Mountain), it was in the 10,000 to 12,000 riel range while in Babaong (Mekong), it appeared to 
be in the 10,000 to 15,000 riel range. In Andong Trach and Kompong Thnaot, wage rates for 
public works similar to agricultural wage rates and even somewhat lower were thought to be 
acceptable by FGD participants. In the other two villages (Khhan Chor and Babaong), 
acceptable wage rates were thought to be somewhat higher partly reflecting labour market 
conditions and partly the cost of living.  
 
The CARD / ILO survey included questions on the economic activities and cash earnings of 
“adult” members (persons 15 years or older) of sample households in the seven days prior to the 
interview. Evidence was also sought on availability for public works employment at specified 
wage rates. Questions on the characteristics of households of respondents and the economic 
activity status of household members were also included and for each household matching data 
on income and expenditure levels and access to land for cultivation were available from the 
MOPS database. 
 
Of the total 2,333 persons in the 15 years plus age range in the sample households, almost 90 
per cent (2,096) were economically active (i.e. had either worked for at least one hour in the 
week before the interview, were absent from work for valid reasons or were seeking work). Of 
those in the labour force, 693 (33 per cent of the economically active) had cash earnings during 
the reference period, either wages or sales revenue net of cost of sales for those engaged in 
trading. The mean earnings were just over 11,000 riel per day though for 30 per cent, earnings 
were below 6,000 riel and for 48 per cent they were at or below 9,000 riel. The median earnings 
level was 10,000 riel. 
 
In total 1074 persons (i.e. 46 per cent of those in the 15 plus years age range) stated that they 
would be available for public works employment at some wage rate. About 12.5 per cent of the 
economically active indicated that they would find 9,000 riel acceptable for public works and 22 
per cent indicated that 10,000 riel would be acceptable. The wage rate at which a person states 
that he/she is willing to take up employment is interpreted as the stated “reservation wage” (the 
lowest wage rate at which a person is willing to take up a given type of employment).  
 
In order to make recommendations on the SSN wage rate, it is necessary to reconcile the 
evidence on the distributions of actual earnings and stated acceptable wage rates for public 
works. The lower end of the distribution of earnings may indicate too low a public works wage 
rate because it may be in activities which are not comparable with public works and actual 
earnings may also have been low because of the effects of the financial crisis and poor relations 
with Thailand. On the other hand, the stated acceptable wage rates may be too high because of 
an element of bargaining and unrealistic expectations.  
 
Limiting participation to one person per household is not being contemplated at present and 
such a limitation may not be necessary where project labour requirement is high in relation to the 
local labour availability. Nevertheless, it is useful to examine the labour supply response under 
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the assumption of access to employment on the programme being limited in this way since such 
a limitation is one option on some LI projects where available resources are not sufficient to 
meet the local need for social protection or to employ all persons wishing to participate. The 
analysis under this assumption also provides insights into the targeting effectiveness of the 
wage rate, labour supply response and programme costs. At least one person from 73 per cent 
of households is willing to participate in public works at some wage rate with at least one person 
from 23 per cent of households indicating 9,000 riel per day as an acceptable wage rate and 
38.5 per cent of households had at least one person who found 10,000 riel acceptable.    
 
Comparison of the stated labour supply response with the distribution of earnings (interpreted as 
revealed labour supply) indicated that stated acceptable wage rates tend to be high in locations 
with limited experience of cash earnings. The judgement was that limited reference points for 
wage rates led to respondents indicating higher wage rates being acceptable for public works 
and therefore there was a need to adjust for this tendency. Three alternative labour supply 
“curves” have been proposed to estimate the likely labour supply response and the wage bill: (a) 
the central assumption which is the stated labour supply response with observations from the 
villages with limited cash earning experience excluded; (b) high estimate (with higher labour 
supply response at lower wage rates) based on the distribution of cash earnings, and (c) the 
lower labour supply response with access to public works limited to one person per household. 
 
5. Wage rate and targeting effectiveness 
 
One reason for the conventional recommendation to set the SSN wage rate below the market 
wage rate is to target poor households. The targeting effectiveness of lower wage rates was 
examined by comparing the proportion of persons from poor households (those falling in the 
bottom and bottom two quintiles of consumption expenditure per head) willing to participate in 
public works at lower wage rates and members of better off households excluding themselves at 
lower wage rates. In both respects, the evidence indicates very limited targeting effectiveness. 
As an alternative, the amount of cultivable land per person the household has access to as a 
proxy indicator of living standards was also used. This indicator demonstrates somewhat better 
but by no means a high level of targeting. About 55 per cent of persons in the bottom two 
“amount of land per person” quintiles are willing to participate at the wage rate of 9,000 riel. By 
implication, 45 per cent are in the higher quintiles. Further, only 35 per cent of those in the 
bottom two quintiles are willing to work for 9,000 riel or less per day. 
 
To provide a cross-check for the stated acceptable wage rates being overstated, the distribution 
of earnings was also placed in expenditure and cultivable land quintiles. While the bottom 
quintile proportionally had the largest number of persons earning below 5,000 riel per day, there 
was a wide distribution of earnings ranges in all quintiles with more than 25 per cent of persons 
in the top expenditure quintile with earnings of 5,000 riel or less and over 50 per cent of persons 
in the bottom expenditure quintiles with earnings over 9,000 riel. This evidence supports the 
conclusion from the assessment of stated responses that a low wage rate by itself is not a 
deterrent against participation for all persons from better off households and persons from poor 
households are not limited to very low wage employment.   
 
Problems with data on consumption cannot be ruled out. However, they do not entirely explain 
the poor targeting through wage rates. Possible explanations are that members of poor 
households may face more severe time constraints and have higher opportunity costs than 
some members of better-off households who are willing to work for lower wages to make their 
contribution to the household budget. There is international evidence to corroborate these 
findings. The implications are that the wage rate should be set to provide an acceptable level of 
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protection without distorting the labour market but since the wage rate by itself will not be 
sufficient for targeting poor households, other approaches to targeting poor and vulnerable 
households and rationing access to the programme will be required. 
 
6. Overview of evidence from CARD/ILO study and other sources 
 
Table ES2: Summary of evidence on wage rates and earnings 
 Source Wage rates and earnings 
1. CARD / ILO FGD 
Rural wage rates 
Agricultural wage rates in 10,000 to 12,000 riel per day range. 
2. CARD / ILO FGD 
Acceptable public works wage rate 
Wage rate comparable to agricultural wage rates and somewhat below in some 
villages thought to be acceptable.   
3. CARD / ILO actual earnings (all 
activities – wage employment, 
self-employment and subsistence 
production) 
For 48% of those with cash earnings, pay was equivalent to 9,000 riel or 
lower.  Earnings are 9,000 riel per day or less for 15.9% of the economically 
active. 
Mean: 11,200 riel. 
Median: 10,000 riel.  
4. CARD / ILO stated acceptable 
wage rate for public works 
employment – all respondents 
9,000 riel per day or less acceptable for 12.5% of economically active. 
10,000 riel or less acceptable for 22% of economically active. 
12,000 riel or less acceptable for 35% of economically active. 
5. CARD / ILO stated acceptable 
wage rate for public works 
employment – all respondents – 
“unrealistic” locations taken out 
9,000 riel per day or less acceptable for 18.4% of economically active. 
10,000 riel or less acceptable for 26.9% of economically active. 
12,000 riel or less acceptable for 31.4% of economically active. 
  
6. CARD / ILO stated acceptable 
wage rate for public works 
employment – restricted to one 
person per  household 
9,000 riel per day or less acceptable for 6.6% of economically active and 23% 
of households. 
10,000 riel or less acceptable for 11% of economically active and 38.5% of 
households. 
12,000 riel or less acceptable for 15.2% of economically active and 53% of 
households. 
7. 2008 survey of households cited in 
World Bank / UNICEF (2010)  
Agricultural wage rates in May-June 2008: 
Transplanting rice: $2.50 (10,500 riel) per day. 
Harvesting, weeding and transplanting: $2.75 (11,600 riel) per day. 
Land clearing: $3.25 (13,700 riel) per day. 
Construction: $3.38 (14,200 riel) per day. 
8. CDRI vulnerable workers’ surveys About 10,300 riel per day for rice field workers in the February and May 2009 
surveys. Down to 8,800 riel per day in August 2009. 
Unskilled construction workers (Phnom Penh) 14,400 riel in May, small fall 
by August 2009.  
9. WFP Payment in rice equivalent to about 10,000 riel per day.  
10. ADB  Emergency Food Assistance 
Project 
Payment in cash equivalent to WFP payment. 
 
Evidence summarised in Table ES2 from the CARD/ILO study and other selected sources, 
notably on agricultural wage rates from the 2008 CSES survey of households and vulnerable 
workers’ surveys undertaken by CDRI indicates that the benchmark rural wage rate for work 
comparable to public works is 10,000 riel. There are significant proportions of rural workers with 
cash earning rates below 10,000 riel though they may not be in activities comparable with public 
works and earnings rates were low at the time of the study because of the financial crisis.  
 
The public works component of the proposed SSN is not intended to be simply an instrument for 
transferring cash to participants but to invest in sound rural infrastructure assets. This will 
evidently be the case for LB projects. For LI projects, the aim is to strengthen the technical input 
and implementation practice to improve the quality of output. On both LB and LI projects, 
workers will be expected to work under supervision to good standards and meet productivity 
targets, usually on task rate basis. Therefore, payment for workers should include an efficiency 
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wage element. Based on the evidence and considerations summarised above, a public works 
wage rate of 10,000 riel seems justified. Even if there is a case for setting different wage rate for 
LB and LI projects on the basis of different levels of work requirements, such differentiation 
would be difficult to maintain for projects being implemented under the common SSN umbrella. 
 
7. Balancing programme costs and welfare effects 
 
Table ES3: Labour supply and wage bill for 100,000 population – all respondents, central 
assumption 
 
Population    
 Cambodia rural total 100,000 
 Cambodia rural 15+ 64,300 
 Persons willing and able to participate at given wage 
rate as proportion of 15+ population    
 5000 7.8 
 9000 16.6 
 10000 24.2 
 12000 28.3 
 15000 40.8 
 Total available at   
5000 5,021 
9000 10,650 
10000 15,549 
12000 18,181 
15000 26,240 
Number of days of employment per person offered
1 
  
 50   
 Exchange rate   
 4215   
 Wage bill at Riel US$ 
5000 1,255,292,206 297,815 
9000 4,792,381,697 1,136,983 
10000 7,774,713,018 1,844,535 
12000 10,908,894,204 2,588,113 
15000 19,679,742,328 4,668,978 
Note:  
1 – 50 days of employment have been used in this table and elsewhere in the report to produce 
illustrative calculations.   
 
The combination of the wage rate, the labour supply response and any additional rationing 
mechanisms used to manage access to the SSN have implications for programme costs and the 
welfare impact of SSN employment. Some illustrative calculations are provided using 50 days of 
public works employment. If a public works based SSN is offered in, say, four average sized 
districts with a total combined population of 100,000 persons, Table ES3 shows that if the wage 
rate is Riel 10,000, 24 per cent of those in the 15+ age group would participate and the SSN 
wage bill would be about $1.84 million. The overall programme costs would be higher since 
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additional non-labour costs are likely to be 30 to 60 per cent of total programme costs depending 
on types of project and labour intensity.  
 
Table ES4: Wage rate and welfare impact for households 
Average annual household consumption
1
 Riel US$ 
1st quintile (bottom 20%) 4,353,415 1033 
2nd quintile (next 20%) 5,925,540 1406 
3rd quintile (middle 20%) 7,608,504 1805 
4th quintile (above average 20%) 10,073,875 2390 
5th quintile (top 20%) 26,600,426 6311 
 Number of days of employment per person  50   
   
Pay per day 9,000   
PW wage contribution as % of household consumption - 
1 household member participating      
1st quintile (bottom 20%) 10.3   
2nd quintile (next 20%) 7.6   
3rd quintile (middle 20%) 5.9   
4th quintile (above average 20%) 4.5   
5th quintile (top 20%) 1.7   
      
Pay per day 10,000   
PW wage contribution as % of household consumption - 
1 hh member     
1st quintile (bottom 20%) 11.5   
2nd quintile (next 20%) 8.4   
3rd quintile (middle 20%) 6.6   
4th quintile (above average 20%) 5.0   
5th quintile (top 20%) 1.9   
      
Pay per day 12,000   
PW wage contribution as % of household consumption - 
1 member     
1st quintile (bottom 20%) 13.8   
2nd quintile (next 20%) 10.1   
3rd quintile (middle 20%) 7.9   
4th quintile (above average 20%) 6.0   
5th quintile (top 20%) 2.3   
      
Note: 
1 - Assumptions are average household size in adult equivalent of 4.7. The average 
consumption per head of Riel 2,528 per person for the 1
st
 quintile (bottom 20%), Riel 3,427 
per person for the 2
nd
 quintile, Riel 4,401 per person for the 3
rd
 quintile, Riel 5,827 per 
person for the 4
th
 quintile and Riel 15,386 per person for the 5
th
 quintile (top 20%) derived 
from MOPS data on household consumption. 
 
If one person from a household participates in public works, the welfare impact at the household 
level (wages from public works employment) according to Table ES4 would be equivalent to 
about 11.5 per cent of total household consumption expenditure for an average household in the 
bottom consumption quintile. The impact for households in higher quintiles will evidently be 
lower. At least 1 person from 37 per cent of sample households stated availability for public 
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works employment at a wage rate of 10,000 riel per day or lower and for these households, on 
average, just over 2 persons were willing to participate at 10,000 riel per day or lower. Therefore, 
if there is no restriction on the number of persons from a household participating, on average the 
welfare effect for public works employment would be about twice as large as that indicated in 
Table ES4.  
 
During the period when one or more members of a household are participating in a public works 
project, the contribution to the livelihood of the household would be much higher. The proposed 
wage rate of 10,000 riel per day is equivalent to about 84 and 62 per cent respectively of the 
daily consumption of an average sized household in the bottom and second consumption 
quintiles. For an average sized household on or close to the poverty line (which could be 
considered to be a very basic living wage in the rural context), the daily wage of 10,000 riel per 
day is equivalent to 67 per cent of household consumption. Therefore, while one person’s daily 
public works wage would not be sufficient to meet all the needs of a household on the poverty 
line, it would meet a large proportion of the basic needs. The supplementary income would be 
especially valuable if public works projects are phased during agriculturally slack periods and 
coincide with the time of year when many rural households suffer from food shortages. 
 
If the SSN is offered at the national level, at a wage rate of Riel 10,000 and 50 days of 
employment offered per household, the total cost would be about $102 million which is 
equivalent to about 1.1 per cent of GDP and about 7 per cent of public expenditure in 2008. 
Excel spreadsheets have been developed and supplied to explore programme costs and welfare 
impact under alternative assumptions.  
 
8. Setting the wage rate and related recommendations 
 
Recommendations on public works SSN wage rate and related aspects with brief comments are 
set out here: 
 
1. Balancing the objectives of providing a reasonable level of social protection, targeting 
poorer sections of the population through the wage rate to the extent possible, minimising 
adverse impacts on other economic activities, ensuring that the wage rate offers incentive 
to work productively and practical aspects, a uniform wage rate of 10,000 riel per day 
across the country is recommended as the public works wage rate.  
a. Coincidentally, this is roughly equivalent to the current minimum wage rate plus living 
allowance for garment workers. 
b. At a uniform wage rate, there will be differences between localities and regions in the 
numbers wishing to participate. The programme will have to be responsive to these 
differences. A uniform wage rate is equitable in that the same amount is paid for 
similar work as long as variations in living costs are not large.  
2. A number of aspects which will need attention at the programme design and early 
implementation stages have been identified below. 
3. About equal numbers of men and women stated willingness to participate at a daily wage 
rate of 10,000 riel. There should be no discrimination between men and women with 
respect to access to LI and LB public works employment and men and women should be 
paid equally for work of equal value.  
4. The wage rate by itself is not an effective device for targeting the poor let alone for 
targeting specific groups. Additional targeting could be: 
a. geographical, of poor areas and those affected by natural or economic shocks. 
b. giving priority to the ID Poor. 
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c. more specific targeting for the poorest, youth, veterans and IDPs, though elaborate 
targeting usually requires additional administrative efforts and costs and introduces 
potential for abuse. 
5. Public works employment should be provided in less busy agricultural periods to reduce 
disruption of other productive activities. This is especially important given the poor 
targeting effectiveness of the wage rate. 
6. A uniform public works wage rate has been proposed for the programme. Issues which 
require further attention are freedom for contractors in the wage rate they pay and whether 
to offer a higher wage on projects in locations where labour supply and productivity are 
inadequate at the standard public works wage rate. For contractors, the public works wage 
rate will effectively be the minimum wage rate. This wage rate could be too low for some 
LB projects, notably in areas with low population density, but not for local community 
based LI projects which will typically be planned to match the local need for SSN support. 
If a higher than the standard wage rate has to be paid on some projects (under contractor 
operation or direct labour), it will be necessary to ensure that the rationale for this deviation 
is clear and is acceptable to participants on other projects who are paid the standard 
public works wage rate. 
7. Limiting the number of days of participation per household is a rationing device though this 
would require additional administrative effort and expenditure. It will not improve targeting 
effectiveness but will increase the proportion of households benefiting while facilitating 
control of the wage bill. An alternative rationing mechanism which is easier to implement 
administratively and more transparent, though ineffective as a targeting mechanism, is 
random selection from those wishing to participate. Whether rationing is required and the 
choice of rationing method will depend on labour supply requirements for projects, the 
need for SSN support and targeting in relation to available resources and feasibility of 
implementation.    
8. The public works wage rate would need to be revised periodically in response to changes 
in labour market conditions and cost of living. The wage rate should be reviewed every two 
years (unless the need for more frequent reviews is apparent because of economic 
circumstances). The review should be based on monitoring the labour supply response to 
programme activities, evidence on rural wage rates from the annual CSES surveys being 
undertaken by NIS and evidence on cost of living. 
9. The proposed SSN aims to combine provision of a level of protection through public works 
during normal times targeted at poor areas and provision of support for the poor and 
vulnerable in response to shocks. With the latter, public works activities would have to be 
initiated and their scale determined when the need arises. In order not to disrupt labour 
supply for other productive activities, if a higher level of support is required because of the 
severity and duration of the shock, it is preferable to adjust the number of days of 
employment offered rather than the SSN wage rate. 
 
Some important conclusions and recommendations are based on stated responses to 
hypothetical questions. It will be necessary to review the findings and related recommendations 
in the light of experience during the early stages of programme implementation. The aspects 
which would need further investigation are the actual labour supply response and the role of the 
wage rate in targeting. When implementation starts, there should be a sample survey of 
participants. Evidence from the survey and monitoring of numbers willing to participate should be 
used to make adjustments to the wage rate, investigate the targeting effectiveness of the wage 
rate and investigate additional targeting and rationing rules as necessary. 
 
 
 
 16 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Study context 
 
The Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) is in the process of developing a Social Safety Net 
(SSN) to respond to the overall levels of poverty in the country and to be responsive to 
intermittent economic shocks and natural disasters to which Cambodia is prone. The process 
commenced in December 2008 at the Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum (CDCF) 
where the Government and its development partners discussed the need for a coherent social 
safety net system. It was recognised that a safety net system was required to provide a level of 
protection for the poor and vulnerable from: (a) impact of economic events such as the global 
food price increases between 2005 and 2008, the global financial crisis of 2008-09; (b) natural 
events such as floods, droughts and crop failures; (c) the enduring poor livelihoods associated 
with underemployment and low productivity that many Cambodians suffer from, and (d) the risk 
of slipping into poverty because of events specifically affecting individual households. 
 
The Government assigned to the Council for Agriculture and Rural Development (CARD) the 
responsibility for managing a number of initial analytical studies, including clarification of terms 
and concepts with regard to safety net policy; a review of key sources of household vulnerability 
in Cambodia; an inventory (or “mapping”) of existing safety nets, and an initial outline of policy 
options to guide strategy development. Over the first half of 2009, CARD convened meetings of 
a broad set of national stakeholders. This process has helped to build consensus on the 
meaning of key concepts and the broad direction for policy development. These findings and 
recommendations were presented and discussed at a National Forum in June 2009. 
 
As part of the process of developing a social safety net policy, RGC requested the ILO to assist 
in the development of a public works component of the SSN. RGC recognises that significant 
levels of expertise and experience have been developed in Cambodia from the various public 
work projects that have been implemented with assistance from the ADB, the WFP and the ILO. 
The aim is to draw on the national experience and lessons from international experience to 
develop a nationwide programme which would be capable of responding to intermittent 
economic and natural shocks and at the same time play a role in alleviating poverty and coping 
with vulnerability.  
 
ILO is in the process of developing an overall strategy for such a programme. A key element of 
the definition of this strategy is the identification of appropriate wage rates for workers on the 
programme. The aims of this study are: (a) to make recommendations on appropriate wage 
rates for a nationwide rural public works based SSN being developed by RGC, and (b) assess 
the availability of labour for such a programme which clearly has implications for the scale of 
public works activities required for a safety net. 
 
1.2 Issues to be investigated and study outline 
 
In brief, the considerations in setting wage rates for public works programmes as SSNs are: (a) 
targeting poorer sections of the population; (b) minimising adverse impacts on other economic 
activities; (c) providing an acceptable level of welfare support, and (d) ensuring that the wage 
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rate offers incentive to work productively where asset creation and preservation through public 
works have a high priority.1  
 
In order to arrive at recommendations on the wage rate, taking into account the considerations 
outlined above, it is necessary to review available evidence on wage rates in comparable 
unskilled work (e.g. farm work, other rural economic activities and urban unskilled wage 
employment accessible to rural households) including any variations between regions. Other 
aspects included in the terms of reference for this study are consideration of: 
 any relevant minimum wage regulations and current and proposed systems and 
procedures to regulate wage rates and their implications for public works wage rates, and 
 the minimum acceptable level of SSN support to be provided through public works taking 
account of poverty lines, the ILO mission to address the plight of the working poor, the 
ILO Decent Work criteria and the concept of a “living wage” to the extent that it applies in 
the rural household economy context. 
 
Another important consideration is whether and to what extent wage rates can be used to target 
certain preferred beneficiaries, i.e. the poorest of the poor, women, youth, veterans, IDPs and 
other vulnerable groups and what other targeting mechanisms may be required if the wage rate 
by itself is not sufficient. The importance of targeting specific groups should take account of the 
other components of the SSN including conditional and unconditional cash transfer schemes.   
 
The recommendations are also required to include suggestions on a mechanism for regular 
review and revision of the SSN wage rate2 so that it can remain responsive to the criteria and 
considerations as identified above and identification of other possible benefits for persons taking 
up public works employment. 
 
In setting up a public works based SSN, it is clearly necessary to have an estimate of the scale 
of public works required to meet the demand for support offered by the safety net. This 
“demand” for participation in public works which has been referred to here as “labour 
availability”3 in turn will depend on the wage rate, the nature of work, the conditions under which 
it is offered and its location. The estimate of labour availability and how responsive it is to the 
wage rate are important for estimating the financial and economic resource requirements as well 
as assessing the institutional and technical capacity necessary for the scale of public works 
activities required and any further rationing necessary to make the SSN feasible and affordable. 
 
The study was designed to be conducted in a number of phases by the Rural Economist in 
collaboration with a Cambodian research institute. During the first phase, which was exploratory 
and preparatory, the Rural Economist: 
 briefly reviewed the available information on wage rates and labour availability in 
Cambodia; 
 made an initial appraisal of available information on the “living wage” representing 
sufficient income to meet basic needs and expenses taking account of living costs and its 
implications for the study; 
 set out the terms of reference for the research institute to undertake the data collection 
and analysis; 
                                                 
1
 These are clearly core considerations in making recommendations on wage rates and have been considered in 
more detail in later sections. They have been stated briefly here to set the context for the study design. 
2
 The term “SSN wage rate” has been used in this report to refer to the wage rate for the public works component of 
the proposed SSN.    
3
 This is effectively the supply of labour. 
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 participated in the evaluation of the proposals put forward by the research institutes and 
selected the institute to collaborate in the study, and 
 designed the economic activities and wage rate study to be undertaken by the research 
institute in a number of sample rural locations representative of the range of the main 
socio-economic and livelihood characteristics in rural Cambodia. 
 
Cambodia Development Research Institute (CDRI) was selected to be the collaborating institute 
because of its expertise and experience in undertaking surveys and qualitative studies in rural 
areas in Cambodia, especially concerned with poverty and vulnerability. More specifically, CDRI 
has conducted a number of investigations under its Moving Out of Poverty Study (MOPS) of the 
dynamics of changes in the rural standards of living and in particular the factors which contribute 
to rural households moving in and out of poverty. A distinctive feature of the studies is that they 
are based on a sample of households representing the main agro-ecological regions in 
Cambodia (Tonle Sap plains, Mekong plains, Plateau / Mountains and Coastal) for which CDRI 
has data over a number of years. The CARD / ILO wage rate and labour supply study has been 
based on a survey of a sub-sample of households in the MOPS database and has therefore 
benefited from existing data on these households.   
 
The second phase (separated into two sub-phases) was the conduct of the economic activities 
and wage rate study by CDRI in two sub-phases4. During the first sub-phase, the main tasks 
were: (a) conduct of focus group discussions (FGDs) to obtain qualitative insights for finalising 
the survey questionnaire and for interpreting the survey results, and (b) preparations for the 
household survey (pilot testing and finalising the survey questionnaire, selecting the locations 
and samples for the household survey and making initial field visits).  
 
Under the second sub-phase, the main activities were the conduct of the household survey and 
coding and checking the data from the survey and to prepare it for analysis. The household 
survey collected information from 600 households in eight of the nine MOPS villages 
representing the four regions. The households selected for the study were a sub-sample of the 
1000 households in CDRI’s MOPS database. For the analysis, data collected for the CARD/ ILO 
study for the households were matched with selected existing MOPS data for the households, 
notably on household expenditure, income and access to land for farming. 
    
The third phase, undertaken by the Rural Economist in collaboration with CDRI was the analysis 
and synthesis of survey data and the broader labour market context to make recommendations 
on wage rates and to assess the likely labour supply response. 
  
1.3 Report plan 
 
The next section reviews the broad economic and labour market context and regulations 
influencing employment and wage rates and examines some available evidence on wage rates 
for unskilled labour. Section 3 summarises evidence from the FGDs and findings from the survey 
on characteristics of households and economic activities of household members. Section 4 
examines FGD and survey evidence on wage rates and labour supply and relates it to the 
considerations to be taken into account in setting wage rates for public works programmes 
including labour supply response to a range of wage rates and targeting effectiveness. 
 
                                                 
4
 See CDRI reports on the two phases of their inputs for details. 
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Section 5 starts by addressing the aspects to be considered in setting the wage rate, 
summarises the evidence for wage setting and proposes a SSN wage rate for Cambodia. 
Section 6 examines the labour supply response and the level of social protection (through 
supplementary household income) provided by the proposed wage rate and alternative wage 
rates in combination with the number of days of public works employment and makes final 
recommendations on the SSN wage rate and related aspects. 
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2 Review of labour market and regulation issues 
 
2.1 The labour force and economic activities 
 
The broad context for examining wage rates and labour availability for public works programmes 
is: (a) the size and growth of the labour force; (b) the activities the labour force is engaged in 
and levels of unemployment and underemployment; (c) wages and earnings in relevant 
economic activities, and (d) their links with poverty and vulnerability. Other relevant aspects 
considered are minimum wage and other labour market regulations. 
 
The population of Cambodia in 20085 was about 13.4 million persons with just over 80 per cent 
living in rural areas. About 34 per cent of the population is under the age of 15 years and about 
46 per cent is aged 19 years or less. This demographic profile implies high numbers of young 
workers entering the workforce in coming years. Economic Institute of Cambodia (EIC) (2009) 
reports that according to the 2004 Cambodia Socioeconomic Survey (CSES), the total labour 
force or the economically active population6 was about 7.5 million persons, or 56 per cent of the 
total population, with about 250,000 persons entering the labour market every year. The 
definitions of employment and unemployed used in making the above estimates of the labour 
force were the conventional ones. Persons who had worked for at least one hour in a reference 
period of seven days were considered to be employed and economically active. Persons who 
had not worked for a minimum of one hour but had been actively seeking employment during the 
reference period of seven days were identified as unemployed but economically active (i.e. part 
of the labour force).  
 
Using the 2004 CSES7 estimate of the size of the labour force, EIC (2009) projects that 
Cambodia’s total labour force was an estimated 8.4 million in 2007 and likely to have reached 
about 8.6 million in 2008 and 8.8 million in 2009, of which about 20 per cent are under 18 years 
old. It should be noted that the estimate of the size of the labour force or the economically active 
population in the 2008 Population Census is lower, about 7.05 million. The discrepancy is most 
probably explained by differences in the definition of the economically active population between 
the two sources. In the 2008 Census, questions about economic activities refer to activities 
during the last six months. Those undertaking very limited activities (e.g. occasional paid or 
unpaid work for very short periods of time) might not have considered them to be significant 
enough to be reported as work8. The economically active totals in CSES 2004 and the 2008 
Population Census include working children. In assessing labour availability for public works, 
children have been excluded. 
 
Morris (2007) notes that while there has been rapid growth and reduction in poverty since the 
mid-1990s, Cambodia’s GDP has grown faster than employment opportunities implying a low 
                                                 
5
 National Institute of Statistics (NIS) (2008) General population census of Cambodia, Ministry of Planning, Phnom 
Penh. This reference is referred to as Population Census 2008 in this report. 
6
 The terms “labour force” and “economically active population” have been used interchangeably in the report.  
7
 NIS undertakes frequent socio-economic surveys (Cambodia Socio-economic Surveys or CSESs) of households 
which form a basis for the analysis of changing living standards and the poverty profile and provide information on a 
range of aspects including demography, economic activities, access and ownership of assets. At the time of the study, 
some data from CSES 2007 were available but economic activity data had not been fully analysed. Limited use of 
CSES 2007 data on economic activity has been made in the report.    
8
 The differences in methodology and estimates between the two sources do not have a significant bearing on the 
broad conclusions on economic activities and this study. 
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employment elasticity of economic growth. Productivity in agriculture and services has been low 
and its growth slow, resulting in inadequate incomes for large numbers of Cambodian workers 
since these two sectors together employ over 80 per cent of the labour force (see Table 2.1).  
 
In 2004 Cambodia’s labour force participation rate was 80 per cent9 for the population aged 15 
years or older, with higher rates for men than women. A larger proportion of the rural population 
was economically active. Three-fifths of workers relied on agriculture for employment and 
income and large majority of Cambodians were employed as own-account workers or unpaid 
family workers. Only 20 per cent were paid employees. Many Cambodians had more than one 
job and worked long hours to earn enough for basic needs. 
 
According to CSES 2004, the unemployment rate for those aged 15 years and over was only 1.1 
per cent in 2004. EIC estimates that the unemployment rate in 2007 derived from CSES 2007 
was even lower at 0.9 per cent though World Bank (2009a) arrives at an alternative estimates of 
3.5 per cent. While levels of open unemployment overall are low, urban youth unemployment is 
a concern. CSES 2004 showed that unemployment rates in Phnom Penh were 6.2 per cent for 
teenagers (aged15–19 years) and 7.8 per cent for young adults (aged 20–24 years) with youth 
accounting for 72 per cent of the total unemployed in the city. 
 
On a broader definition of unemployment (including those not working or looking for 
employment, but available for work), the unemployment rate was significantly higher and quite 
alarming for young people in Phnom Penh, at 20.1 per cent in 2004 (27.8 per cent for teenagers 
aged 15–19 years and 16.6 per cent for young adults aged 20–24 years). Youth unemployment 
and underemployment is also a rural issue (see section 3.2 which reports on FGDs undertaken 
as a part of this study). 
 
Open unemployment is low in rural areas but levels of underemployment are high. Virtually all 
economically active persons in rural households are assumed to be engaged in farming even if 
the amount of work they do is small and there are large seasonal variations in work 
requirements. Evidence from CSES 2004 indicates that large numbers of Cambodians are 
available for additional employment. A larger proportion of workers in rural areas than in urban 
were available for additional employment, partly reflecting low incomes in their existing 
employment and partly the seasonal nature of agricultural work. More men than women wanted 
more work in 2004. According to Morris (2007), data from household surveys show a steady 
increase in the share of paid employment in rural areas. This partly reflects a rise in 
landlessness and partly the emergence of off-farm jobs.  
  
Agriculture will continue to be the main source of employment and income for some time to 
come for the majority of households. Most employment in agriculture is in rice production, and 
much of this is subsistence farming that relies on traditional techniques. Freshwater fishing has 
also been significant for livelihoods. Given the reliance on primary activities for livelihoods, the 
underemployment and low productivity and incomes from them and the natural shocks such as 
floods and droughts affecting production, there will be a need to provide a safety net for the rural 
poor and vulnerable for some time to come.   
 
Internal mobility and international migration are important labour market issues. Migration within 
the country has been increasing in recent years, with most movement from one rural area to 
another. However, Phnom Penh and the port area around Krong Preah Sihanouk have the 
greatest concentration of migrants. Recent migration rates for young people are very high, 
                                                 
9
 An estimate based on CSES.  
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especially for youth in their twenties. Many migrants move for employment-related reasons or to 
follow their families. Others have returned to their homes after being displaced by conflict or 
disaster. In the past decade, many young women from rural areas have found jobs in the 
garment factories of Phnom Penh. However, more than half of the female migrants in the urban 
labour force in 2004 were employed in sales and other services. 
 
Table 2.1: Employment by sector 
 
  All Male Female 
Number of employed persons 6,934,891 3,392,400 3,542,491 
        
Sectoral distribution of employed All (%) Male (%) Female (%) 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 72.3 69.4 75.1 
Manufacturing 6.2 4.2 8.2 
Construction 2.0 3.5 0.6 
Wholesale and retail trade 7.6 5.8 9.6 
Transportation and storage 2.2 4.2 0.4 
Public administration 2.7 4.8 0.7 
Other 7.0 8.1 5.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Population Census 2008. 
 
 
Table 2.1 shows that over 70 per cent of employed persons are engaged in the primary activities 
of agriculture, forestry and fishing. The proportion of persons employed in manufacturing, 
construction and services remained small in 2008 in relation to the primary activities. Recent 
developments in Cambodia’s economy and the international context have important implications 
for the labour market, wage rates and poverty incidence. Cambodia’s economy grew by more 
than 8 per cent per year between 1994 and 2007. However, growth of employment in agriculture 
remained low indicating underemployment in traditional self-employed farming and slow growth 
of employment in the commercial farming sector contributing to migration to Phnom Penh and 
other urban areas and across the border in search of jobs that require low skills. Garment 
manufacture, tourism and construction were the sectors which generated the largest amount of 
employment during this period of rapid growth. While these activities are largely urban oriented, 
they are important for the rural economy since for many rural households incomes from their 
members taking up unskilled employment in these sectors makes an important contribution to 
their living standards.  
 
Because of the global financial crisis of 2007/9, growth in all three sectors slowed down in 2008 
with an adverse impact on the rural economy. EIC (2009) estimated that while in 2007 the 
growing non-rural economy could absorb 71 per cent of those joining the labour force, in 2008 
only 44 per cent of the addition to the labour force could be absorbed and in 2009, only about 26 
per cent of those joining the labour force were expected to have found employment with adverse 
impacts on rural households. Another factor with adverse impact on rural households is the 
recent deterioration of relations between Cambodia and Thailand with reduced and less 
favourable employment prospects in Thailand. 
 
Kimsun, Chan Hang and Socheth (2009) show that for a sample of 90 rural households, there 
was a substantial decline in average per capita real income of 31 per cent and average per 
capita real consumption of 23 per cent between March 2008 and May 2009. There were drops 
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on average of between 45 and 50 per cent in off-farm income (e.g. from petty trading and wage 
income from employment). Two aspects of note from Kimsun, Chan Hang and Socheth (2009) 
are: (a) the importance for rural households of off-farm income which includes wage employment 
in the locality and further afield, and (b) the diversity of livelihood sources which enables 
households to spread risk. Another aspect of relevance for this study is that the evidence 
collected for this study on economic activities and earnings in October / November 2009 could 
represent an element of distress resulting from the adverse conditions. If this is the case, 
allowances has to be made when making recommendations on SSN wage rates.  
 
In summary, the rural economy and labour market are characterised by: 
 a range of subsistence and cash earning primary activities (farming and harvesting 
common resources) supplemented by petty trading and wage employment locally and 
further afield; 
 seasonality of labour requirement in farming and the need for off-farm employment in the 
slack agricultural season to supplement livelihoods; 
 increasing reliance of rural households, especially those with no or very little land, on 
income from unskilled wage employment locally and further afield; 
 poverty being associated with underemployment and low productivity in primary activities 
and limited other livelihood opportunities, and 
 the vulnerability of rural livelihoods to household specific and broader economic and 
natural shocks. 
 
The slow growth in employment opportunities has implications for earnings, especially of those 
engaged in unskilled work. A brief review of trends in earnings of some categories of vulnerable 
workers based on CDRI’s periodic sample surveys is provided here. Evidence from the CARD / 
ILO10 survey and other sources on relevant rural wage rates and earnings is provided in later 
sections before making recommendations on SSN wage rates.  
 
CDRI has conducted surveys of earnings of ten groups of workers (Table 2.2) since 2000. The 
total sample is 480, 120 garment workers and 40 in each of the other nine groups. The evidence 
shows that there was a large rise in average earnings in nominal terms between November 2004 
and November 2008, a period of rapid economic growth11. Excluding taxi drivers, the daily 
earnings range in November 2008 was 19,400 riel (about $4.60)12 for construction workers and 
cyclo drivers (19,275 riel, about $4.60) at the top end to 6,285 riel (about $1.6) for waitresses. 
Some of the rise in wages from 2006 reflects higher food prices. In this respect, it is noteworthy 
that rice field workers had one of the highest increases over this period most probably reflecting 
the high rice prices13. Table 2.2 shows that growth in nominal earnings has wavered since 
November 2008 with large falls for some groups, notably vegetable traders, cyclo drivers and 
rice field workers.   
 
  
                                                 
10
 The household survey conducted as a part of this study is referred to as the CARD / ILO survey. See section 3.1 for 
more details and later sections for results. 
11
 The impact of the global financial crisis was not felt in Cambodia until about the middle of 2008. CDRI (2009a) 
provides a comparison of changes in earnings in real terms and makes an assessment of the effects of the financial 
crisis on the earnings of vulnerable workers and Kimsun and Dorina (2009) report on two further rounds of the survey 
to include data for May and August 2009.  
12
 November 2009 exchange rate at Riel 4215 = $1.00 has been used throughout this report, $ refers to US$. 
13
 The explanation of wage increases for rice field workers is probably a combination of the willingness and ability of 
farmers to more because of higher rice prices and the impact of higher rice prices on the cost of living of workers. 
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Table 2.2: Daily average earnings of vulnerable workers at current prices (riel) 
 
  Nov-04 Nov-05 Nov-06 Nov-07 Nov-08  Feb-09 May-09 Aug-09 
Cyclo drivers  6,200 9,598 8,902 12,388 19,275 12,525 12,890 11,738 
Porters  5,570 8,050 8,483 11,675 13,744 15,375 14,950 12,375 
Vegetable traders  7,386 11,732 9,250 10,950 15,150 11,175 14,146 12,625 
Scavengers  4,400 6,573 4,700 7,333 7,100 7,588 9,615 10,750 
Waitresses  4,576 4,541 5,350 5,945 6,605 6,285 6,296 6,938 
Rice field workers  4,313 5,535 6,920 8,228 13,275 10,338 10,235 8,775 
Garment workers  8,855 8,719 9,346 9,269 10,004 9,913 9,694 11,240 
Motor taxi drivers 9,500 11,400 10,098 15,200 23,950 17,100 17,600 14,514 
Unskilled 
construction 
workers  
6,525 7,805 6,338 9,958 13,400 8,975 14,425 14,325 
Skilled construction 
workers    
13,200 13,125 12,300 14,450 19,400 17,275 19,831 18,078 
Weighted mean (1) 7353 8710 8365 10328 13493 11365 12423 11987 
Source: CDRI         
(1) The mean has been weighted to take account of garment workers' sample being 120 (i.e. three 
times the size of samples of 40 for all other categories of workers). 
 
Kimsun and Dorina (2009) include comparison of earnings in real terms at November 2000 
prices. This is of course entirely appropriate and necessary to make valid comparisons of 
changes over time. The comparison in real terms shows that between May and August 2009, 
earnings of all but three groups (scavengers, waitresses and garment workers) fell by an 
average of over 10 per cent. These falls are reflected in the nominal figures in Table 2.2. Kimsun 
and Dorina (2009) convert the earnings at November 2000 prices into $ equivalents at the 
nominal exchange rate. This clearly gives a misleadingly low estimate of current wage rates and 
may cause confusion. The trends in wage rates in nominal terms and their conversion to $s at 
the nominal exchange rate have been used as comparators in this report. An important 
qualification in using this evidence is that the survey samples are small and therefore some of 
the large fluctuations in earnings may be due to specific circumstances affecting the small 
samples and may not reflect the general situation. 
 
The only rural workers in the sample are rice field workers in two villages, one in Kandal 
province, a relatively better off province close to Phnom Penh in the Mekong Plain region, the 
other in Kampong Speu, one of the poorer provinces in the Plateau / Mountain region. Arguably, 
rice field workers’ and unskilled construction workers’ wage rates could be considered to be 
reasonable comparators for rural public works wage rates because of the nature of work 
involved though the sample of unskilled construction workers is from Phnom Penh. The August 
2009 round shows a sharp drop in rice field workers’ wage rate to riel 8,800 which may be a sign 
of distress because of the impact of the financial crisis though unskilled construction workers’ 
wages rose sharply in May 2009 with a small fall in August 2009. Earnings rates for these two 
groups have been used as some of the comparators in section 5 in making recommendations on 
the SSN wage rate.   
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2.2 Rural economic activity, poverty and vulnerability 
 
As an outcome of the economic growth Cambodia enjoyed between 1994 and 2007, there has 
been a decline in poverty with the headcount falling from 34.8 per cent in 2004 to 30.1 per cent 
in 2007 though the decline in food poverty incidence was slower because of the higher food 
price inflation (World Bank, 2009b). Poverty gap and severity have also fallen14. The 
improvement can be seen in increases in consumption in real terms of more than 10 per cent for 
the poorest 40 per cent of the population as ranked by per capita consumption (i.e. households 
in the bottom two quintiles for consumption per head). This conclusion is supported by increase 
in ownership of consumer durables such as TVs, bicycles and motorbikes by households in the 
bottom two consumption quintiles and increase in the size and improvement in quality of their 
houses. 
 
Table 2.3: Changes in living standards, 2004 to 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The rural poverty headcount fell from 39.1 per cent to 34.7 per cent between 2004 and 2007 but 
evidently remains higher than the national headcount. While the rapid economic growth between 
2004 and 2007 has contributed to poverty reduction it is also associated with rising inequality. 
Table 2.3 shows that real per capita expenditure growth between 2004 and 2007 was much 
higher in the richest quintile and in urban areas (especially Phnom Penh) than in the remaining 
quintiles and rural areas. Because of the higher rural poverty incidence and the high proportion 
of population being rural, poverty remains primarily a rural phenomenon. In 2004, 91.6 per cent 
of the poor were rural. In 2007, 92.7 per cent of the poor were rural. 
 
Table 2.4 shows urban and rural poverty lines at current prices. With inflation adjustment, the 
estimated household consumption in Table 2.3 and the poverty lines in Table 2.4 will be 
compared with the consumption estimates for sample households and earnings from public 
works. However, these estimates should be seen as approximations. The mean consumption 
levels for the richest and poorest quintiles in Table 2.3 are somewhat different from the NIS 
(2009) estimates, 1,608 riel for quintile 1 (i.e. the poorest quintile), 2,407 riel for quintile 2, 3,227 
riel for quintile 3, 4,710 riel for quintile 4 and 12,889 riel for quintile 5.          
 
  
                                                 
14
 Poverty gap is a measure of the average depth of poverty. It is calculated as the sum of the difference between the 
poverty line consumption and the actual consumption of those below the poverty line divided by the number of the 
poor. Poverty severity is the mean sum of the square of the poverty gap which gives greater weight to deeper poverty. 
  
Mean per capita consumption of goods and 
services (riel per day, constant 2004 prices) 
  2004 2007 Per cent 
change 
Cambodia 3,804 4,616 21.3 
Phnom Penh 8,067 10,592 31.3 
Other urban 4,929 6,275 27.3 
Rural 3,218 3,649 13.4 
Richest 
quintile 8,990 11,723 30.4 
Poorest 
quintile 1,377 1,524 10.7 
Sources: Conway T and Samsen N (2009) and World Bank (2009b). 
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Table 2.4: National poverty lines, 2004 and 2007 (current riel per capita per day) 
     
    2004 2007  
Phnom Penh Poverty line  2351 3092  
  Food poverty line 1785 2445  
Other urban Poverty line  1952 2704  
  Food poverty line 1568 2274  
Rural Poverty line  1753 2367  
  Food poverty line 1389 1965  
Source: Conway T and Samsen N (2009) and World Bank (2009b). 
 
For the rural poor, the most important assets are labour and land. Because of limited human 
capital and lack of skills, the poor are less able to make use of their labour to pursue more 
productive non-farm employment opportunities. Thus, land becomes the most critical asset for 
many rural poor. Landlessness15 increased from 12.6 per cent in CSES 1997 to 15.8 per cent in 
CSES 1999 to 19.6 per cent in CSES 2004. However, not all landless are poor since some 
become landless by choice in order to pursue better income opportunities through migration and 
wage employment. For a large proportion of rural households relying on farming for their 
livelihoods, the amount of land available for farming is small. According to the European Union 
supported project Economic and Social Relaunch of Northwest Provinces (ECOSORN) in Siem 
Reap, Battambang and Banteay Meanchey, the size of poor farmers’ land in the ECOSORN 
project area ranges between 0.5 and 2.0 ha with the poorest owning less than 0.5 ha, a size 
which is “not sufficient to produce enough food to feed a family” (ECOSORN, 2007).  
    
The rural poor are those who have had to sell all or part of their land because of debt or shocks 
and therefore have limited or no land and for whom other income earning opportunities are 
limited, though as noted above, not all landless are poor. Other sources of poverty are external 
economic or natural shocks that affect communities or individuals. Many households which may 
not be poor are pushed into poverty by natural or economic shocks which affect the whole 
community or particular households.  
 
The quotes in FitzGerald and So (2007) from Cambodian rural families demonstrate the role of 
access to land for poor livelihoods: 
The poor have no land or other assets to rely on ... no capital to invest in alternative 
businesses ... Most poor here take a new loan to repay an outstanding loan, meet 
food shortages or cure sick household members ... If someone falls into this vicious 
poverty, it is almost impossible for them to escape (Trapeang Prey village, Kampong 
Speu) 
 
The have-nots earn just enough for food and consumption and cannot make any 
savings. The rich can earn more than household consumption ... [and] make some 
savings for investing in new income-earning activities. (Krasaing village, 
Battambang) 
 
Over time, stratification has been getting worse … It will be very hard for the poor to 
move out of poverty in the next five years because of landlessness, lack of capital 
and growing inequality. The gap between the rich and poor has grown tremendously. 
(Andong Trach village, Battambang) 
 
                                                 
15
 The rural landless are defined as households without any access at all to land for cultivation. 
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According to World Bank (2006), while poverty incidence has declined in recent years, a 
significant proportion of the non-poor remain vulnerable to risks that could push them back into 
poverty. Nearly 7 per cent of households fell within a 10 per cent band above the poverty line. 
Therefore, if the per capita consumption of these households were to decline by just 10 per cent, 
the poverty rate would increase by 7 per cent from 35 percent to 42 percent. The same source 
also identifies the variety of risks which can, individually or in combination, push even relatively 
wealthy households into poverty, and poor households into destitution. Covariant shocks include 
natural calamities such as extreme floods and droughts and economic events such as the 
financial crisis. Idiosyncratic or individual-
cycle events such as weddings, deaths, or births. Vulnerability to these shocks is exacerbated 
by: (i) the limited asset base and savings of poor households; (ii) the underdevelopment of 
financial markets for saving, borrowing or insurance; (iii) the lack of diversification in many rural 
households (and communities); (iv) heavy reliance on common property resources as either part 
of normal livelihood strategies or as safety nets, when access to or productivity of these 
resources is in decline, and (v) a lack of justice in conflicts between the poor and wealthier or 
more powerful actors.  
 
For a large proportion of rural households, for some time to come, given the limited access to 
land and constraints on productivity improvement in agriculture, off-farm employment for 
household members, either close to home or further afield is the principal route out of poverty 
and protection from economic, natural or household specific shocks. Growth of productive 
employment through economic development will take some time to evolve. In the meantime, a 
rural public works based SSN, especially during the agricultural slack season, would offer 
additional income opportunities to supplement poor livelihoods and to support the vulnerable 
during episodes of shocks. Such a SSN component would be appropriate for poor and 
vulnerable households with able bodied members who can participate in public works. For 
households who do not meet these criteria, a different form of support is needed. 
 
2.3 Evidence on the living wage 
 
One component of the Rural Economist’s TOR is to “assess the available information on the 
minimum level of the cost of living, which reflects a household economy with sufficient income to 
meet basic needs and expenses”. This is concerned with examining evidence to determine 
whether the recommended SSN wage rate would provide an adequate level of social protection. 
A related aspect is the implications of any current or proposed minimum wage regulations for the 
public works wage rate considered in section 2.4. 
 
A living wage is defined as a wage that provides for decent living for a worker and his/her 
dependents, within regulated working hours (not including overtime) from the one income 
source, and should allow for some savings to cope with contingencies. The notion of the “living 
wage” was conceived to examine the adequacy of waged employment to provide an adequate 
standard of living especially in circumstances in which there is a concern that workers may be 
exploited because of labour market conditions. This is likely to be the case where livelihood 
opportunities are severely limited and competition for the available wage employment drives 
down the wage rate. Poor working conditions are also often an associated concern. A recent 
study (Cambodia Institute of Development Study (CIDS), 2009) has investigated whether 
workers in Cambodia are paid an adequate living wage.    
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CIDS (2009) attempted to assess whether garment workers in Phnom Penh and surrounding 
suburbs were earning an adequate “living wage”. A total of 353 garment factory workers (91% 
female and 9% male) from 47 factories in Phnom Penh and surrounding suburbs were 
interviewed. The average age of interviewees was 24 years, the youngest being 15 years and 
the oldest 47 years. Seven out of ten of the interviewees were single, 20 per cent married and 
roughly 9 per cent widowed. Ninety-six per cent were migrants, typically from Kampong Cham 
and Prey Veng provinces. More than half of the interviewees (51 per cent) worked as sewers.  
On average, interviewees had worked at the current factory for 3.1 years and had 3.5 years of 
work experience. Interviewees typically come from 4-member households, of which 2 people 
(including the interviewee) are income earners. The other income earner is typically a farmer. 
 
The minimum wage for garment workers, after a probationary period of three months, was $50 
per month supplemented by an allowance of $6 per month since April 2008. However, 
interviewees earned an average of $79 per month (based on earnings in the four months before 
the interview)16 from their garment factory employment. The earnings included the basic wage 
and all allowances (attendance bonus, seniority bonus, overtime, living support allowance, 
specialization premiums and allowances for food and transport). Interviewees were typically 
contracted to work a six-day 48 hour week. The average level of pay is roughly equivalent to 
12,800 riel per day assuming a six day working week and riel 11,800 assuming a seven day 
working week. Both these estimates are rather high in comparison with the CDRI vulnerable 
workers’ survey estimate for November 2008 in Table 2.2. Possible explanations are differences 
in the period of the survey (CIDs collected information over the previous four month period while 
CDRI data are for a shorter period) and differences in data collection method and sampling.  
 
The CIDS study concluded that average earnings were not an adequate living wage since, after 
deducting the living costs on average of about US$1.90 per day per worker, the amount each 
worker could contribute to the household’s budget fell far short of the amount required.        
However, it should be noted that garment factory workers were largely young (average age 24 
years), female (91 per cent female) and single (70 per cent). They came from households in 
which, typically there was at least one other income earner who was normally a farmer implying 
that many garment workers are migrants. There was also evidence of rural households 
supporting migrant household members through supply of food and cash when pay in urban jobs 
was adversely affected by the economic situation. Garment workers predominantly appeared to 
have links with rural households. The profile of garment workers supports the observation made 
earlier about urban-rural economic linkages and income from garment manufacture and other 
urban employment being one of the livelihood sources for many rural households.  
 
CIDS (2009) applies the living wage concept to garment workers on the assumption that 
households are urban. The study also highlights the interdependence between urban and rural 
economies, typically with remittances from young garment workers to rural households 
supplementing rural household incomes. When urban jobs are limited or pay in them is reduced, 
e.g. as a result of the economic crisis, urban migrant workers relying on support (in kind and 
monetary) from rural households.  
 
The application of the living wage concept to rural households has to be adapted to take account 
of the diversity of income sources for most rural households and contribution of subsistence 
production (farming and harvesting common resources) for rural livelihoods. SSN public works 
employment should be seen as making a contribution to the livelihoods of rural households, 
especially rural poor households and those adversely affected by shocks. Therefore the better 
                                                 
16
 The survey was conducted in December 2008 and January 2009.  
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approach in determining the wage rate is whether SSN earnings, which depend on the wage 
rate and the number of days of employment, make a sufficient contribution to the livelihoods of 
poor and vulnerable households. This is especially the case since SSN public works are not 
being contemplated as offering year round employment and an important contribution of SSN 
public works is to provide support during crises.  
 
Public works projects will typically provide employment and earnings at a time when other 
employment opportunities are limited and households may be suffering food shortages. 
Therefore, in setting the wage rate, account has to be taken of the contribution earnings from 
project employment make to the living standards of poor households on an annual basis and 
whether they make an adequate living wage contribution to household during the period of 
project employment. 
2.4 Labour laws and minimum wage regulation 
 
A further issue to be considered is the relevance of any minimum wage and other regulations for 
SSN employment and wage rate and their possible implications for the public works component 
of the proposed SSN. The framework currently in place on labour market policies was initiated in 
the 1993 Constitution and later elaborated by the 1997 Cambodian Labour Law which provides 
a legal framework for the protection of employees and employers. The Labour Law provides for 
a standard legal workweek of 48 hours, not to exceed 8 hours per day and stipulates additional 
pay at higher pay for overtime work. The law also stipulates health and safety standards. There 
are shortfalls in the capacity to enforce the labour laws but the larger registered garment 
factories and other large formal sector enterprises by and large comply with the Labour Law. 
 
The Labour Law includes provision for the Ministry of Labour and Vocational Training (MoLVT) 
to set guaranteed minimum wage rates which may vary by region. The Labour Advisory 
Committee with representatives from MoLVT and employers’ and workers’ organisations makes 
recommendations on the minimum wage rate. The considerations in setting the minimum wage 
rate include the cost of living and the basic needs of workers and their families, prevailing wage 
rates in the economy, economic development and maintaining a high level of employment, 
achieving adequate productivity and meeting development objectives (ILO, 2009).          
 
To date, a statutory minimum wage rate has been set for workers in the textile, garment and 
shoe manufacturing sectors. The rate was raised from $45 to $50 per month in January 2007 
with an additional cost of living allowance of $6.00 per month from April 2008. While there is 
provision for regional variation in the minimum wage rate, no such variation exists at present. 
There is no set time period for the adjustment of the minimum wage rate which is adjusted from 
time to time in accordance with the evolution of economic conditions and the cost of living. For a 
six day week, the minimum wage and the daily allowance are roughly equivalent to $2.33 or just 
over riel 9,800 per day17.  
 
The actual average earnings of garment workers are higher than the minimum wage rate. As 
noted in section 2.3, CIDS (2009) found that in the second half of 2008 average earnings for 
garment sector workers were US$79 per month. GIPC / USAID (2007) estimated average 
earnings per worker almost identical to CIDS (2009). Making allowances for the longer hours 
worked including overtime, GIPC / USAID estimated that the daily wage rate was equivalent to 
$2.71 or about 11,400 riel (hourly rate of $0.34 or about 1,430 riel assuming an eight hour day). 
                                                 
17
 The daily equivalent wage rate has been calculated on the basis of six days per week being equivalent to about 24 
days per month.   
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By contrast the latest report on the CDRI surveys of wage rates of vulnerable workers (Kimsun 
and Dorina, 2009) shows somewhat lower average earnings for their sample (see Table 2.2) – 
10,000 riel (about $2.4) per day in November 2008, somewhat lower in February and May 2009, 
reflecting the impact of the financial crisis, but 11,240 riel (or about $2.7) in August 2009.  
 
The present minimum wage rate was set just under two years ago and a revision of the 
minimum wage rate is under negotiation with a trade union bid to raise the rate to $93 per month 
which the unions claim is necessary because of the rising cost of living. Such a sharp increase 
appears to be unrealistic and unlikely to be agreed especially in the fragile market conditions 
garment manufacturers face. Nevertheless, actual earnings being substantially higher than the 
minimum wage and the pressure for increase in the minimum wage are indicative of the current 
minimum wage setting a base for wage rates in the sector rather than putting pressure to push 
the wage rate above the market rate.         
 
Using evidence from NIS 2006 handbook and other earlier sources Almazan (2008) concludes 
that in the construction sector, wage rates for unskilled workers are at about the minimum wage 
level though as noted above the minimum wage rate does not apply in the construction sector. 
In a case study of a labour contractor engaged in a project to build apartments in Phnom Penh 
in Almazan (2008), male unskilled workers were paid 12,000 riel per day and women 10,000 riel 
per day. 
 
This section has provided some evidence on prevailing wage rates for unskilled labour in a 
number of activities which provide a part of the context for setting the rural public works wage 
rate. The living wage concept also introduces the notion of providing a basic level of support for 
poor households. Other than the textile, garment and shoe manufacture sectors, wage rates are 
set in the market. Hence, there is no existing minimum wage rate which would be applicable to 
public works projects whether as part of a SSN or otherwise. An additional consideration is that 
the public works wage rate and scheduling of works do not disrupt other economic activities.  
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3. Labour supply and wage rate study: Household 
characteristics and economic activities 
 
3.1 Study rationale, design and details 
 
The above brief review of available information and analysis identifies the main issues relating to 
the labour force, employment and underemployment and the relationship between employment 
and poverty. The review demonstrates a need for a SSN and the possible contribution of a 
public works based component of the proposed SSN to address rural poverty and vulnerability. 
The study was designed to collect and analyse the more specific information needed on 
variations in rural wage rates between locations with different socioeconomic and agro-
ecological characteristics, willingness to participate in public works and response to alternative 
levels of wage rates to make recommendations on appropriate wage rates and assess labour 
availability.  
 
As noted in section 1.2, a sub-sample of 600 households of CDRI’s MOPS sample was used in 
the study. The four broad natural and agro-ecological regions in Cambodia are represented in 
the sample. Table 3.1 shows that Mekong Plains (henceforth Mekong) and Tonle Sap are the 
most populous regions. The table includes urban and rural population. The population density is 
much higher in the Mekong region though the differences between population densities are 
accentuated by the inclusion of Phnom Penh in this region. Broadly reflecting the differences in 
rural population, the sample sizes for the more populous regions of Tonle Sap and Mekong are 
twice as large as those for the Plateau / Mountain and Coastal regions.  
 
Table 3.1: Natural regions in Cambodia: Area and population 
    
 Natural regions Area (km2) Population Population 
density (per 
km2) 
Mekong Plains 25,069.00 6,547,953.00 261 
Tonle Sap 67,688.00 4,356,705.00 64 
Plateau / Mountain 68,061.00 1,530,544.00 22 
Coastal 17,237.00 960,480.00 56 
Cambodia 181,035.00 13,395,682.00 74 
Source: Population Census 2008 
 
Mekong is agriculturally the most fertile of the regions with rain-fed and dry season rice 
production being the most important agricultural activities. The region’s proximity to Phnom Penh 
and other urban areas and overall high population density offer market opportunities for livestock 
products and high value perishable crops such as vegetables and fruit. Proximity to Phnom 
Penh also offers employment opportunities in industrial and service sectors. Tonle Sap is also a 
large rice producing region but there are differences in livelihoods between people living on or 
close to the lake and further afield. For those close to the lake, fishing and fishing related 
activities are important though there is now concern about the depletion of this resource. There 
is also floating and deepwater rice cultivation by the lake but possibilities of diversification into 
other crops and livestock are limited. There is more conventional wet and dry season rice 
cultivation further away from the lake. Other employment opportunities are work in farms along 
the Thailand-Cambodia border or migration deeper into Thailand.  
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In the Plateau / Mountain region, farming includes upland rice cultivation, non-rice crops such as 
maize, cassava and fruit and livestock. In addition, the forested areas offer timber and non-
timber products. There are also employment opportunities on plantations growing industrial and 
export crops such as rubber and coffee. In the Coastal region, livelihoods based on traditional 
farming are supplemented by marine fishing and fishing related activities and panning for salt. 
Krong Preah Sihanouk and other urban and industrial areas also offer employment 
opportunities. 
 
Table 3.2: Villages in which FGDs and household surveys were conducted 
 
Region  
and 
Village 
Province Features Household 
survey 
sample size
2 
Tonle Sap   200 
Andong Trach
1 
Battambang Wet season rice. High resettlement of 
returnees from border camps. 2 km from 
National Road 5. 
52 
Krasaing 
 
Battambang Wet season rice. High emigration. 500 
metres from National Road 5. 
74 
Khsach Chiros Kampong 
Thom 
Floating rice plus fishing in flooded Tonle 
Sap. No road access for six months of the 
year. 
74 
Mekong 
Plains 
  200 
Babaong
1
 Prey Veng Substantial dry season rice. 14 km from 
Neak Loeang market town. 
100 
Prek Khmeng Kandal Dry season rice and substantial fishing. No 
road access for six months of the year. 
100 
Plateau / 
Mountain 
  100 
Khhan Chor
1
 Kratie Dry season rice and substantial forest 
dependence. Improved road access since 
2002. 
50 
Dang Kdar Kampong 
Thom 
Low yield wet season rice and substantial 
forest dependence. 20 km from National 
Road 6. 
50 
Coastal   100 
Kompong 
Thnaot
1
 
Kampot Low yield wet season rice, coastal fishing 
and salt panning. On National Road 
between Kep and Kampot 
100 
Source: Adapted from I Fitzgerald and So Sovannarith et al (2007) Moving out of poverty: Trends in 
community well-being and household mobility in nine Cambodian villages, CDRI, Phnom Penh.  
Notes:  
1 -  Locations of FGDs. 
2 -  The total sample size was 600 households with 200 households each in Tonle Sap and Mekong 
Plains Regions and 100 each in Plateau / Mountain and Coastal Regions broadly reflecting the 
relative population sizes in the four Regions. The samples in the villages in each Region add up to 
the total sample size for the Region.  
 
Before undertaking the survey, four focus group discussions (FGDs), one in each region, were 
conducted to obtain qualitative information which was used to finalise the survey questionnaire 
and has contributed important insights to complement the findings of the survey. Table 3.2 
summarises information on the study locations, including where the FGDs were conducted, and 
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sample sizes for the CARD / ILO household survey. The FGDs were conducted in the middle of 
October and the surveys during the first half of November.  
 
The main focus of the survey was on the economic activities and availability for employment of 
household members fifteen years or older. Therefore, the questionnaire included a set of 
questions typical in labour force surveys (see Annex I for the questionnaire in English) on types 
of economic activities and the main place of work, wage rates and earnings which could be 
compared with economic activity and labour force data from other sources. Based on standard 
ILO definitions, the labour force is defined as the economically active population between 15 to 
64 years. Since persons aged below 15 years will not be offered public works employment in 
compliance with Cambodian Labour Code under which children under 15 years are not 
permitted to undertake wage employment, the survey did not collect information about the 
economic activities of children. However, all “adults”18 including persons older than 64 years 
were asked about their economic activities and availability for employment because many 
persons beyond the age of 64 continue to be economically active and may wish to take 
advantage of the public works component of the proposed SSN. 
 
Economically active persons are either currently employed or unemployed. The former include 
those who worked in the last week for at least one hour as well as those who did not work in the 
last week but have a job19 but could not work during the reference period because of illness, 
circumstances such as bad weather or non-work commitments. The unemployed are defined as 
those who did not work in the last seven days, did not have a job and were looking for work or 
were waiting for the busy agricultural season. The population out of the labour force comprises 
those who were neither employed nor unemployed during the last week. They represent those 
who were not economically active for a variety of reasons including attendance at an educational 
institution, engagement in household duties, retirement, old age or disability. They also include 
“discouraged” workers who are unemployed and available for work but not actively seeking 
employment. 
 
The questionnaire also included general questions about the characteristics of households and 
their members to relate participation in economic activities and willingness to participate in public 
works to household and personal characteristics. Questions on income and expenditure would 
have provided important information especially to make an assessment of the targeting 
effectiveness of the SSN. However, they were excluded because the survey had to be 
conducted over a short period of time and obtaining reliable income and expenditure data is 
generally more difficult and requires more interview time with households and repeat visits. 
Further, income and expenditure data were available for the sample households from the MOPS 
database. Data from the last round of the survey in late 2008 on income and expenditure were 
matched with the data from the CARD / ILO survey for the analysis. In addition, data from the 
MOPS database on availability of land for cultivation, as an indirect indicator of the living 
standards of households, were used to describe household characteristics and assess targeting 
effectiveness. 
 
There were also specific questions on availability for public works and acceptable wage rates for 
such work. More details on these questions and responses to them are set out in section 4. The 
geographical spread of the sample locations makes it possible to arrive at reasonably robust 
conclusions at the national level. In the following analysis, some observations on samples from 
                                                 
18
 The term “adult” has been used in connection with the analysis of economic activity in this report to represent all 
persons 15 years old or older. 
19
 The term “job” here includes self employment.  
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different locations representing geographical regions have been made. However, these should 
be treated with caution since samples in each region are small and from clusters of households 
in a small number of villages. Therefore, any differences between samples may not necessarily 
represent differences between regions but the specific features of sample localities.  
3.2 Evidence from FGDs: Economic activities and household 
characteristics 
 
As noted earlier, the purposes of the FGDs were to: (a) assist in finalising the household survey 
questionnaire, and (b) provide a qualitative context and insights for interpreting the results of the 
household survey. Since the aim of the study is to make an assessment of the appropriate wage 
rate and labour availability for public works employment, the FGDs sought broad understanding 
of the importance of unskilled waged employment and other sources of cash income for 
households in the village, including differences between poor, average and better off households 
on sources of cash income and how it is used. This also required some discussion of the 
characteristics which distinguish between poor, average and better off households. 
 
Other aspects discussed were: 
 types and location of unskilled wage employment available and taken up by people from 
the village and any exchange of labour arrangements between households; 
 wage rates and payment arrangements; 
 seasonality of labour requirement in farming and availability for off-farm work; 
 local experience of public works employment and views of participants on public works; 
 acceptable wage rates and employment conditions for public works; 
 how households accommodate some members taking up waged employment and the 
pros and cons of employment locally and further away, and 
 female participation and participation by the young in wage employment and public 
works.  
 
The rest of this sub-section and Table 3.3 summarise findings from the FGDs which were 
undertaken in four villages, one in each region (see Table 3.2) in October 2009. Further details 
of FGD topics are set out in Annex II and the detailed reports of FGDs are in CDRI (2009b).  
 
The FGDs support the earlier conclusion in Section 2 that members of most households engage 
in a range of economic activities and have multiple livelihood sources. Those with land are 
typically busy in ploughing and rice planting and transplanting between June and August and 
harvesting during December to February. Even for households without land there is work in rice 
fields during these times in their own villages or in nearby villages. Generally people are 
available for off-farm work between October and April though there are some variations between 
villages as Table 3.3 indicates. Notably, in Babaong village in the Mekong region, dry season 
rice is cultivated between October and April which makes this the busiest time of the year. 
 
Economic activities and cash earning opportunities other than in farming vary between the 
villages reflecting the features of their regions. In Andong Trach, the alternatives are fishing, 
work in vegetable plantations along the border with Thailand and urban jobs. In Babaong, they 
are local jobs in rice cultivation, carrying rocks and as security guards, small businesses (e.g. 
shops and battery charging) and urban jobs (housemaids and garment factory workers in 
Phnom Penh). In Khhan Chor, the alternatives are work in rubber plantations, forestry, carpentry 
and construction as well as urban jobs further afield. In Kampong Thnaot, they are sea fishing 
and work in salt pans.   
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Table 3.3: Summary of selected findings from FGDs 
 
Region Tonle Sap Mekong Plain Plateau / Mountain Coastal 
Village Andong Trach Babaong Khhan Chor Kompong Thnaot 
Economic 
activities 
(sources of cash 
income) 
Wage employment:  
 Migrant workers in farms and  
market gardens along Thai 
border (about 30% of 
households). 
 Rice field workers (rice 
transplanting and harvesting) in 
the village and nearby villages 
(within 4-5km) 
 Young women working as 
housemaids in Battambang and 
Phnom Penh – mostly young 
women (15-25 year-old).  
 
Other income sources: 
Farming including livestock, fishing 
and small businesses.  
 
Wage employment: 
 Rice field workers. 
 Maize harvesting in Thailand. 
 Portering. 
 Rock transporting. 
 Urban jobs (in garment factories, 
restaurants, security). 
 
Other income sources: 
Small businesses (battery 
recharging, tire fixing, coffee shops, 
trading), fishing, farming including 
rearing and selling livestock.    
 
Wage employment: 
Rubber plantations. 
Rice field workers. 
Wood processing and carpentry. 
Domestic service. 
 
Other income sources: 
Farming including livestock, fishing 
and small businesses.      
 
Wage employment 
 Rice field workers (rice 
transplanting and harvesting) – 
10 to 20% of households rely on 
this heavily.  
 Salt field worker (about 5% of 
households) 
 Migrant workers (fishing, very 
few) 
 Young women working as 
housemaids in Phnom Penh 
(very few).  
 
Other income sources: 
Farming (staple crops, livestock and 
a few growing peanuts, corn and 
watermelon), seafood fishing (80% 
of total households but mostly men) 
and small businesses (mainly 
women, very few). 
Unskilled wage 
employment and 
wage rates 
Migrant workers along the 
Cambodian – Thai border and rice 
field workers within and nearby 
villages are paid 10,000 riel per day.    
 
In the village and other villages 
nearby, people can earn between 
10,000 and 15000 riel per day as 
rice field workers depending on the 
season. 
  
Wages in other employment: maize 
harvesting in Thailand - 15,000 to 
20,000 riel per day; construction - 
15000 riel a day; garment factories - 
minimum wage $50 a month, 
average earnings $70 per month; 
rock transporting - 15,000 to 30,000 
riel per day; rice portering - between 
20,000 and 40,000 riel per day; 
security guards – $50 to 60 per 
month; restaurant waiters – $50 a 
month plus food. 
 
Unskilled workers earn between 
10,000 and 12,000 riel plus food. 
Workers on rubber plantations earn 
150,000 riel per month plus 10kg of 
rice. 
 
Unskilled workers can earn up to 
$1000 per month in Korea and 
household workers can earn $160 in 
Malaysia while in Cambodian 
villages, household workers can 
only make 150,000 riel per month.  
 
Men’s earnings are higher than 
women’s because of higher 
productivity, for example, in land 
clearing for rubber plantations, men 
can earn 15,000 riel while women 
typically earn 12,000 riel per day.  
 
The payment arrangements for salt 
field workers are based on the 
amount of work done. On average, 
each worker can earn 10,000 riel per 
day (work from 3 – 7 am).  
 
Rice field workers are paid 10,000 
riel per day. However, if workers 
ask for advance payment from rice 
farmers (about 3 – 6 months in 
advance), they could earn only 
5,000 – 7,000 riel per day.  Both 
women and men work and are paid 
equally. 
 
Migrants go to Kampong Soam and 
Koh Kong to work as fishermen and 
usually return home once a month 
(15 – 28 days) with 3,000 to 5,000 
Thai Baht. 
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Table 3.3: Summary of selected findings from FGDs (continued) 
Region Tonle Sap Mekong Plain Plateau / Mountain Coastal 
Village Andong Trach Babaong Khhan Chor Kompong Thnaot 
Seasonality in 
labour 
requirements in 
farming 
Labour requirements for rice 
cultivation are heavy for:  
 Ploughing: June – July 
 Transplanting: July – October 
 Harvesting: December – 
February 
 
Fishing is during September to 
December and workers are required 
on farms along the border with 
Thailand during August to 
September and November to 
December.      
 
Labour requirement in farming is 
heavy during the dry season 
(October to April) for dry season 
rice.  
 
 
People in the village are very busy 
during the rainy season in preparing 
for rice planting (June – July). 
October to November in 
transplanting rice seedlings and 
transporting wood and harvesting 
rice in January. 
 
Available for more wage 
employment to supplement 
household livelihoods at other times. 
Labour requirements for rice 
cultivation are heavy for  
 Ploughing: June – July 
 Transplanting: Mid July – Mid 
August 
 Harvesting: Mid December – 
Mid January  
 
Other requirements are whole year 
round for seafood fishing and work 
in salt fields during October to 
April.       
Acceptable wage 
rates in public 
works 
If public works employment is 
available in or near the village, 
especially during the dry season 
(May – June), villagers would be 
willing to participate at a wage rate 
slightly lower than in farming (i.e. 
below 10,000 riel per day).  
 
Payment in cash is preferable to 
payment in kind.   
  
 
 
The acceptable wage rate for public 
works indicated by participants was 
higher than the agricultural wage 
rate - between 15000 and 20000 riel 
per day given the current high prices 
of essentials.  
 
The best time for public works is 
May to October. Preference is for 
payment in kind, mainly rice 
between October and February 
because of shortage of rice stock 
during that period but payment in 
cash at other times. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Participants made a distinction 
between wage rates for men and 
women. For men, the wage rates 
were in the 20,000 to 30,000 riel 
range. For women, the wage rates 
were 12,000 riel (with food) to 
15000 riel (without food).  
 
The participants from well-off and 
average household prefer payment 
in cash while participants from poor 
households prefer in-kind payment, 
especially rice. 
All participants in the FGD claimed 
that if public works are available in 
the village, especially after the rice 
harvesting season (April – June), 
villagers would be willing to 
participate and would prefer the 
payment in kind (information on 
acceptable wage rates was not 
obtained). 
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Table 3.3: Summary of selected findings from FGDs (continued) 
Region Tonle Sap Mekong Plain Plateau / Mountain Coastal 
Village Andong Trach Babaong Khhan Chor Kompong Thnaot 
Wage 
employment and 
implications for 
other activities 
Participants claimed that wage 
employment does not burden other 
family members since workers 
return home during the busiest 
agricultural season to help in rice 
transplanting and harvesting. They 
send money to hire labour if 
necessary if they are not able to 
return. 
 
Local employment is preferred 
because of lower travel costs and 
possibility of combining wage 
employment with other 
commitments. 
During the busy season (October – 
April) participants prefer wage 
employment within the village so 
they can participate in harvesting 
and other farming activities.  
 
However, even during the busy 
season, people would be willing to 
take on wage employment if the 
wage rate is high enough and hire 
others to help with farm work.  
 
In the agricultural slack season 
(May – October), the burden on the 
rest of the household of wage 
employment by some members is 
low.  
 
There is preference for working near 
the village but there is willingness to 
go further afield for higher wages. 
There are also concerns about safety 
and vulnerability when household 
members, especially women, have to 
work away from home. 
 
The participants preferred 
employment in the village to work 
away from it because they can stay 
close to the family and save money 
required to travel and rent 
accommodation if jobs are further 
away. 
 
All participants said that villagers 
had a need for wage employment to 
supplement their livelihoods. 
 
 
Waged employment undertaken by 
most villagers is in the village. 
Working in the village saves the cost 
of transport and leaves time for 
household activities.  
 
Participants stressed that earnings 
from working in the village were 
similar to earnings from work 
further away. There is also fear of 
being cheated, getting sick away 
from home and the cost of travelling 
and living away from home. 
 
Participation by 
women and 
young 
Women are willing to participate in 
wage employment and public works 
in or near the village. Young women 
thought that there were no barriers 
against their participation in public 
works and other employment 
opportunities. 
 
Young people of both sexes 
expressed their desire to stay in their 
own village, rather than leave. 
Women participants felt that they 
have the same opportunities in 
obtaining jobs and self-employment 
as men. Women are willing to join 
any project to earn money. 
However, they feel that some jobs 
such as excavation are too heavy for 
them. 
 
With regard to youth employment, 
the deputy chief of the village said 
that around 70 per cent of the young 
are unemployed. Some have to go to 
urban areas for jobs. 
All female participants revealed that 
all women in the village want to and 
are able to work for waged public 
works or other employment.  
Also, all young men and women just 
need to work to survive because 
there are very few jobs in the village 
outside the harvesting season.     
 
Women participants in the FGD 
claimed that they are willing to 
participate in wage employment and 
public works in or near the village. 
They do not have enough job 
opportunities and do not go fishing. 
Married women can combine 
housework with other employment.  
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There has been a tradition of labour exchange between households in rural areas but 
recently there has been preference for working for payment in cash or kind. In Andong Trach 
and Kompong Thnaot, the wage rate for agricultural labour was riel 10,000 per day. In Khhan 
Chor, it appears to be in the riel 10,000 to 12,000 range while in Prey Veng, it appeared to be 
in the riel 10,000 to 15,000 range. Other local work opportunities and proximity to Phnom 
Penh are possible explanations for the somewhat higher wage rates in Babaong (Mekong 
region). In Khhan Chor (Platea / Mountain region), there are opportunities in commercial 
farms (rubber plantations), timber haulage processing and other forestry related activities. 
 
For members of poor and average households, employment outside farming is essential for 
supplementing their livelihoods. For average and better-off households, it provides cash to 
improve their livelihoods by acquiring livestock and productive assets (e.g. for the farm or 
fishing) and buying stock for trading. Unemployed youth and lack of opportunities for women 
were also identified as problems. Three out of the four villages (the exception being Khhan 
Chor in Kratie Province, Plateau / Mountain region) had experience of public works under the 
World Food Programme (WFP) in the 1990s. In all four villages, there appeared to be 
willingness to participate in a public works programme offering employment near the village 
during the slack agricultural season.  
 
In Andong Trach and Kompong Thnaot, wage rates for public works similar to agricultural 
wage rates were thought to be acceptable by FGD participants. In the other two villages, 
acceptable wage rates were thought to be somewhat higher partly reflecting labour market 
conditions and partly the cost of living. In Khhan Chor, the participants thought that public 
works wage rates for men would have to be significantly higher than for women, possibly 
reflecting higher earnings of men in alternative activities. On public works projects, whether 
they perform a safety net function or not, there should be no discrimination in access to 
projects and pay between men and women. Administrative and practical obstacles against 
women’s participation should be avoided and the principle of “equal pay for work of equal 
value” should be applied20.  
 
In all four villages, the main features distinguishing poor, average and well-off households 
were ownership and amount of land owned, ownership and quality of productive assets (e.g. 
fishing boats) and operation of businesses. Members of poorer and landless households rely 
on wages from unskilled labour near their homes and further away while better off 
households rely more on farming and businesses.      
 
There is preference for local jobs because such jobs can be combined with other chores in 
the home and on the farm. However, there is also migration, especially by the young to seek 
jobs away from home. Younger people migrating to Phnom Penh to work in the garment 
sector was commonly cited, though its importance varied between villages. Other urban jobs 
were security guards and working as waiters and waitresses. Unemployed youth and lack of 
opportunities for women were identified as problems. Local employment opportunities during 
the slack agricultural season were considered to be important for women and the young but 
were in short supply.  
  
                                                 
20
 Tajgman and de Veen (1998) provide further details on policies and practices for ensuring equal opportunities 
and pay. 
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3.3 Characteristics of sample households and economic activities 
of “adult” household members 
 
3.3.1 Household size and structure 
 
This section presents evidence on some characteristics of sample households (size and 
structure of households, access to land for cultivation, income and consumption levels) 
followed by findings on economic activities of household members 15 years old and older.  
 
Table 3.4: Average household size and household size distribution by region 
 
  
Number 
of hhs 
Mean 
size 
Minimum Maximum 
Region     
Tonle sap 200 5.7 1 12 
Mekong plain 200 5.5 1 11 
Plateau 100 5.4 1 9 
Coastal 100 5.7 1 11 
Total 600 5.6 1 12 
 
 
Table 3.4 shows the average size of households by regional samples and for the whole 
sample. The average of 5.6 persons for all regions exceeds the mean rural household size in 
CSES 2007 (4.9 persons) and the mean of 4.6 persons in Population Census 2008. Apart 
from any sampling errors, the most likely explanation for this difference is the definition of the 
household in the questionnaire which is “defined as a group of persons who commonly live 
together and would take their meals from a common kitchen unless the need to be away 
from the household for work prevented any of them from doing so”. This definition probably 
led some intermittently migrant workers to be included as household members while the 
more stringent requirements for household membership of a common kitchen or food budget 
in CSES and given number of nights spent in the home during a specified period (Population 
Census 2008) led to the exclusion of intermittent migrant workers. While it would have been 
desirable to have a household definition more consistent with that in CSES 2007 and 
Population Census 2008, the differences in household size do not cause any problems for 
the analysis in this study. Arguably, the possible inclusion of household members who may 
be temporarily absent for work is preferable since some of them may prefer to work on a 
public works project near home instead of seeking employment further afield as evidence 
from the FGDs (section 3.2) indicates. 
 
Table 3.4 shows the structure of sample households, notably the relationship of members of 
households 15 years or older to the household head. This information is of relevance if 
rationing of public works employment to one member per household is an option because of 
resource limitations. Such rationing disadvantages large or communal households and rules 
to permit more than one participants from larger households may be required. Table 3.5 
shows that most households are nuclear with relatively small number of households with 
relatives other than spouse and children. Household size is in the range 1 to 12 persons 
(Table 3.4) and therefore a rule based on additional participation from a household with size 
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exceeding a certain number of persons may be appropriate to lessen the disadvantage faced 
by larger households if participation per household is going to be limited21. 
 
Table 3.5: Structure of sample households 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.6: Male and female headed households 
      
  Male headed Female headed Total 
  Number % Number %   
Tonle sap 159 79.5 41 20.5 200 
Mekong Plain 150 75.0 50 25.0 200 
Plateau/Mountain 76 76.0 24 24.0 100 
Coastal 73 73.0 27 27.0 100 
Whole sample 458 76.3 142 23.7 600 
 
 
Table 3.5 shows the percentages of male and female headed households. The whole sample 
percentage is below the national average of 25.6 per cent but of a similar order of magnitude 
and the difference between the sample and population percentages is not statistically 
significant at 95 per cent confidence level. World Bank (2006) and World Bank (2009) based 
on analysis of CSES 2003/4 and CSES 2007 respectively show that female headed 
households on the whole are not necessarily poorer households. In contrast, National 
Institute of Statistics (2007) using evidence from CSES 2003/4 found that female headed 
households had a higher incidence of food deprivation than male headed households. Some 
female headed households with remittances from migrant workers (spouses or children) and 
low dependency ratios are among the better off while those with no such income sources, 
limited land and ability to earn from hiring out labour are likely to be among the poor and 
suffering from food deprivation. 
3.3.2 Agricultural land distribution and landlessness 
 
Evidence from FGDs and other sources shows that access to land for cultivation is an 
important determinant of the living standards of rural poor households though, as noted 
earlier, it is not the sole determinant since some become landless by choice in order to 
pursue better income opportunities through migration and wage employment.  
                                                 
21
 NREGS (National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme) in India rations the employment guarantee to one 
person per household. The proposed solution to more equitable access to NREGS for larger and communal 
households is to define a household to be a nuclear household for the purpose of the programme, i.e. the 
entitlement is for each nuclear household defined as parent(s) and children who are not adults living together. 
Relationship with hh head Number Per cent 
Household head 600 25.7 
Husband / wife 462 19.8 
Sister / brother (in-law, legal, 
adopted) 
39 1.77 
Son / daughter (legal, adopted) 1,032 44.2 
Son / daughter-in-law 85 3.6 
Grandchild 25 1.1 
Parent 66 2.8 
Grandparent 2 0.1 
Niece/Nephew 8 0.3 
Others 14 0.6 
Total 2,333 100 
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The rural poor are those who have to sell all or part of their land because of debt or shocks 
and therefore have limited or no land and for whom other income earning opportunities are 
limited. However, FGDs in all four locations consistently identified households who had no 
land, especially if they had been compelled to sell land, because of hardship as being among 
the poorest. Therefore, landlessness and having access to small amount of land per 
household member have been included as criteria for examining effectiveness of the wage 
rate as a targeting device.   
 
Table 3.7: Agricultural land per person available to sample households  
 
Region 
Agricultural land per person - number of 
households   
 No land <0.5ha 0.51-1ha 1.1 - 2.5 ha >2.5ha All hhs 
Tonle sap 42 96 45 17 0 200 
Mekong 
plain 61 85 38 14 2 200 
Plateau 16 33 38 13 0 100 
Coastal 7 86 6 0 1 100 
Total 126 300 127 44 3 600 
% of total 21.0 50.0 21.2 7.3 0.5 100.0 
  Source: MOPS database. 
 
Table 3.6 shows access to agricultural land per household member for sample households. 
As noted earlier, the data on agricultural land were not collected during the CARD / ILO 
survey but during the late 2008 of the MOPS round of data collection. In order to calculate 
agricultural land per household member, the standard convention of children (persons 
younger than 15 years) as half of adults was used22. The table shows that 21 per cent of 
households have no access to land for cultivation. Access to land for cultivation for another 
50 per cent of households is 0.5 hectares or less per person. 
 
3.3.3 Household consumption expenditure 
 
As noted earlier, data on household consumption and income were not collected during the 
survey but those collected during the round of data collection in late 2008 as a part of MOPS 
have been matched with the CARD / ILO survey data. Expenditure is the generally preferred 
measure of living standard because data on expenditure tend to be more reliable than 
income and consumption expenditure is smoother than income. Data were collected using 
the recall method which raises issues of accuracy and quality. However, this method is 
compatible with the CSES approach used to date and the categories of expenditure used in 
MOPS are similar to CSES. Following convention, children 14 years old and younger are 
counted as half in calculating the per capita expenditure. Table 3.8 shows the mean per 
capita expenditure by quintile and the upper and lower limits of the quintiles.  
 
The quintiles are not all precise 20 per cent of the total partly because of adjustments at the 
margin and partly because the quintiles are at the household level while the table shows the 
number of persons 15 years and older in households by quintile. Information is required in 
this form for comparison with the headcount measures of poverty and to examine the 
targeting effectiveness of the programme at different wage rates in later sections. The 2007 
rural poverty line is 2367 riel per day (see Table 2.4). Adjusting for inflation at about 20 per 
                                                 
22
 This convention has also been used in calculating per capita income and consumption per household. 
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cent23 between the time of the CSES (during 2007) and MOPS (late 2008) surveys, the level 
in late 2008 would be 2,840 riel. This is at about the same level as the lower limit of the 
second quintile. Since the rural headcount poverty rate in 2007 was 34 per cent, the 
comparison suggests that poverty incidence is lower for the sample household than the 
national rural average though it is likely that the national headcount has fallen somewhat 
since 2007. The mean expenditure levels for the bottom and top quintiles in CSES 2007, 
adjusted for inflation, are also somewhat lower than in the CARD / ILO sample. 
 
Table 3.8: Daily household consumption expenditure per head:  
    Number of persons in households by quintile  
  
 
     Consumption 
expenditure per head 
quintiles 
Number of 
persons 
Per cent of 
persons 
Mean 
household 
expenditure 
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
Very Poor (bottom 20%) 440 18.9 2127 1141 2742 
  Poor (21 to 40%) 481 20.6 3179 2749 3659 
  Middle (41 to 60%) 478 20.5 4121 3660 4713 
  Above average (61 to 
80%) 476 20.4 5595 4738 6655 
  Top 20 per cent (81 to 
100%) 458 19.6 16432 6753 161597 
  All persons (15+ years) 2333 100.0 6268 1141 161597 
   
The issue of whether female headed households are at a disadvantage was discussed 
earlier.  Table 3.9 shows a breakdown of female headed and male headed households by 
per capita expenditure quintiles. The table shows that the proportion of female headed 
households in the bottom two quintiles is significantly higher than the average and the 
proportion of female headed households is strikingly lower than average in the top quintile. 
The evidence supports the view that proportionally more female headed households are poor 
and may have greater need for social protection. Ensuring access for women in general and 
members of female headed households will be an important consideration at the planning 
and implementation stages. 
 
Table 3.9: Male and female headed households by per capita expenditure quintiles 
         Expenditure 
quintiles 
Male headed 
households 
Female headed 
households 
All households 
    Number % Number  % Number % 
  1 86 68.3 40 31.7 126 21.1 
  2 84 71.8 33 28.2 117 19.6 
  3 92 79.3 24 20.7 116 19.4 
  4 91 77.1 27 22.9 118 19.7 
  5 103 85.1 18 14.9 121 20.2 
  Total 456 76.3 142 23.7 598 100.0 
   
  
                                                 
23
 The inflation adjustments used in Kimsun and Dorina (2009) assume inflation rates of 9.5 per cent between 
November 2006 and November 2007 and 15.7 per cent between November 2007 and November 2008. Based on 
this information, inflation from mid-2007 to end of 2008 amounts to just over 20 per cent.  
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3.3.4 Economic Activities of “adult” household members   
 
To make an assessment of the labour supply response to a rural public works based SSN, it 
is clearly necessary to have an understanding of rural economic activities. The focus is on 
the economic activities of persons 15 years and older since children are excluded from public 
works employment. Table 3.10 shows the age distribution of the 2333 persons 15 years or 
older in the 600 sample households. About 38 per cent are in the 15 to 24 year age range 
and nearly 60 per cent in the 15 to 40 years age range. This high proportion of population in 
the young adult age range forming part of the labour force is broadly consistent with the 
national demographic profile. This “youth bulge” and the corresponding rapid growth in the 
labour force in Cambodia are explained by the baby booms in the early 1980s and early 
1990s (World Bank 2009a). Normally the 65+ age group is excluded from the labour force. 
As noted earlier, they have been included here because a number of them remain 
economically active on family farms and available for off-farm employment.  
 
Table 3.10: Age distribution of persons 15 years and older in sample households 
 
Age range Number Per cent Cum. Per cent 
15-24 years 893 38.3 38.3 
25-39 years 484 20.8 59.1 
40-49 years 399 17.1 76.2 
50-59 years 276 11.8 88.0 
>60 years 281 12.0 100.0 
Total 2,333 100.0   
 
 
On current economic activities, information was sought on the main place of work of each 
“adult” member of respondent households. Table 3.11 shows that just over 72 per cent of the 
economically active consider subsistence production to be their main economic activity. This 
broadly corresponds with the national average derived from Population Census 2008 (see 
Table 2.1) though the latter includes activities of urban and rural people and the economically 
active below 15 years old. The proportions of those engaged in employment and self-
employment are somewhat higher in Mekong and Coastal regions and therefore the 
proportions engaged in subsistence are somewhat lower, indicating availability of more off-
farm economic activities either near the village or further away in these two regions. Based 
on the response to this question, 1875 persons (or 80 per cent) in the 15+ age group are 
economically active though an alternative more inclusive estimate of the numbers 
economically active has been preferred and used in the rest of this report (see below). 
 
The survey also included a more precise question on economic activities undertaken during 
the seven days prior to the interview and follow up questions on the number of hours of work 
during the past seven days and reasons for economic inactivity during the reference period. 
Of the total of 2333 “adult” persons, 1954 had been economically active in the seven day 
reference period (i.e. having engaged in an economic activity for at least one hour during that 
period). Possible explanations of the number of “economically active” in the previous seven 
days exceeding the persons who indicated their main place of work (Table 3.11) are that the 
response to the question on the main place of work probably excluded some of those who 
had engaged in unpaid work for household enterprises and very short periods of work (as 
little as 1 hour). The proportion of men and women among the economically active defined 
as those engaged in an economic activity for at least one hour during the seven day 
reference period was reasonably well balanced with just under 51 per cent men and just over 
49 per cent women.  
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Table 3.11: Main place of work of the economically active in the sample 
 
  Tonle Sap Mekong Plain Plateau / 
Mountain 
Coastal Whole sample 
  No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Government / UN / 
NGO employment 
5 0.8 11 1.9 4 1.3 14 4.0 34 1.8 
Other employment 103 16.3 103 17.5 36 11.8 71 20.1 313 16.7 
Self-employment 30 4.8 75 12.8 37 12.2 27 7.6 169 9.0 
Subsistence 
(farming, fishing, 
hunting, 
gathering) 
489 77.5 397 67.6 227 74.7 240 68.0 1353 72.2 
Looking for work 4 0.6 1 0.2 0 0.0 1 0.3 6 0.3 
Total 631 100.0 587 100.0 304 100.0 353 100.0 1875 100.0 
  
Of the 379 persons not economically active during the seven day reference period, 142 were 
normally economically active but had not worked in the reference period because of a variety 
of reasons, the most important being own illness, caring for others and bad weather (the 
three explanations accounting for 80 per cent of all the reasons given). If the persons who 
were in work but had not worked during the reference period are included in the labour force, 
2096 persons (see last row in Table 3.12) are economically active in the sample household.  
 
The definition of economically active which includes those who engaged in an economic 
activity for at least one hour during the reference period of seven days or were normally in 
work but had not been able to work for legitimate reasons or were actively looking for work 
has been used in the rest of this report. On this basis, there are an estimated 2096 
economically active persons in the CARD / ILO sample households out of a total of 2333 
persons in the 15+ years age range. Therefore, just under 90 per cent of the population in 
the 15+ years age range is economically active. This is broadly consistent with the labour 
force participation rate of 87 per cent estimated from CSES 2007 (World Bank, 2009a).  
 
The remaining 237 persons (10.2 per cent) were economically inactive and not normally part 
of the labour force for a variety of reasons. About 37 per cent were scholars and preferred 
not to work, about 33 per cent were “too young or to old to work”, about 18 per cent were ill, 
invalid or disabled and just over 6 per cent were homemakers. The discrepancy between the 
number of persons who indicated their main place of work in Tables 3.11 and the numbers 
economically active for at least one hour during the reference period of seven days (Table 
3.12) may include some persons marginally economically active. For example, young people 
at school, home workers and older persons help out occasionally in household economic 
activities and take up casual work if opportunities arise but are not considered to be 
economically active in the sense of having a “main place of work” (Table 3.11).  
 
Table 3.12 shows the main economic activities in the last seven days which broadly reflect 
Table 3.11. The percentages in Table 3.12 represent the number of persons engaged in a 
given activity as a proportion of the economically active. The percentages for each region 
and the whole sample add up to more than 100 per cent because a significant proportion of 
the economically active are engaged in more than one activities. It should also be noted that 
some of the activities may be for very limited number of hours. As would be expected, 
farming and harvesting common resources (fishing, hunting and gathering) are the dominant 
economic activities. Notable differences are the much lower paid employment in the Tonle 
Sap region and the much higher paid employment in the Plateau / Mountain and Coastal 
regions than indicated by Table 3.11. The most probable explanations are specific seasonal 
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labour requirements and local characteristics. The smaller percentage of persons in paid 
employment in Tonle Sap region is probably partly because the FGDs were conducted in the 
second half of October while labour requirement in farms along the Cambodia – Thailand 
border is heaviest in August, September, November and December. The poor relations 
between Cambodia and Thailand and the impact of the financial crisis may also have 
affected this part of Cambodia more severely. In the Plateau / Mountain and Coastal regions, 
Table 3.3 shows evidence of a range of off-farm activities in October though October is also 
a busy period in farming in the Plateau / Mountain region.  
 
Table 3.12: Economic activities of persons 15 years old or older 
(Persons engaged in one or more activities for at least one hour during the reference week.) 
 
  Tonle Sap Mekong Plain Plateau / 
Mountain 
Coastal Whole sample 
  Number % Number % Number % Number % Number % 
Own or family 
business 
107 15.9 109 15.6 47 14.1 47 12.0 303 14.5 
Paid 
employment 
84 12.5 140 20.1 101 30.4 125 31.7 443 21.1 
Unpaid help in 
household 
business 
23 3.4 86 12.3 18 5.4 30 7.7 163 7.8 
Farm work 
including 
tending 
livestock 
358 53.4 303 43.5 239 71.7 216 54.7 1120 53.4 
Construction / 
repair work - 
house, 
business, farm 
15 2.3 16 2.2 0 0.0 9 2.2 47 2.2 
Fishing, hunting 
or gathering 
(household use 
or sale) 
251 37.5 249 35.7 69 20.7 129 32.8 700 33.4 
Sum 838 124.9 902 129.3 474 142.4 556 141.1 2776 132.5 
Economically 
active  
671   698   333   394   2096   
 
 
The open unemployment rate is small. Only 14 persons indicated that they were looking for 
work (6) or were not looking but available for work (8)24. However, there is some evidence 
that the economically inactive include some persons who are available for work but had 
withdrawn from employment seeking. The level of unemployment does not adequately reflect 
the level of underemployment and associated low earnings. Workers who usually do not earn 
much from one job desire to have additional jobs. Typically, the rural economically active 
engage in farming and one or more additional activities – harvesting common forest and fish 
resources, working as wage labourers or running small businesses. The additional activities 
are more prominent in the less busy part of the farming year.   
 
There is however substantial underemployment which can be defined on the basis of 
employed persons wishing to work for longer hours in their present job or in another job or 
low number of hours worked by the employed at present. The latest available figure for 
underemployment based on the economically active wishing to work longer hours is from a 
labour force survey in 2001 when the rate was estimated at 38 per cent. Another dimension 
of underemployment is the very low returns from current economic activities and therefore 
                                                 
24
 This is about 0.7 per cent of the labour force. 
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the need to supplement or displace current activities even by those who are working long 
hours but for low rewards. The question on whether economically active persons would be 
willing to take on another job was included in the questionnaire and the responses are 
discussed below.  
 
Table 3.13 shows the distribution of the number of hours of work of the economically active 
in the reference period and provides evidence on the number of hours worked as a basis of 
defining underemployment. The table shows that for quite a large number of the 
economically active, the stated number of hours of work is low. Just under 18 per cent 
claimed to work for less than 10 hours and more than a third work for less than 20 hours. At 
the other end, almost 38 per cent claimed to be working more than 40 hours with the average 
number of hours worked by the economically active being 34 hours implying very long hours 
worked by many of the economically active. This result is consistent with the conclusions 
drawn by Morris (2007).    
 
Table 3.13: Distribution of work hours (7 day reference period) 
  
  No. Per 
cent 
Cum. 
No. 
Cum. per 
cent 
1-5 hours 158 8.1 158 8.1 
6-10 hours 192 9.8 350 17.9 
11-15 hours 211 10.8 561 28.7 
16-20 hours 100 5.1 661 33.8 
21-30 hours 358 18.3 1019 52.1 
31-40 hours 199 10.2 1218 62.3 
41+ hours 736 37.7 1954 100.0 
Total 1954 100.0     
 
The apparent slack depicted by the low number of hours worked by a substantial proportion 
of economically active is partly because the survey was undertaken in the second half of 
October which agriculturally is a less busy season in most localities25 and partly possibly 
because of the impact of the financial crisis on off-farm employment opportunities (Kimsun, 
Chan Hang and Socheth, 2009). Table 3.14 shows the distribution of hours of work by type 
of activity. As would be expected, the distribution is dominated by subsistence production 
since for 72 per cent of the economically active, subsistence is the main activity. 
                                                 
25
 FGD findings (Table 3.3) show that in the villages in Tonle Sap and Coastal regions, October is the slack period 
though in the village in the Mekong region with dry season rice and the Plateau / Mountain region it is not.    
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The CARD / ILO survey also included a question on the response of the economically active 
to take on “a suitable job at acceptable pay” if such a job became available. The two reasons 
for including this question were to: (a) obtain indications of underemployment and level of 
satisfaction with current economic activities, and (b) provide a cross-check for the later more 
precise questions on availability for public works employment. In all 1544 persons, 66 per 
cent of all persons in the 15 years plus age range, indicated availability for a new “suitable 
job” (see last two rows in Table 3.15). Availability for a new job is shown as a proportion of all 
persons 15 years and above and not as a proportion of the economically active because a 
significant number, about 40, of the economically inactive were available for a new job. Of 
these, about 60 per cent were students with homemakers being the next largest category.  
 
Table 3.15 presents evidence to compare the willingness to accept a new job to the number 
of hours worked during the reference week. The table does not produce a very clear picture 
on the relationship between underemployment as indicated by the number of hours of work 
and availability for other work. High proportions of those working very few hours would be 
expected to be available for additional work. Table 3.15 shows that about 58 to 59 per cent of 
those working 1 to 10 hours are available for other work. However, the proportions available 
for work are even higher for those working more than 11 hours reaching the highest 
percentage for those working between 31 and 40 hours. The per cent of those working 41 or 
more hours willing to take on additional work is 66 per cent, i.e. higher than that for those 
working less than 10 hours. Two inferences can be drawn from this evidence. The first is that 
a large proportion of those working long hours are engaged in work offering poor reward. 
Therefore, they are either looking for other work to supplement their incomes or to displace 
their current work. The second is that many of those who are working for small number of 
hours are content with their level of activity or unable to increases it because of other 
commitments. 
 
Table 3.14: Number of hours of work by main place of work 
 
Main place of 
work 
1 - 5 
hours 
6 - 10 
hours 
11 - 15 
hours 
16 - 20 
hours 
21 - 30 
hours 
31 - 40 
hours 
41+ 
hours 
Total 
Government 
(including police, 
military, teacher) 
2 1 2 5 2 4 13 29 
UN organization 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
NGO (paid or 
voluntary) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 
Employment in 
private 
4 16 14 10 18 21 196 279 
Self-employment 6 11 8 12 26 15 75 153 
Subsistence 
(farming, fishing, 
hunting etc) 
90 126 148 57 269 149 429 1268 
Looking for work 
and available to 
start work 
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 
Other 55 38 38 15 42 9 19 216 
Total 158 192 210 100 358 198 735 1951 
Per cent 8.1 9.8 10.8 5.1 18.3 10.1 37.7 100.0 
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Table 3.15: Number of hours of work and availability for other work 
 
  Accept suitable job if offered  
  Yes No Total 
Hours worked in 
reference period         
0 hours Number 137 242 379 
  % 36.1 63.9 100.0 
1 - 5 hours Number 93 65 158 
  % 58.9 41.1 100.0 
6 - 10 hours Number 111 81 192 
  % 57.8 42.2 100.0 
11 - 15 hours Number 145 66 211 
  % 68.7 31.3 100.0 
16 - 20 hours Number 71 29 100 
  % 71 29 100.0 
21 - 30 hours Number 258 100 358 
  % 72.1 27.9 100.0 
31 - 40 hours Number 156 43 199 
  % 78.4 21.6 100.0 
41+ hours Number 573 163 736 
  % 77.9 22.1 100.0 
Total Number 1544 789 2333 
  % 66.2 33.8 100.0 
 
 
Table 3.16: Current activities of those available for additional work 
 
A follow-up to the question on availability for a new job was what would happen to work and 
other activities respondent were currently doing if they take up the new job. Table 3.16 
summarises the responses. Less than 5 per cent of those who would take up other work 
were not engaged in paid work. Nearly 46 per cent of those who would take up other work 
would combine it with their current activities. This is consistent with the general 
characteristics of the rural labour market in which the economically active combine a number 
of activities, typically farming with off-farm employment, to supplement their livelihoods. A 
substantial proportion (over one-third) would give up their current activity to take up paid 
employment, indicating that their current activity is not sufficiently attractive in length of time 
and / or reward.  
 
 Region   
 Current activities Tonle 
Sap 
Mekong 
Plain 
Plateau / 
Mountain 
Coastal Whole 
sample 
Per 
cent 
No activities or paid work at 
present 
11 27 10 26 74 4.8 
Combine new employment with 
current activities 
274 203 168 63 708 45.9 
Give up current paid employment 183 161 32 143 519 33.6 
Other family members to do more 
household chores and work on 
farm 
59 75 50 33 217 14.1 
Another family member to take 
up current paid employment 
6 7 5 8 26 1.7 
Total 533 473 265 273 1544 100.0 
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The survey included questions on wage rates and earnings for the economically active since 
the range of earnings provides a useful comparator for public works wage rates. Table 3.17 
shows that 693 of the economically active (33 per cent) had some cash earnings during the 
seven day reference period. The distribution of daily pay rates shown in the table is derived 
from the actual pay received for those in employment and the revenue net of direct costs for 
those in self-employment.26 The table shows that 25 per cent of earnings being in the 9,000 
to 12,000 riel range, though for 30 per cent in the sample, earnings were below riel 6,000 
and for 48 per cent they were 9,000 riel or below.  
 
Table 3.18 shows that mean daily earnings for the whole sample are 11,230 riel with 
substantial variations between regions. The mean daily earnings rates are the highest in 
Plateau / Mountain region which is consistent with evidence from FGDs but somewhat 
unexpected since Plateau / Mountain and Tonle Sap (which has the second highest mean 
earnings rates) were the regions with very high poverty incidence according to the last region 
level poverty assessment based on CSES 2003/4 (World Bank, 2006). Possible explanations 
and implications are considered in section 4.3 where the regional distribution of acceptable 
wage rates for public works and earnings rates considered.    
 
Table 3.17: Daily earnings range for those in paid employment in the past seven days 
 
Riel per day Number Per cent 
of total 
with 
earnings 
Cum per 
cent of 
total with 
earnings 
Per cent of 
economically 
active 
Cum per 
cent of 
economically 
active 
1-3000 58 8.4 8.4 2.8 2.8 
3001-5000 116 16.7 25.1 5.5 8.3 
5001-9000 159 22.9 48.1 7.6 15.9 
9001-10000 131 18.9 67.0 6.3 22.1 
10001-12000 43 6.2 73.2 2.1 24.2 
12001-15000 58 8.4 81.5 2.8 27.0 
15001-20000 70 10.1 91.6 3.3 30.3 
20001 – 25000 19 2.7 94.4 0.9 31.2 
25001-30000 17 2.5 96.8 0.8 32.0 
More than 30000 22 3.2 100.0 1.0 33.1 
Total 693 100.0     
Economically 
active 
2096 
  
  
  
 
Table 3.18: Current earnings of those in paid economic activities 
 
Region Mean daily wage 
rate (Riel) 
Minimum Maximum Standard 
deviation 
Tonle Sap 11529 1333 70000 7688 
Mekong Plain 9441 833 100000 7956 
Plateau / Mountain 16719 1000 100000 21403 
Coastal 9990 833 50000 7255 
Whole sample 11231 833 100000 10348.04 
 
 
                                                 
26
 Figures quoted for periods other than per day were converted to the daily rate. Daily earnings from self-
employment are gross earnings less direct inputs such as cost of stock for shops and energy and other materials 
for services. Investment costs are not deducted.   
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Economic activities of “adult” members of sample households portray a broad picture 
representative of the situation in rural Cambodia. Subsistence production is the most 
important economic activity but employment and self-employment make increasingly 
important contributions, especially because of increasing land pressures with one-third of the 
economically active engaged in cash earning employment of some form. There is very little 
open unemployment but substantial underemployment, though many working short hours are 
not willing to take on additional work. This is probably explained by many people combining 
work with other commitments.  
 
A higher proportion of those working longer hours would be willing to take on other work with 
some displacement of current work. Over one-third of those who indicated that they would 
take up another job at acceptable pay stated that they would give up their current activity. 
These respondents may be dissatisfied with the rewards from their present work or the 
nature of work or simply demonstrating an economically rational response that they would 
take up employment with better pay and conditions if it became available. This finding is of 
some importance in setting the public works wage rate since the aim is not to disrupt other 
economic activities. If public works employment is for limited periods during the slack 
agricultural season, the risk of disrupting other economic activities will be limited. 
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4 Wage rates and labour supply: Evidence and analysis 
4.1 Stated acceptable wage rates for public works and some 
characteristics of respondents 
 
The previous section outlines evidence from the CARD / ILO survey on household 
characteristics and economic activities. This section sets out evidence on the more specific 
questions on the willingness to undertake public works employment. The first of these 
questions asked, for each person in the 15+ age range in the household, whether he/she 
was available for “manual work in road improvement, such as digging earth or hauling” if 
such work is offered at a wage rate of 5,000 riel per day. If the person stated unwillingness to 
work for 5,000 riel per day, a further question was asked to inquire whether the person would 
be available at 9,000 riel per day27.  
 
While a reasonable response may be expected if the question is repeated once with a higher 
wage rate, i.e. 5,000 riel followed by 9,000 riel, it was thought that repeating the same 
question with higher wage rates would introduce an element of bargaining with the 
respondent speculating how far the enumerator was willing to go. Therefore if the response 
to the question on willingness to work for 9,000 riel was negative, the follow-up inquiry was 
the minimum acceptable pay for manual work. The choice of 5,000 riel and 9,000 riel per day 
was partly based on evidence on distribution of rural wage rates and earnings from other 
sources (Kimsun and Dorina, 2009, evidence on distribution of rural wage rates from CSES 
2007) and partly on evidence from pilot testing of the questionnaire.  
 
A stated willingness to work at 5,000 riel by a member of a respondent household would 
indicate that the stated reservation wage rate28 (RWR) of the person is 5,000 riel or lower 
and if the answer is positive for 9,000 riel, the stated RWR is between 5,000 and 9,000 riel. 
The open question on the wage rate at which the person would be willing to work if 9,000 riel 
was too low was intended to provide data on a subjectively stated RWR above 9,000 riel. 
There are clearly problems associated with a subjective statement of the willingness to work 
for a given wage rate since there may be discrepancies between a stated intention and 
actual conduct. Therefore the evidence on stated acceptable wage rates has been compared 
with evidence on actual wage rates and earnings of respondents and evidence from other 
sources in arriving at recommendations on SSN wage rates and estimating the labour supply 
response. Account has also been taken of the impact of the financial crisis on wage rates 
and earnings of “adult” members of households and living standards of households in making 
recommendations. 
 
Since limiting access to the public works SSN to one person per household is an option 
where rationing of access to the public works programme is necessary, the evidence has 
been presented on the response of all persons in the 15+ age range in the sample (Table 
4.1) and on at least one person per household responding (Table 4.2). For the latter, if more 
than one person declares availability for public works employment, the person indicating the 
lowest acceptable wage rate is included. If more than one person per household indicates 
the same wage rate which is the lowest for the household, the person with the lowest number 
of hours of economic activity has been included and where there are more than one persons 
with the lowest wage rate and same number of working hours, the person with the lowest 
earnings per day was chosen. If these criteria applied in that order did not identify a single for 
a household, the youngest person fulfilling the above criteria was chosen. 
                                                 
27
 This is very similar to the approach applied in a recent study for determining wage rates for the EGPWs in 
Timor Leste (see Vaidya, 2008).   
28
 Defined as the lowest wage rate at which a person is willing to take up a given type of employment. 
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According to Table 4.1, in total 1074 persons (i.e. 51 per cent of the labour force and 46 per 
cent of those 15 years or older) stated that they would be available for public works 
employment at some wage rate. Since at least one person from 437 out of 600 households 
indicated availability for public works employment (see Table 4.2 and related discussion 
below), on average 2.3 persons per household from the 437 participating households are 
available for public works. The evidence in Table 4.1 indicates that if there is no limit on the 
number for participants from a household, for 11.5 per cent of those indicating availability for 
public works at some wage rate, riel 5,000 would be acceptable while for a further 12.9 per 
cent, riel 9,000 would be acceptable and so on. It is reasonable to interpret the wage rate at 
which a person states that he/she is willing to take up employment as the stated reservation 
wage (RW). Column 6, which shows availability for public works as per cent of persons in the 
15+ age range, is the labour supply response at a given wage rate as per cent of the 15+ 
population29. 
 
Table 4.1: Acceptable wage rates for public works, all respondents 
 
(1) 
Minimum 
acceptable 
pay for public 
works (riel 
per day) 
(2) 
Number of 
respondents 
(3) 
% of 
respondents 
"available" 
for public 
works 
(4) 
Cum 
numbers 
"available" 
for public 
works 
(5) 
Cum % 
"available
" for 
public 
works 
(6) 
Cum % of 
economically 
active  
available for 
public works 
(7) 
Cum % of 
all in 15+ 
age range 
in sample 
households 
(8) 
Average 
supply 
elasticity 
5000 124 11.5 124 11.5 5.9 5.3   
9000 139 12.9 263 24.5 12.5 11.3 1.26 
10000 202 18.8 465 43.3 22.2 19.9 5.27 
12000 258 24.0 723 67.3 34.5 31.0 2.39 
15000 259 24.1 982 91.4 46.9 42.1 1.37 
20000 85 7.9 1067 99.3 50.9 45.7 0.29 
25000 5 0.5 1072 99.8 51.1 45.9 0.02 
30000 2 0.2 1074 100.0 51.2 46.0 0.01 
Total 1074            
Total labour 
force in 
sample 
2096 
      
 
    
Total 
population 
15+ years in 
sample 
2333 
      
 
    
The evidence on labour supply response has also been used to estimate average labour 
supply elasticities30. The supply elasticity of nearly 5.3 for an increase in the wage rate from 
riel 9,000 to riel 10,000 indicates that a 10 per cent increase in the wage rate would lead to a 
more than 50 per cent increase in the labour supply. On the one hand, the high elasticity 
implies that at the higher wage rate the wage bill would be higher if all those available to 
work are employed. On the other, the high elasticity demonstrates a strong demand for 
employment in response to a relatively small increase in the wage rate. The supply elasticity 
is also high for an increase in the wage rate between riel 10,000 and riel 12,000. Above riel 
12,000, the labour supply response diminishes and we also have wage rates which are well 
above comparable market wage rates in most regions. There are significant regional 
variations in the stated labour supply response. These have been outlined and discussed in 
the next section.  
 
                                                 
29
 Strictly speaking, the labour supply should be represented as a proportion of the economically active. It has 
been represented here as the proportion of the total population in the 15+ age group because some persons who 
were not economically active have indicated willingness to participate in public works. 
30
 Labour supply elasticity is a measure of the response of labour supply to change in the wage rate. It is defined 
as (% change in labour supply)/(% change in the wage rate).   
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As noted earlier, labour supply response if access to public works is limited to one person 
per household has also been estimated. In practice, when such a restriction is imposed, 
access is not strictly limited to one specific person from a household. More than one person 
per household could participate as long as the total number of days of employment per 
household is limited to a given number of days. The first rule (specified above) applied in 
relating a household’s labour availability to the lowest wage rate at which a member of a 
household is willing to work is reasonable. The remaining rules if more than one person 
indicates availability at the lowest wage rate (i.e. including persons with fewer hours of 
economic activity, lower earnings and age) are somewhat arbitrary and may not represent 
the actual labour supply response. For example, a person with a low number of hours of 
economic activity may have other non-economic commitments. Therefore another person in 
the household with more hours of economic activity may be more likely to participate.  
 
Table 4.2: Acceptable wage rates for public works – one person per household 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Minimum 
acceptable 
pay for 
public 
works (riel 
per day) 
Number of 
households 
with at 
least one 
person 
available 
for public 
works 
% of 
households 
with at 
least one 
person 
available 
for public 
works 
Cum 
numbers 
"available" 
for public 
works 
Cum % 
"available" 
for public 
works 
Cum % of 
all 
households 
available 
for public 
works 
Average 
supply 
elasticity 
5,000 73 16.7 73 16.7 12.2   
9,000 64 14.6 137 31.4 22.8 1.1 
10,000 85 19.5 222 50.8 37.0 4.5 
12,000 91 20.8 313 71.6 52.2 1.9 
15,000 91 20.8 404 92.4 67.3 1.1 
20,000 30 6.9 434 99.3 72.3 0.3 
30,000 3 0.7 437 100.0 72.8 0.0 
Total 437 100.0         
 
 
Table 4.2 shows that at least one person from 437 out 600 households (73 per cent) 
indicated availability for public works at some wage rate. Column 6 shows that for at least 
one person in 12.2 per cent of all sample households, riel 5,000 would be acceptable while 
for 22.8 per cent, riel 9,000 or less would be acceptable and for 37 per cent, 10,000 riel 
would be acceptable. As for Table 4.1, it is reasonable to interpret the wage rate at which a 
person states that he/she is willing to take up employment as the stated reservation wage. 
However, the one person per household restriction limits the number of participants. Labour 
supply under this restriction as a proportion of the total population in the 15+ age range is 
clearly smaller (5.9 per cent at 9,000 riel or less and 18.7 per cent at some wage rate). The 
comparison between the two labour supply responses has been made in the next section 
prior to making recommendations on wage rates.  
 
Labour supply elasticity calculations in column 7 are broadly similar to those for labour 
supply with no restriction in Table 4.1. The supply elasticity is highest for an increase in the 
wage rate from riel 9,000 to riel 10,000. The high elasticity demonstrates a strong demand 
for employment in response to the increase in the wage rate and a much higher wage bill.  
  
In the rest of section 4.1 stated availability for public works is related to current economic 
activities and demographic characteristics for all respondents indicating availability for public 
works at some wage rate. Similar evidence was also examined for respondents where 
 54 
access was limited to one person per household. The findings under the one person per 
household restriction were broadly similar to those for all respondents. The main differences 
were that persons available for public works under the one per household restriction were 
willing to work for lower wage rates, tended to be younger or older persons and with higher 
representation of women. The lower acceptable wage rates are to be expected because of 
the selection rule applied to identify one person only from a household. The demographic 
characteristics of the available are also likely to be related to the lowest wage rate selection 
rule. To avoid repetition detailed evidence for the one per household available has not been 
presented in the report.   
 
Almost 96 per cent of those who indicated availability for public works had also indicated that 
they would be willing to take up a job if pay was acceptable. However, only two-thirds of 
those available for a new job found public works acceptable. Table 4.3 shows the current 
place of work of those who would be available for public works employment. The proportion 
of those engaged in subsistence activities is somewhat higher, nearly 76 per cent, in 
comparison with the proportion for whom subsistence is the main activity (72 per cent in 
Table 3.11). Nevertheless, less than 60 per cent of those engaged in subsistence would be 
willing to undertake public works. The remainder presumably have a balance of subsistence 
and other activities which engage them fully. They may also be unwilling to change the 
balance of activities and relationships with employers for proposed public works which may 
be seen as short-term and temporary in nature. Smaller proportions of those in other 
employment and self-employment (44 and 35 per cent respectively) would find public works 
employment acceptable at some wage rate. 
 
   Table 4.3: Current place of work and availability for public works 
 
Acceptable 
wage rate 
Government Other 
employment 
Self-
employment 
Subsistence 
(farming, 
fishing, 
hunting, 
gathering) 
Other Total 
5000 1 16 5 91 8 121 
9000 0 30 7 99 3 139 
10000 0 22 14 147 13 196 
11000 0 0 0 18 1 19 
12000 0 10 6 210 11 237 
13000 0 0 0 22 0 22 
14000 0 1 0 4 0 5 
15000 5 38 21 151 15 230 
17000 0 0 0 1 0 1 
18000 0 1 0 2 0 3 
20000 1 17 6 52 1 77 
25000 0 0 0 5 0 5 
30000 0 2 0 0 0 2 
Total 7 137 59 802 52 1,057 
  
Table 4.4 shows the relationship between daily earnings in the reference period of seven 
days for those who had activities which yielded cash earnings and acceptable pay for public 
works. Of the 1074 persons in the sample available for public works, 304 (or 28 per cent) had 
cash earnings. The expectation would be for those with low pay in current activities to be 
willing to work for lower wages and those with higher current earnings to only take on public 
works employment at higher wages. There is a positive correlation coefficient of 0.31 
between current earnings and the wage rate at which respondents are willing to work.  
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One would expect the correlation coefficient to be higher. If other considerations such as the 
nature and amount of work and its location are not relevant, it makes no sense for a person 
earning between 15,000 to 18,000 riel to find 9,000 riel acceptable and somewhat unrealistic 
for persons earning between 3,000 to 6,000 riel to demand between 13,000 and 15,000 riel 
for public works employment. With the latter, i.e. those with low earnings asking for more, 
possible answers are an element of bargaining, very low current earnings because of the 
financial crisis or the combination of activities of the respondent which may make it difficult to 
accommodate public works employment. With the former, possible explanations are the 
nature and location of the type of work the person was engaged in which may render it 
unattractive and the earnings may have been for temporary or very short-term activities. 
 
Table 4.4: Acceptable pay for public works and earnings in current activities 
 
  Acceptable pay for public works   
Earnings 
per day in 
last week 
5000 riels 9000 
riel 
10000-12000 
riel 
13000-15000 
riel 
>15000 riel Total 
0-3000 4 4 4 1 1 14 
3001-6000 12 13 22 18 5 70 
6001-9000 5 21 4 11 5 46 
9001-12000 11 18 27 28 7 91 
12001-15000 2 3 4 17 2 28 
15001-18000 1 2 4 3 3 13 
18001-21000 0 3 3 6 4 16 
21001-24000 0 0 0 0 1 1 
24001-27000 0 0 2 5 1 8 
27001-30000 0 0 0 0 4 4 
>30000 0 1 3 2 7 13 
Total 35 65 73 91 40 304 
 
Table 4.5 attempts to identify any relationship between the number of hours of work during 
the reference period and the level of wage rate acceptable. Those working fewer hours 
would generally be expected to find lower wage rates acceptable if fewer hours of economic 
activity represents underemployment. Those working longer hours would hold out for higher 
wage rates because of the higher opportunity cost of their time. There appears to be some 
discernible relationship at the bottom end of acceptable wage rates. On average 11.5 per 
cent of the sample available for public works at some wage rate would find 5,000 riel 
acceptable. For those working 10 hours or less, the percentages are over 15 per cent (18 per 
cent of those with no economic activity during the reference period). For those who worked 
more than 40 hours, the proportion finding 5,000 riel acceptable is much lower (7.4 per cent). 
For those working between 1 and 10 hours, acceptance of a wage rate of 9,000 riel or lower 
is above average while acceptance of 9,000 riel is below average for those who worked more 
than 40 hours. However, the picture is not consistent overall as Table 4.4 shows and the 
overall correlation between number of hours worked and level of acceptable public works pay 
is weak. 
 
The overall conclusion from tables 4.3 to 4.5 and their discussion is that participation in the 
labour markets and willingness to take on additional activities, even if they are intended to 
offer a safety net appear to be dependent on a complex interaction of household and 
individual characteristics which cannot be easily explained by looking at the effects of 
individual variables on availability for public works at specified wage rates. Two implications 
are that: (a) multivariate analysis would be required to form a better understanding of the 
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complex relationships at work, and (b) more importantly for making recommendations on the 
wage rate, its effectiveness in targeting the poor may have limitations. 
 
Before going on to the evidence on targeting, the basic aspects of declared participation by 
women and by age groups are outlined. Table 4.6 shows the breakdown by sex of those 
stating availability for public works employment at some wage rate. While the proportion of 
women in the 15+ age range is somewhat higher than that of men, a smaller proportion of 
women (43 per cent) than men are available for public works employment at some wage 
rate. However, the proportion of women who find the lower wage rates acceptable is higher 
as shown by the percentages. A wage rate of 10,000 riel, would be acceptable to 48.7 per 
cent of women31 available for public works while it would be acceptable to 39.2 per cent of 
men. As a consequence, if the stated responses are reflected in actual participation, at the 
wage rate of 10,000 riel the proportion of women participating would be 48 per cent.  
 
The willingness of women to work at lower wage rates is consistent with international 
evidence. There would of course be no discrimination in pay between men and women who 
would be paid on the basis of equal pay for work of equal value. However, in setting the 
wage rate, an important aspect is the balance of men and women on projects since some 
work may be considered to be too heavy by some women. 
  
                                                 
31
 Adding the availability percentages for 5,000 to 10,000 riel. 
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Table 4.5: Current hours of work and acceptable wage rate for public works 
 
  Hours worked in the reference week 
  None 1-5 hours 6-10 hours 11-15 hours 16-20 hours 21-30 hours 
Acceptable 
wage rate 
Number Cum % Number Cum % Number Cum % Number Cum % Number Cum % Number Cum % 
5000 11 18.0 9 15.3 11 15.3 11 9.6 7 15.9 29 15.8 
9000 4 24.6 9 30.5 12 31.9 11 19.1 7 31.8 22 27.7 
10000 14 47.5 11 49.2 9 44.4 16 33.0 11 56.8 43 51.1 
12000 7 59.0 6 59.3 8 55.6 41 68.7 8 75.0 53 79.9 
15000 17 86.9 19 91.5 23 87.5 30 94.8 6 88.6 27 94.6 
20000 8 100.0 5 100.0 8 98.6 6 100.0 5 100.0 10 100.0 
25000 0 100.0 0 100.0 1 100.0 0 100.0 0 100.0 0 100.0 
30000 0 100.0 0 100.0 0 100.0 0 100.0 0 100.0 0 100.0 
Total 61   59   72   115   44   184   
 
 
Table 4.5: Current hours of work and acceptable wage rate for public works (continued) 
 
 
  Hours worked in the reference week 
 
31-40 hours 41+ hours Total   
Acceptable 
wage rate 
Number Cum % Number Cum % Number Cum % 
5000 15 12.6 31 7.4 124 11.5 
9000 15 25.2 59 21.4 139 24.5 
10000 25 46.2 73 38.8 202 43.3 
12000 24 66.4 111 65.2 258 67.3 
15000 31 92.4 106 90.5 259 91.4 
20000 9 100.0 34 98.6 85 99.3 
25000 0 100.0 4 99.5 5 99.8 
30000 0 100.0 2 100.0 2 100.0 
Total 119   420   1074   
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Table 4.6: Acceptable wage rate and male-female breakdown 
 
Acceptable wage 
rate 
Male Female Total 
  Number % Number % Number % 
5000 60 9.8 64 13.9 124 11.5 
9000 76 12.4 63 13.6 139 12.9 
10000 104 17.0 98 21.2 202 18.8 
12000 136 22.2 122 26.4 258 24.0 
15000 171 27.9 88 19.0 259 24.1 
20000 61 10.0 24 5.2 85 7.9 
25000 2 0.3 3 0.6 5 0.5 
30000 2 0.3 0 0.0 2 0.2 
Total 612 100.0 462 100.0 1074 100.0 
Per cent of 
“acceptable pay” 
 57.0  43.0  100.0 
Per cent in 15+ 
age range 
 47.8  52.2  100.0 
 
 
Table 4.7 shows the age breakdown of persons willing to undertake public works at some 
wage rate. The proportion of persons in the 15 to 24 age group willing to work at some wage 
rate is marginally higher and statistically not significantly different from their representation in 
the sample households. The proportions of persons in the 25 to 39 and 40 to 49 age groups 
willing to work at some wage rate were significantly higher than in the sample. Persons older 
than 49 years are under-represented among those available for public works. Both these are 
to be expected since persons in the 25 to 49 age range are the most active participants in 
the labour force while many older persons (more than 49 years old) may find public works 
employment too arduous.  
 
The relationship between age and acceptable wage rate appears to be complex though 
there are some discernible patterns. Higher than average proportion of those in the older 
age groups (40 years and older) find a wage rate of 5,000 riel per day acceptable 
presumably representing a low opportunity cost of taking up such work and the expectation 
of undertaking light work. By implication, fewer of those in the younger age groups (15 to 39 
years) find 5,000 riel acceptable. Somewhat higher than average proportions in the 15 to 39 
age group find 9,000 riel acceptable.  
 
Wage rates in the 9,000 to 12,000 riel per day range are acceptable for just under 56 per 
cent of those available for public works employment. Proportions who find this wage range 
acceptable is somewhat higher in the 15 to 24 age range and the 50 to 59 age range. In the 
25 to 39 age range, the proportions finding this wage range acceptable is lower with higher 
percentages holding out for wage rates of 15,000 riel or above. Those who indicate 
availability at higher wage rates have either higher opportunity costs or require higher pay 
because of the nature of the work.  
 
The “Other” column in Table 4.3 and corresponding data on labour availability under the one 
per household restriction indicates that small numbers of those in the “too young or scholar” 
and “too old or infirm” categories are willing to undertake manual work. If young people 
choose to work on public works projects to earn cash as an alternative to pursuing 
education, this could be a cause for concern. Many older people continue to engage in 
subsistence production and as long as they are physically able and provision could be made 
for their participation, they could be accommodated on LI projects. 
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Table 4.7: Acceptable pay for public works employment by age group 
 
Acceptable 
pay 15-24 years 25-39 years 40-49 years 50-59 years >60+ years Total 
5000 41 9.7 27 9.6 34 14.2 14 14.6 8 24.2 124 11.5 
9000 60 14.2 37 13.1 28 11.7 11 11.5 3 9.1 139 12.9 
10000 85 20.0 43 15.2 50 20.9 20 20.8 4 12.1 202 18.8 
12000 114 26.9 63 22.3 44 18.4 26 27.1 11 33.3 258 24.0 
15000 91 21.5 72 25.5 67 28.0 22 22.9 7 21.2 259 24.1 
20000 30 7.1 37 13.1 15 6.3 3 3.1 0 0.0 85 7.9 
25000 3 0.7 1 0.4 1 0.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 5 0.5 
30000 0 0.0 2 0.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 0.2 
Total 424 100.0 282 100.0 239 100.0 96 100.0 33 100.0 1074 100.0 
Age group as 
% of 
"acceptable 
pay" 
  39.5   26.3   22.3   8.9   3.1   100.0 
Age group as 
% of all in 
sample 
  38.3   20.8   17.1   11.8   12.0   100.0 
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4.2 Evidence on targeting effectiveness of stated wage rates 
 
As noted earlier, the survey did not collect information on household income or expenditure 
but data from the late 2008 round of MOPS for the households in the sample were combined 
with data from the CARD / ILO survey to examine any relationship between the stated 
willingness to work at different wage rates and household expenditure levels. This is an 
important relationship to examine since if the wage rate is used as a targeting device, 
members of poorer households would be expected to be willing to participate at lower wage 
rates.  
 
All sample households and therefore persons belonging to them were placed in expenditure 
quintiles for this purpose (see Table 3.8 and related discussion in the previous section). 
Households and persons in them were placed in quintiles under two alternative rules. The 
first was “village level ranking” under which each household was placed in a quintile within 
its village. Therefore, each quintile at the whole sample level includes all households in that 
quintile in all villages. The second was the more straightforward ranking across the whole 
sample. The pros and cons of these two approaches for examining the relationship between 
an acceptable wage rate for public works and the standard of living of households are 
considered later in this section.  
 
Table 4.8 presents evidence on the number of persons stating availability for public works at 
a given wage rate (Table 4.1) and the expenditure per head quintile in which the person’s 
household falls. Table 4.9 presents similar evidence if access to public works is limited to 
one person per household. The top part of Table 4.8 shows the evidence followed by some 
calculations of indicators of targeting effectiveness within quintiles and relative targeting 
across quintiles. If targeting within a quintile is effective, a high proportion of those in the 
very poor category would find low wage rates acceptable and a low proportion of those in the 
better off quintiles would find low wage rates acceptable. Relative targeting across quintiles 
presents evidence on targeting effectiveness for one or more quintiles relative to the total 
number of persons (or households in the one per household cases) in all quintiles for a 
range of wage rates.   
 
Starting with targeting within quintiles in Table 4.8, the numbers and percentages of persons 
willing to work for 9,000 riel or lower and 10,000 riel or lower in the first quintile are 28.8 and 
51.1 per cent respectively. This implies that nearly 50 per cent of the “Very poor” would not 
undertake public works for less than 12,000 riel. Comparison with the higher quintile 
suggests very weak targeting since somewhat lower per cent of “Poor”, “Middle” and “Above 
average” than the “Very poor” indicated 9,000 riel per day acceptable. However, the per cent 
of the “Top 20%” finding 9,000 riel per day acceptable is almost the same as that for the 
“Very poor”.  
 
Evidence on targeting across quintiles also shows weak targeting. In the “Very poor” column, 
25.6 per cent in the “Quintile 1 up to 9,000 riel as per cent of all up to 9,000 riel” row is the 
number of persons who find 9,000 riel or less acceptable for public work employment (i.e. 
32+35 in the “Very poor” column) as a per cent of all persons who find such work acceptable 
at this or lower wage rate (i.e. 123+139 in the “Total” column). Clearly, the higher this 
percentage is, the more effective the targeting. For example, if 9,000 riel or lower is only 
acceptable to those in the poorest quintile, 100 per cent of persons would be in this 
category. Since this is very far from the case, a targeting effectiveness index has been 
calculated. The “No targeting if % at or below” of 21.7 per cent in the same row is the total 
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number of very poor who are available for public works at some wage rate (233 persons) as 
per cent of all who are available for public works at some wage rate (1073 persons32).  
 
Table 4.8: Acceptable pay for public works by household expenditure quintiles and 
targeting – village level ranking 
 
Willingness to work at a given 
wage rate (riel per day) 
Quintiles of consumption per head by village 
aggregated to total   
  Very 
Poor 
Poor Middle Above 
average 
Top 20% Total 
5000 32 17 20 17 37 123 
9000 35 23 39 23 19 139 
10000 52 46 54 22 28 202 
12000 55 59 36 62 46 258 
15000 37 50 66 46 60 259 
20000 22 24 10 14 15 85 
25000 0 0 0 5 0 5 
30000 0 0 1 1 0 2 
Total 233 219 226 190 205 1073 
Targeting within quintiles 
      Total 9,000 riel or below 67 40 59 40 56 262 
9,000 riel or below as % of total 28.8 18.3 26.1 21.1 27.3 24.4 
Total below 10,000 riel 119 86 113 62 84 464 
10,000 riel or below as % of total 51.1 39.3 50.0 32.6 41.0 43.2 
Relative targeting across quintiles 
        
Targeting 
index 
Quintile 1 up to 9,000 riel as % 
of all up to 9,000 riel  
25.6 No targeting if % at or below  21.7 117.8 
Quintile 1 up to 10,000 riel as % 
of all up to 10,000 riel  
25.6 No targeting if % at or below  21.7 118.1 
Quintiles 1 & 2 up to 9,000 riel 
as % of all up to 9,000 riel  
39.8 No targeting if % at or below  42.1 94.6 
Quintiles 1 & 2 up to 10,000 riel 
as % of all up to 10,000 riel  
40.8 No targeting if % at or below  42.1 96.9 
Quintiles 1 to 3 up to 9,000 riel 
as % of all up to 9,000 riel  
56.1 No targeting if % at or below  63.2 88.8 
Quintiles 1 to 3 up to 10,000 riel 
as % of all up to 10,000 riel  
63.4 No targeting if % at or below  63.2 100.3 
 
There is some degree of targeting if the per cent of the “Very poor” accepting 9,000 riel or 
lower wage rate is greater than 21.7 per cent. The targeting index (25.6 per cent as a per 
cent of 21.7 per cent in this case) is 117.8 indicates some level of targeting. A similar 
calculation for wage rates up to 10,000 riel also indicates some level of targeting of persons 
in the lowest expenditure quintile. However, similar calculations of targeting effectiveness for 
quintiles 1 and 2 (“Very poor” and “Poor”) for 9,000 and 10,000 riel indicate no targeting or 
even somewhat negative targeting since the targeting indices are below 100. This implies 
that there is a higher representation of persons from the three upper quintiles for wage rates 
of 9,000 and 10,00 riel or below and a similar result for the bottom three quintiles. Arguably, 
at the lowest wage rate of 5,000 riel, there would be a higher representation of the “Very 
                                                 
32 The total number of persons available for public works at some wage rate is 1074. The total here is 1073 
because of a missing value. 
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poor”. While the proportion of the “Very poor” is significantly higher at this wage rate, there 
are substantial numbers of those persons in the higher expenditure quintiles willing to work 
for 5,000 riel and the number of persons from the highest quintiles is higher than that from 
the lowest. 
 
Table 4.9 shows the targeting evidence on the assumption that access to the public works 
based SSN is restricted to one person per household (see Table 4.2 and the related 
discussion). The table shows a moderate level of targeting broadly reflecting Table 4.8.  
 
Table 4.9: Acceptable pay for public works by household expenditure quintiles and 
targeting under one person per household restriction – village level ranking   
 
Willingness to work at a given 
wage rate (riel per day) 
Quintiles of consumption per head by village 
aggregated to total – one per household   
  Very 
Poor 
Poor Middle Above 
average 
Top 20% Total 
5000 16 12 12 14 18 72 
9000 15 16 18 9 6 64 
10000 24 21 19 11 10 85 
12000 18 20 15 19 19 91 
15000 13 13 23 19 23 91 
20000 6 8 3 8 5 30 
30000 0 0 1 2 0 3 
Total 92 90 91 82 81 436 
Targeting within quintiles 
      Total 9,000 riel or below 31 28 30 23 24 136 
9,000 riel or below as % of total 33.7 31.1 33.0 28.0 29.6 31.2 
Total below 10,000 riel 55 49 49 34 34 221 
10,000 riel or below as % of total 59.8 54.4 53.8 41.5 42.0 50.7 
Relative targeting across quintiles 
        
Targeting 
index 
Quintile 1 up to 9,000 riel as % 
of all up to 9,000 riel  
22.8 No targeting if % at or below  21.1 108.0 
Quintile 1 up to 10,000 riel as % 
of all up to 10,000 riel  
24.9 No targeting if % at or below  21.1 117.9 
Quintiles 1 & 2 up to 9,000 riel 
as % of all up to 9,000 riel  
38.9 No targeting if % at or below  41.7 93.2 
Quintiles 1 & 2 up to 10,000 riel 
as % of all up to 10,000 riel  
43.4 No targeting if % at or below  41.7 103.9 
Quintiles 1 to 3 up to 9,000 riel 
as % of all up to 9,000 riel  
55.6 No targeting if % at or below  62.6 88.7 
Quintiles 1 to 3 up to 10,000 riel 
as % of all up to 10,000 riel  
65.4 No targeting if % at or below  62.6 104.5 
 
As noted above, the location of households in quintiles for tables 4.8 and 4.9 has been 
determined at the village level and then aggregated to produce the quintiles at the whole 
sample level. This approach is appropriate if there are differences in the cost of living 
between villages and the living standards of households in relation to others in the village 
are more important in influencing their participation in public works than the position of a 
household in the overall ranking of all sample households. Table 4.10 shows evidence on 
targeting effectiveness where households of persons willing to participate are placed in an 
overall ranking of all sample households. Arguably, this ranking is more appropriate unless 
there are variations in the cost of living between villages which seriously distort the ranking 
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across locations. Table 4.10 indicates very poor targeting of the poor at the lower wage rates 
with all the targeting indices being well below 100 implying more effective targeting of the 
persons from households in the better off households at wage rates of 9,000 and 10,000 riel. 
The outcome is similar under the one per household restriction.     
 
Table 4.10: Acceptable pay for public works by household expenditure quintiles and 
targeting – ranking across whole sample 
   
Willingness to work at a given 
wage rate (riel per day) 
Quintiles of consumption per head ranked 
across whole sample   
  Very Poor Poor Middle Above 
average 
Top 
20% Total 
5000 23 23 22 22 33 123 
9000 13 25 35 51 15 139 
10000 61 39 35 52 15 202 
12000 91 64 41 17 45 258 
15000 49 46 68 45 51 259 
20000 17 23 18 18 9 85 
30000 1 1 5 0 0 7 
Total 255 221 224 205 168 1073 
Targeting within quintiles 
      Total 9,000 riel or below 36 48 57 73 48 262 
9,000 riel or below as % of total 14.1 21.7 25.4 35.6 28.6 24.4 
Total below 10,000 riel 97 87 92 125 63 464 
10,000 riel or below as % of total 38.0 39.4 41.1 61.0 37.5 43.2 
Relative targeting across quintiles 
        
Targeting 
index 
Quintile 1 up to 9,000 riel as % 
of all up to 9,000 riel  
13.7 No targeting if % at or 
below  
23.8 57.8 
Quintile 1 up to 10,000 riel as % 
of all up to 10,000 riel  
20.9 No targeting if % at or 
below  
23.8 88.0 
Quintiles 1 & 2 up to 9,000 riel 
as % of all up to 9,000 riel  
37.4 No targeting if % at or 
below  
44.4 84.3 
Quintiles 1 & 2 up to 10,000 riel 
as % of all up to 10,000 riel  
32.1 No targeting if % at or 
below  
44.4 72.3 
Quintiles 1 to 3 up to 9,000 riel 
as % of all up to 9,000 riel  
55.3 No targeting if % at or 
below  
65.2 84.7 
Quintiles 1 to 3 up to 10,000 riel 
as % of all up to 10,000 riel  
53.8 No targeting if % at or 
below  
65.2 82.5 
 
 
Given the apparent poor targeting effectiveness of poverty measured on the basis of 
household expenditure level per head, targeting effectiveness of access to land for 
cultivation as a proxy indicator for household standard of living has been examined33. Table 
4.11 shows the number of persons stating availability for public works at a given wage rate 
(Table 4.1) and quintiles of cultivable land that the person’s household has access to. The 
bottom quintile includes persons from landless households. The targeting indices being well 
in excess of 100 in the table show clear evidence of a level of targeting especially with 
respect to a wage rate of 9,000 riel and the targeting of the bottom two quintiles. However, at 
9,000 riel, based on stated availability for public works, nearly 19 per cent of participants will 
                                                 
33
 See section 2.2 for discussion of the importance of access to land for cultivation for rural livelihoods. 
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be from households in the top two quintiles. The one per household table is not shown here 
but indicates broadly similar targeting effectiveness.     
 
Table 4.11: Acceptable pay for public works by access to cultivable land quintiles and 
targeting – ranking across whole sample 
 
Willingness to work at a 
given wage rate (riel per day) 
Quintiles of cultivable land access per head for 
whole sample   
  Lowest 
20% 
including 
landless 
Next 
20% 
Middle 
20% 
Above 
average 
20% 
Highest 
20% 
Total 
5000 22 34 35 19 14 124 
9000 38 51 34 10 6 139 
10000 40 29 40 52 41 202 
12000 19 34 34 92 79 258 
15000 60 39 48 63 49 259 
20000 19 22 12 20 12 85 
25000 0 0 5 0 0 5 
30000 0 0 1 1 0 2 
Total 198 209 209 257 201 1074 
Targeting within quintiles 
      Total 9000 or below 60 85 69 29 20 263 
9000 or below as % of total 30.3 40.7 33.0 11.3 10.0 24.5 
Total below 10000 100 114 109 81 61 465 
10,000 or below as % of total 50.5 54.5 52.2 31.5 30.3 43.3 
Total in each quintiles 471 470 459 499 434 2333 
Relative targeting across quintiles 
        
Targeting 
index 
Quintile 1 up to 9,000 riel as % 
of all up to 9,000 riel  
22.8 No targeting if % at or below  18.4 123.7 
Quintile 1 up to 10,000 riel as 
% of all up to 10,000 riel  
21.5 No targeting if % at or below  18.4 116.7 
Quintiles 1 & 2 up to 9,000 riel 
as % of all up to 9,000 riel  
55.1 No targeting if % at or below  37.9 145.5 
Quintiles 1 & 2 up to 10,000 
riel as % of all up to 10,000 riel  
46.0 No targeting if % at or below  37.9 121.4 
Quintiles 1 to 3 up to 9,000 riel 
as % of all up to 9,000 riel  
81.4 No targeting if % at or below  57.4 141.9 
Quintiles 1 to 3 up to 10,000 
riel as % of all up to 10,000 riel  
69.5 No targeting if % at or below  57.4 121.1 
 
The evidence on targeting discussed above poses a puzzle. Based on expenditure level 
indicators the targeting is poor. This may be because of deficiencies in household 
expenditure data34 or economically rational decision making at the household level within the 
context of specific labour market conditions. Given that access to cultivable land as an 
indirect indicator of household living standard shows moderate effectiveness of targeting, 
deficiencies in data on household expenditure or on stated availability at given wage rates 
cannot be ruled out.  
 
                                                 
34
 A cross-tabulation between acceptable wage rates and household income per capita was also examined. 
Targeting effectiveness was no better than for expenditure per capita.    
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Table 4.12: Cash earnings during reference period and per capita household 
expenditure quintiles – ranking across whole sample 
 
Earnings during the reference 
period (riel per day) 
Quintiles of consumption per head - whole 
sample 
  
  Very 
Poor 
Poor Middle Above 
average 
Top 
20% Total 
1-3000 Riel 8 13 8 11 18 58 
3001-5000 Riel 27 14 25 23 25 114 
5001-9000 Riel 13 33 27 37 48 158 
9001-10000 Riel 24 24 27 27 24 126 
10001-11000 Riel 0 1 1 3 3 8 
11000-12000 Riel 8 5 6 7 4 30 
12001-13000 Riel 2 2 4 2 0 10 
More than 15000 17 34 32 45 41 169 
Total 99 126 130 155 163 673 
Targeting within quintiles 
      Total 5,000 riel or below 35 27 33 34 43 172 
5,000 riel or below as % of total 35.4 21.4 25.4 21.9 26.4 25.6 
Total below 9,000 riel 48 60 60 71 91 330 
9,000 riel or below as % of total 48.5 47.6 46.2 45.8 55.8 49.0 
Relative targeting across quintiles 
        
Targeting 
index 
Quintile 1 up to 5,000 riel as % 
of all up to 5,000 riel  
20.3 No targeting if % at or below  14.7 138.3 
Quintile 1 up to 9,000 riel as % 
of all up to 9,000 riel  
14.5 No targeting if % at or below  14.7 98.9 
Quintiles 1 & 2 up to 5,000 riel 
as % of all up to 5,000 riel  
36.2 No targeting if % at or below  33.4 108.3 
Quintiles 1 & 2 up to 9,000 riel 
as % of all up to 9,000 riel  
36.0 No targeting if % at or below  33.4 107.8 
Quintiles 1 to 3 up to 5,000 riel 
as % of all up to 5,000 riel  
50.0 No targeting if % at or below  52.7 94.8 
Quintiles 1 to 3 up to 9,000 riel 
as % of all up to 9,000 riel  
55.2 No targeting if % at or below  52.7 104.7 
 
To confirm that the apparent poor targeting is not simply because of aberrations in data, 
cross-tabulations between the level of earnings per day during the reference period of seven 
days for those who had cash earnings and household expenditure per head and cultivable 
land per head have been shown (Tables 4.12 and 4.13). Under the conventional hypothesis 
on which the wage rate is considered to be an effective targeting mechanism, members of 
poor households would be expected to be willing to work for low wage rates35. The targeting 
indices in Table 4.12 show that there is some moderate level of targeting of the lowest 
quintile at the wage rate of 5,000 riel but virtually no targeting at 9,000 riel. Further, the 
number of persons with cash earnings during the reference period is much lower in the 
lowest expenditure quintile (99 persons) than in the higher expenditure quintiles with an 
apparent trend of more persons with cash earnings in higher expenditure quintiles (i.e. 126 
in the second quintile, 130 in the third quintile, 155 in the fourth quintile and 163 in the 
highest quintile). Therefore, while 35 persons in the lowest expenditure quintile are willing to 
                                                 
35
 The relationship between earnings of household members and standard of living could be in both directions 
since low earnings of household members could be a cause for low household expenditure.   
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work for earnings of 5,000 riel per day or lower, 43 persons in the highest quintile are willing 
to work for 5,000 riel per day or less. 
 
The above suggests that the relationship between cash earnings and their levels and the 
standard of living of households is much more complex than the conventional hypothesis on 
which wage rate as a targeting device is based. Cash earnings appear to be important for 
the living standards of households but not necessarily high earnings rates. Further, just over 
53 per cent of the 600 sample households had at least one person with cash earnings and a 
number of them had more than one person. The better off households are likely to have 
more than one cash earners though a number of them may have low pay rates. 
 
Table 4.13: Cash earnings during reference period by access to cultivable land 
quintiles and targeting – ranking across whole sample 
 
Earnings during the 
reference period (riel per 
day) 
Quintiles of cultivable land access per head for whole 
sample 
  
  Lowest 20% 
including 
landless 
Next 
20% 
Middle 
20% 
Above 
average 
20% 
Highest 
20% 
Total 
1-3000 Riel 22 14 6 5 11 58 
3001-5000 Riel 46 31 20 13 6 116 
5001-9000 Riel 67 53 14 16 8 158 
9001-10000 Riel 59 34 22 5 6 126 
10001-11000 Riel 4 1 1 1 1 8 
11000-12000 Riel 17 7 2 3 1 30 
12001-13000 Riel 4 2 2 1 1 10 
More than 15000 64 28 28 32 17 169 
Total 283 170 95 76 51 675 
Targeting within quintiles 
      Total 5,000 riel or below 68 45 26 18 17 174 
5,000 riel or below as % of 
total 24.0 26.5 27.4 23.7 33.3 25.8 
Total below 9,000 riel 135 98 40 34 25 332 
9,000 riel or below as % of 
total 47.7 57.6 42.1 44.7 49.0 49.2 
Total in each quintiles 471 470 459 499 434 2333 
Relative targeting across quintiles 
        
Targeting 
index 
Quintile 1 up to 5,000 riel as 
% of all up to 5,000 riel  
39.1 No targeting if % at or below  41.9 93.2 
Quintile 1 up to 9,000 riel as 
% of all up to 9,000 riel  
40.7 No targeting if % at or below  41.9 97.0 
Quintiles 1 & 2 up to 5,000 
riel as % of all up to 5,000 riel  
64.9 No targeting if % at or below  67.1 96.8 
Quintiles 1 & 2 up to 9,000 
riel as % of all up to 9,000 riel  
70.2 No targeting if % at or below  67.1 104.6 
Quintiles 1 to 3 up to 5,000 
riel as % of all up to 5,000 riel  
79.9 No targeting if % at or below  81.2 98.4 
Quintiles 1 to 3 up to 9,000 
riel as % of all up to 9,000 riel  
82.2 No targeting if % at or below  81.2 101.3 
         
Table 4.13 shows a high level of targeting according to the first measure, i.e. the proportion 
of persons at 5,000 and 9,000 riel in the bottom and bottom two quintiles. About 40 per cent 
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of all earning 5,000 riel or less and 9,000 riel or less are in the bottom quintile for access to 
cultivable lane. However, there is virtually no relative targeting since the proportion of those 
with the low earnings in each quintile is virtually the same. This combination is explained by 
the total number of cash earning persons in each quintile, 283 in the bottom quintile but 
progressively lower in the higher quintiles with only 51 in the top quintile. The evidence 
supports the expectation that landless households and those with very limited land per 
capita have to rely much more on earning cash through employment or self-employment 
than those with more land. The table also shows that a substantial proportion of persons 
from households relatively well endowed with cultivable land engage in activities yielding low 
earnings rates.     
 
The evidence presented in this section highlights the necessity to explain ineffective 
targeting. Possible explanations of why members of poor households may hold out for higher 
pay and members of better off households may work for low wages and the implications of 
this apparently ineffective targeting through wage setting are considered in the next section 
before making recommendations on wage rates. 
4.3 Differences in labour supply responses between villages and 
regions 
 
So far, our analysis is based on the whole sample. As noted earlier, given small sample 
sizes at village and region levels, results disaggregated to these levels may not be 
representative of the regions. Nevertheless, it is necessary to look at differences in labour 
supply response rates between the samples in districts to obtain an indication of the possible 
range of variations in response rates and their implications for wage rate policy and local 
level planning of SSN public works. 
 
Table 4.14 shows the village and regional level differences in the stated labour supply 
response at different wage rates. These are discussed here in the context of the relevant 
characteristics of the villages summarised in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. The table shows stated 
availability at a range of wage rates and availability at 9,000, 10,000 and 12,000 riel as 
proportions of total number of persons available and the total number of persons in the 15+ 
age range for comparison. The three villages in Tonle Sap illustrate differences within a 
region. In Tuol Krasaing a significant proportion of respondents indicated availability for 
public works employment at 5,000 riel per day while in the other two villages in the region, 
the numbers stating availability were very low (none in Khsach Chiros). In Tuol Krasaing, the 
numbers indicating availability at higher wage rates (15,000 and 20,000 riel) is also higher.  
 
Possible explanations of relatively large numbers in Tuol Krasaing available at 5,000 riel 
during the agriculturally slack season when the interviews were conducted are reliance on: 
(a) wet season rice with its highly seasonal labour requirement, and (b) jobs away from the 
village during the slack season and reduction in job opportunities because of the financial 
crisis and Cambodia’s relations with Thailand. The significant numbers available at high 
wage rates represent those not in desperate need for cash employment and or unwilling to 
undertake public works unless the reward was high. In Khsach Chiros, The table also shows 
a very high stated labour supply elasticity for Tonle Sap of between 9,000 and 10,000 riel 
per day supporting the views expressed at the FGDs that 10,000 riel per day was seen as 
the going unskilled wage rate.  
 
Comparison between the two Plateau / Mountain region villages again shows differences 
between the villages with stated acceptable wage rates in Dang Kdar concentrated in the 
9,000 to 12,000 riel per day range while in Khann Chor, they are spread more widely. In 
addition to farming, economic activities in both the villages include, harvesting common 
forest based resources, timber transport and processing and work in rubber plantations. 
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Earnings in these activities influence acceptable pay for public works. The stated labour 
supply elasticity for the region between 9,000 and 10,000 riel per day is very high, to a great 
extent, explained by very low stated availability at 9,000 riel. 
 
In contrast with Tonle Sap and especially Plateau / Mountain regions, in the two Mekong 
region villages, the numbers and proportions indicating 5,000 and 9,000 riel as acceptable 
are much higher. The labour supply elasticity between 9,000 and 10,000 riel is lower than in 
Tonle Sap and Plateau / Mountain because of the higher base of the number accepting 
9,000 riel as an acceptable wage rate. In both the villages in Mekong region, there is a wide 
spread of acceptable wages with substantial numbers indicating 15,000 riel or higher as 
acceptable wage rates. The spread of acceptable wage rates is indicative of a wide range of 
rural economic activities and urban employment opportunities and wide variations in the 
living standards of households and need for cash income. The financial crisis and relations 
with Thailand are also likely to have influenced acceptable wage rates. 
 
In Coastal region, the sample households are from one village. At lower wage rates (5,000 
and 9,000 riel per day), the proportions of acceptable wage rates are similar to those in 
Mekong region and consequently the stated supply elasticity between 9,000 and 10,000 riel 
is low. The proportions holding out for a wage rate of 15,000 riel or higher are much lower 
than in Mekong region and more comparable to Tonle Sap. The acceptable wage rates 
appear to reflect earnings in farm work, fishing and other rural economic activities. 
 
In addition to the small samples, a limitation of the evidence on stated labour supply 
response is that the stated acceptable wage rates may be inflated, partly because of an 
element of bargaining or just higher than realistic expectations. To obtain some insights into 
the extent to which this might be the case and to provide corroborative evidence for the 
stated acceptable wage rates, Table 4.15 has been included to show the number of persons 
engaged in activities yielding cash earnings during the reference period of seven days and 
the distribution of cash earnings by village and region. A summary table aggregating the 
evidence over all the regions was included in section 3 (Table 3.17). The following 
observations are subject to the qualification that sample sizes are small. 
 
During the reference period of seven days prior to the CARD / ILO survey interview, 27.5 per 
cent of persons in the 15+ age range were engaged in a cash earning activity for some time. 
As would be expected, there are variations between villages and regions with over 53 per 
cent engaged in some cash earning in Prek Khmeng (Mekong) to just 5.7 per cent in Khsach 
Chiros (Tonle Sap). Tonle Sap and Plateau Mountain regions have the lowest proportion 
engaged in cash earning though in both regions the average is brought down by one village 
with very low cash earning activities. The mean earnings per day in these two regions are 
higher (Table 3.18). This is consistent with evidence from FGDs but somewhat unexpected 
since Plateau / Mountain and Tonle Sap (which has the second highest mean earnings 
rates) were the regions with very high poverty incidence according to the last region level 
poverty assessment based on CSES 2003/4 (World Bank, 2006). 
 
Arguably small numbers engaged in cash earning could be evidence of greater need for 
public works. However, it is also necessary to look at evidence on earnings rates in localities 
in which high proportions have cash earnings. Another aspect to be considered is that where 
cash earning is very limited, the stated acceptable wage rates may not be based on 
experience or observation and may therefore be unrealistic. A comparison of evidence on 
Tuol Krasaing and Khsach Chiros in Tonle Sap in Table 4.14 and 4.15 illustrates these 
points well. Tuol Krasaing had a relatively high proportion in cash earning activities. The 
spread of stated acceptable wage rates (Table 4.14) is similar to that of earnings (Table 
4.15). In Khsach Chiros, where the proportion of persons with cash earnings is very small, 
no persons find 5,000 and 9,000 riel per day acceptable and there is a pronounced peak at 
12,000 riel for acceptable pay though there are very few persons who have earnings at this 
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level. It appears that there is a notion of 12,000 riel being the going wage rate based on very 
little local evidence. 
 
In Plateau / Mountain region, there is a contrast similar to that in Tonle Sap between the two 
villages. In Khhan Chor, with nearly 35 per cent of persons in 15+ years age range with cash 
earnings during the reference period, the spread of acceptable wage rates is broadly 
representative of levels of cash earnings while in Dang Kdar, with very limited cash earning, 
the spread of acceptable pay for public works is focused on 12,000 riel per day. It is of 
course likely that other factors such as limited need for cash earning and seasonal factors 
may also have influenced the low numbers engaged in cash earning and the high stated 
acceptable wage rates in Khsach Chiros and Dang Kdar. 
 
In Mekong region, while there is a difference in the proportions engaged in public works 
between Prek Khmeng and Babaong, the contrast is not as sharp. In both villages, at the 
lower end the distribution of stated acceptable wage rates broadly reflects cash earnings 
though the pronounced peak at 15,000 riel as a minimum acceptable wage rate is not 
reflected in cash earnings rates. As noted earlier, the stated high wage rates indicate 
reluctance to engage in public works. In the Coastal village, the distribution of stated 
acceptable wage rates appears to reflect the distribution of cash earnings. 
 
The above evidence suggests that where a high proportion of persons are engaged in cash 
earning, the distribution of stated acceptable wage rates appears to be broadly in line with 
the distribution of earnings and could be reasonably interpreted as the distribution of 
reservation wage rates of the respondents. Where cash earning is limited, the stated wage 
rate appears to gravitate towards a notional going wage rate of 12,000 riel. In locations with 
limited cash earning opportunities, it would be reasonable to assume that there would be 
somewhat higher labour supply responses to local public works employment opportunities at 
lower wage rates than the stated acceptable wage rates indicate. 
 
The evidence in Table 4.14 (supported by that in Table 4.15) indicates that at a given wage 
rate, there will be substantial variations in labour supply response between localities. For 
example, wage rates of 9,000 riel and 10,000 riel per day would be acceptable for 5.4 and 
17.3 per cent of persons in the 15+ age range respectively while in the Coastal village, the 
corresponding percentages are 23.9 and 29.0 per cent. There will therefore be a need for 
flexibility in programme and project design to respond to: (a) differences in the need for 
public works employment between localities, and (b) shocks which require increased public 
works activity. 
 
The pros and cons of setting a single wage rate are considered in the next section. If there is 
a single countrywide SSN wage rate, as is proposed for the programme, the setting of the 
wage rate should take account of the differences in labour supply response between 
localities. In sections 5 and 6, we draw together the conclusions and recommendations on 
wage rate policy and wage rates from this and the previous sections, make 
recommendations on wage rates, address the issue of targeting and assess implications for 
programme costs and level of protection of wage rate levels and labour supply response.   
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Table 4.14: Variations in labour supply response between villages and regions 
Tonle Sap 
Minimum acceptable 
pay for public works 
Tuol 
Krasaing 
Andong 
Trach 
Khsach 
Chiros 
Tonle 
Sap 
total 
Tonle Sap 
total cumul 
Tonle 
Sap 
total 
cumul 
(% of all 
15+) 
Tonle 
Sap 
average 
supply 
elasticity 
5000 22 2 0 24 24 3.1   
9000 9 8 0 17 41 5.4 0.92 
10000 24 31 36 91 132 17.3 9.99 
12000 14 12 118 144 276 36.2 3.88 
15000 26 17 44 87 363 47.6 1.23 
20000 23 8 7 38 401 52.6 0.35 
25000   5   5 406 53.3 0.06 
30000     2 2 408 53.5 0.03 
Number of sample 
households 
74 52 74 200       
Total 118 83 207 408       
Total up to 9,000 riel 31 10 0 41       
% up to 9,000 riel 26.3 12.0 0.0 10.0       
Total up to 10,000 riel 55 41 36 132       
% up to 10,000 riel 46.6 49.4 17.4 32.4       
Total up to 12000 69 53 154 276       
% up to 12,000 riel 58.5 63.9 74.4 67.6       
Total 15+ 280 186 296 762       
Up to 9,000 as % of 15+ 11.1 5.4 0.0 5.4       
Up to 10,000 as % of 15+ 19.6 22.0 12.2 17.3       
Up to 12,000 as % of 15+ 24.6 28.5 52.0 36.2       
Total as % of 15+ 42.1 44.6 69.9 53.5       
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Table 4.14: Variations in labour supply response between villages and regions (continued) 
 
  Plateau/Mountain Mekong 
Minimum acceptable 
pay for public works 
Dang 
Kdar 
Khhan 
Chor 
Plateau / 
Mountain 
total 
Plateau / 
Mountain 
total 
cumul 
Plateau / 
Mountain 
total cumul 
(% of all 
15+) 
Plateau / 
Mountain 
average 
supply 
elasticity 
Prek 
Khmeng 
Babaong Mekong 
total 
Mekong 
total 
cumul 
Mekong 
total 
cumul 
(% of all 
15+) 
Mekong 
average 
supply 
elasticity 
5000 0 7 7 7 1.9   24 35 59 59 7.6   
9000 0 6 6 13 3.6 1.05 35 12 47 106 13.6 1.00 
10000 45 15 60 73 20.2 13.26 10 19 29 135 17.4 2.29 
12000 75 18 93 166 45.9 4.28 2 7 9 144 18.5 0.35 
15000 16 27 43 209 57.7 1.03 34 76 110 254 32.6 2.49 
20000   19 19 228 63.0 0.30 10 10 20 274 35.2 0.27 
25000     0 228 63.0 0.00     0 274 35.2 0.00 
30000     0 228 63.0 0.00     0 274 35.2 0.00 
Number of sample 
households 
50 50 100       100 100 200       
Total 136 92 228       115 159 274       
Total up to 9,000 riel 0 13 13       59 47 106       
% up to 9,000 riel 0.0 14.1 5.7       51.3 29.6 38.7       
Total up to 10,000 riel 45 28 73       69 66 135       
% up to 10,000 riel 33.1 30.4 32.0       60.0 41.5 49.3       
Total up to 12000 120 46 166       71 73 144       
% up to 12,000 riel 88.2 50.0 72.8       61.7 45.9 52.6       
Total 15+ 168 194 362       409 369 778       
Up to 9,000 as % of 
15+ 0.0 6.7 3.6 
      
14.4 12.7 13.6 
      
Up to 10,000 as % of 
15+ 26.8 14.4 20.2       16.9 17.9 17.4       
Up to 12,000 as % of 
15+ 71.4 23.7 45.9       17.4 19.8 18.5       
Total as % of 15+ 81.0 47.4 63.0       28.1 43.1 35.2       
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Table 4.14: Variations in labour supply response between villages and regions (continued) 
  Coastal All Regions aggregated 
Minimum 
acceptable pay 
for public works 
Kompong 
Thnoat - 
Coastal 
Kompong 
Thnoat - 
Coastal 
cumul 
Kompong 
Thnoat - 
Coastal 
cumul (% 
of all 15+) 
Kompong 
Thnoat - 
Coastal 
average supply 
elasticity 
All 
Regions 
total 
All Regions 
total cumul 
All Regions 
total cumul 
(% of all 
15+) 
All 
Regions 
total 
average 
supply 
elasticity 
5000 34 34 7.9   124 124 5.3   
9000 69 103 23.9 1.76 139 263 11.3 1.26 
10000 22 125 29.0 1.83 202 465 19.9 5.27 
12000 12 137 31.8 0.50 258 723 31.0 2.39 
15000 19 156 36.2 0.58 259 982 42.1 1.37 
20000 8 164 38.1 0.18 85 1067 45.7 0.29 
25000 0 164 38.1 0.00 5 1072 45.9 0.02 
30000 0 164 38.1 0.00 2 1074 46.0 0.01 
Number of sample 
households 
100 100     600 
      
Total 164       1074       
Total up to 9,000 
riel 
103       263 
      
% up to 9,000 riel 62.8       24.5       
Total up to 10,000 
riel 
125       465 
      
% up to 10,000 
riel 
76.2       43.3 
      
Total up to 12000 137       723       
% up to 12,000 
riel 
83.5       67.3 
      
Total 15+ 431       2333       
Up to 9,000 as % 
of 15+ 23.9       11.3       
Up to 10,000 as % 
of 15+ 29.0       19.9       
Up to 12,000 as % 
of 15+ 31.8       31.0       
Total as % of 15+ 38.1       46.0       
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Table 4.15: Earnings during reference period by village and Region 
  Tonle Sap Plateau/Mountain 
Daily earnings 
during reference 
week 
Tuol 
Krasaing 
Andong 
Trach 
Khsach 
Chiros 
Tonle 
Sap 
total 
Tonle Sap 
total 
cumul 
Tonle Sap 
total cumul 
(% of all 
15+) 
Dang 
Kdar 
Khhan 
Chor 
Plateau / 
Mountain 
total 
Plateau / 
Mountain 
total 
cumul 
Plateau / 
Mountain total 
cumul (% of all 
15+) 
0-3000 8 5 0 13 13 1.7 5 2 7 7 1.9 
3001-6000 13 7 4 24 37 4.9 5 13 18 25 6.9 
6001-9000 4 2 2 8 45 5.9 0 8 8 33 9.1 
9001-12000 27 26 4 57 102 13.4 1 14 15 48 13.3 
12001-15000 6 3 4 13 115 15.1 1 6 7 55 15.2 
15001-18000 16 3 1 20 135 17.7 0 2 2 57 15.7 
18001-21000 6 5 1 12 147 19.3 2 2 4 61 16.9 
20001-24000 0 0 0 0 147 19.3 0 1 1 62 17.1 
24001-27000 5 0 0 5 152 19.9 0 4 4 66 18.2 
27001-30000 4 1 0 5 157 20.6 0 4 4 70 19.3 
>30000 5 0 1 6 163 21.4 2 9 11 81 22.4 
Total 94 52 17 163     16 65 81     
Total as % of 15+ 33.6 28.0 5.7 21.4     9.5 33.5 22.4     
Total up to 6,000 riel 21 12 4 37     10 15 25     
% up to 6,000 riel 22.3 23.1 23.5 22.7     62.5 23.1 30.9     
Total up to 9,000 riel 25 14 6 45     10 23 33     
% up to 9,000 riel 26.6 26.9 35.3 27.6     62.5 35.4 40.7     
Total up to 12000 52 40 10 102     11 37 48     
% up to 12,000 riel 55.3 76.9 58.8 62.6     68.8 56.9 59.3     
Total 15+ 280 186 296 762     168 194 362     
Up to 9,000 as % of 
15+ 
7.5 6.5 1.4 4.9     6.0 7.7 6.9     
Up to 10,000 as % of 
15+ 
8.9 7.5 2.0 5.9     6.0 11.9 9.1     
Up to 12,000 as % of 
15+ 
18.6 21.5 3.4 13.4     6.5 19.1 13.3     
Total as % of 15+ 33.6 28.0 5.7 21.4     9.5 33.5 22.4     
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Table 4.15: Earnings during reference period by village and Region (continued) 
 Mekong Coastal All Regions aggregated 
Daily earnings 
during reference 
week 
Prek 
Khmeng 
Babaong Mekong 
total 
Mekong 
total 
cumul 
Mekong 
total 
cumul (% 
of all 15+) 
Kompong 
Thnoat - 
Coastal 
Kompong 
Thnoat - 
Coastal 
cumul 
Kompong 
Thnoat - 
Coastal cumul 
(% of all 15+) 
All 
Regions 
total 
All 
Regions 
total 
cumul 
All Regions 
total cumul 
(% of all 15+) 
0-3000 17 11 28 28 3.6 10 10 2.3 58 58 2.5 
3001-6000 60 16 76 104 13.4 32 42 9.7 150 208 8.9 
6001-9000 52 14 66 170 21.9 43 85 19.7 125 333 14.3 
9001-12000 50 13 63 233 29.9 39 124 28.8 174 507 21.7 
12001-15000 16 11 27 260 33.4 11 135 31.3 58 565 24.2 
15001-18000 2 2 4 264 33.9 3 138 32.0 29 594 25.5 
18001-21000 12 4 16 280 36.0 11 149 34.6 43 637 27.3 
20001-24000 1 1 2 282 36.2 2 151 35.0 5 642 27.5 
24001-27000 5 0 5 287 36.9 3 154 35.7 17 659 28.2 
27001-30000 1 0 1 288 37.0 1 155 36.0 11 670 28.7 
>30000 2 1 3 291 37.4 3 158 36.7 23 693 29.7 
Total                       
Total as % of 15+ 218 73 291     158     642     
Total up to 6,000 
riel 
53.3 19.8 37.4     36.7     27.5     
% up to 6,000 riel 77 27 104     42     208     
Total up to 9,000 
riel 
35.3 37.0 35.7     26.6     32.4     
% up to 9,000 riel 129 41 170     85     333     
Total up to 12000 59.2 56.2 58.4     53.8     51.9     
% up to 12,000 
riel 
179 54 233     124     507     
Total 15+ 82.1 74.0 80.1     78.5     79.0     
Up to 9,000 as % 
of 15+ 
409 369 778     431     2333     
Up to 10,000 as % 
of 15+ 
18.8 7.3 13.4     9.7     8.9     
Up to 12,000 as % 
of 15+ 
31.5 11.1 21.9     19.7     14.3     
Total as % of 15+ 43.8 14.6 29.9     28.8     21.7     
 53.3 19.8 37.4     36.7     27.5     
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5 Wage rates, labour availability estimates and 
programme costs: Conclusions and recommendations 
 
5.1 Types of programmes and their implications in the 
Cambodian context  
 
Before bringing together the evidence on wage rates and labour availability to make 
recommendations, the modes of public works activities being envisaged for inclusion in the 
SSN are reviewed here with special reference to the wage rate and its implications for 
meeting programme objectives and resource requirements. 
  
The aim of CARD is to bring all EGPWs in Cambodia under one umbrella to develop a 
coherent public works based safety net component. EGPWs differ in the balance between 
social protection and creation or preservation of social and economic assets and much 
experience in implementing them has been accumulated in Cambodia over the years 
(Edmonds, 2010). The WFP Food for Work (FFW) programme which has been supporting 
vulnerable groups and providing food during periods of crisis in Cambodia since 1992 and 
the more recent ADB Emergency Food Assistance Programme are examples of EGPWs 
with emphasis on supporting the poor and the vulnerable, especially during crises.   
 
Other EGPWs give a higher priority to the quality of work done. This typically requires a 
higher amount of technical input and a combination of labour with light equipment. Therefore 
for a given unit of resource, the amount of employment generated is less than with the purely 
employment creation or food for work approaches. Examples of past programmes of this 
type balancing employment generation and asset creation in Cambodia are the ILO / UNDP 
labour-based rural infrastructure rehabilitation and maintenance projects (1992-96), the 
ILO/SIDA/PWT labour based rural roads and local infrastructure planning project and the 
ADB Rural Infrastructure Improvement Project (RIIP) undertaken between 1998 and 2001. 
 
It is important to be clear about the differences between types of EGPWs as components of 
a SSN and their implications for setting wage rates36. In this section we summarise relevant 
features of three main types of EGPWs, employment guarantees37 (EGs), labour intensive 
(LI) with payment in cash or kind and labour-based (LB). 
 
Employment guarantee (EG) programmes, as the term implies, offer guaranteed 
employment of a certain number of days in an year at a given wage rate to all those who 
wish to take advantage of it. The resources required for EGs depend on the need for such 
employment to supplement household incomes and the wage rate being offered. An 
important attraction of EGs is that they are self targeting. It is up to a person or a household 
to participate if the EG wage rate is sufficiently attractive given the alternative livelihood 
opportunities and the requirement to supplement household income.  
 
  
                                                 
36
 Attention is also needed to other aspects (e.g. resource requirements and implementing capacity). These are 
mentioned briefly in this section but not considered further because they are beyond the scope of the TOR for 
this assignment.  
37
 An employment guarantee is not envisaged in Cambodia at present. Nevertheless, it is helpful to include a 
brief discussion of its features in this review to highlight the wage rate issues associated with a SSN. 
 76 
Table 5.1: What kinds of programmes? Objectives and implications for wage rates, 
balance between objectives and resource commitments  
 
  Employment 
guarantee (EG) 
Employment generation 
Labour intensive (LI) Labour-based (LB) 
Brief 
description 
and objective 
Guarantee of a given 
number of days of 
employment for all 
who claim the right. 
Creation of maximum 
employment for a given level 
of resources. 
Appropriate labour and 
light equipment 
combination for efficient 
infrastructure works. 
Resource 
commitment 
and 
implications 
Generally high and 
dependent on the 
wage rate and take up. 
Number of jobs created 
depends on the budget and 
wage rate. 
Labour-based methods 
used if technically 
satisfactory and cost 
effective. Wage rate 
affects cost and 
competitiveness.  
Implications 
for the wage 
rate 
Must be low in relation 
to prevailing wage 
rates and opportunity 
cost of labour. But less 
impact on welfare if 
too low. 
Needs to be low in relation to 
prevailing wage rates and 
opportunity cost of labour. But 
less impact on welfare if too 
low. 
Needs to be set in 
relation to prevailing 
wage rates and 
opportunity cost of 
labour. Efficiency wage 
premium may be required 
as an incentive to 
improve productivity and 
quality.  
Beneficiary 
targeting 
Self targeting. Self targeting if wage rate 
sufficiently low. Otherwise, 
additional criteria needed for 
beneficiary selection or 
rationing of access to the 
programme. 
Self targeting if wage rate 
sufficiently low. Efficiency 
wage premium may imply 
need for beneficiary 
selection or rationing of 
access to the 
programme. 
Effectiveness 
in asset 
creation and 
maintenance  
Generally low - 
difficulty of providing 
adequate technical 
input but could be 
improved for suitably 
selected projects and 
adequate technical 
support. 
Generally low - difficulty of 
providing adequate technical 
input but could be improved 
for suitably selected projects 
and adequate technical 
support. 
Very effective if well 
implemented with 
adequate technical 
planning, supervision and 
monitoring. 
 
 
The higher the wage rate, the higher the number of persons wishing to take advantage of the 
EG38. Therefore, in setting the wage rate there is a need to balance the provision of benefits 
to the poor on the one hand and on the other hand, the cost of the programme and the 
possible damaging effects on other economic activities by drawing labour away from them. 
However, where there is pronounced seasonality in rural economic activity with high levels of 
unemployment and underemployment at certain times of the year and the number of days of 
EG employment offered is limited and does not conflict with busy agricultural periods, the 
risk of disrupting other economic activities may be low even with a somewhat higher wage 
rate. Self selection of timing of taking up the EG as is the case on NREGS in India and the 
offer of a limited number of days would reduce the disruption of other activities. Too high a 
                                                 
38
 The higher labour supply response to the higher wage rate for a given set of employment conditions is a 
general labour market phenomenon not just limited to EGs. 
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wage rate would raise programme costs and weaken the effectiveness of targeting the 
poorest sections of the population.  
 
It is conventionally assumed that the wage rate is a highly effective instrument for targeting 
with members of poor households being much more willing to participate at low wage rates 
than members of better-off households. EG employment is often rationed to a given number 
of days for one person per household for affordability. The need for such rationing implies 
that the wage rate is not the sole targeting device. However, the wage rate remains an 
important screening device and as long as all who wish to participate are afforded access, 
poor households which wish to participate will not be excluded. The targeting effectiveness 
will be low and programme costs high if there is participation from better off households. 
While the proposed SSN in Cambodia is not an EG, the role of wage setting in targeting is 
an important question which will be addressed later in this section. Evidence from the study 
on the apparently poor targeting effectiveness of the wage rate has been presented in 
section 4.2. Its implications for wage setting and targeting are considered later in this 
section.   
 
The rest of EGPWs have been separated into two categories in Table 5.1, labour intensive 
(LI) and labour-based (LB). LI programmes aim to create the maximum amount of 
employment within a given budget. Short-term public works employment as a means of 
supporting the participants through payment of cash or food is typically the main objective. 
To maximise payment to labour39, resources devoted to tools, equipment, technical planning 
and supervision and management are kept low. If the wage rate for LI projects is too high in 
relation to the prevailing market wage rate, the problems will be fewer persons benefiting 
from the programme and possible damaging effects on other economic activities. As for 
EGs, the damaging effects on other economic activities may not be serious if work on such 
projects is planned for less busy agricultural periods and other economic activities are limited 
at those times.  
 
Even if damaging effects on other economic activities is not an issue, more people will want 
to benefit from the project than resources permit if the wage rate is too high. Therefore, the 
wage rate will not be an effective instrument for rationing access to project employment and 
other criteria and procedures will be needed to select beneficiaries. If satisfactory objective 
and transparent criteria for identifying the poor are not available or the processes for 
ensuring that the poor gain access to LI projects are ineffective and opaque, there is high 
risk of elite capture and misdirection of resources. A strong argument for using the wage rate 
for rationing access to LI projects is to avoid the higher costs of the alternative administrative 
structures and processes required to determine eligibility for participation and the higher 
risks of leakage generally associated with such processes. 
 
LB programmes are generally less labour intensive than LI. The choice of technology, while 
preferring use of labour, is determined by effectiveness and efficiency in achieving the 
outcomes (i.e. creation, rehabilitation or maintenance of infrastructure or other assets). 
Typically, for rural road rehabilitation and construction, the choice of technology which is 
found to be most appropriate is labour supported by light equipment (for example, small 
mechanical rollers for compaction and trucks for hauling material over longer distances). 
Maintenance is by its nature generally more labour intensive but the appropriate combination 
of labour and tools and equipment is determined by technical and cost effectiveness 
considerations.   
 
For a given amount of resources, the LB approach will typically create less employment than 
the LI approach. However, the LB approach is more effective in creating and maintaining 
                                                 
39
 This is often also the case for EGs though, in principle, EGs can encompass LB and LI activities as long as 
they are clearly differentiated (see section 5.2).  
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infrastructure assets than the EG or LI approaches. This is partly because of the objectives 
of EG and LI type programmes (greater emphasis on employment creation than output) and 
partly because of the difficulty of managing and providing the technical inputs and 
supervision on such programmes. Retention and motivation of workers and achieving 
adequate productivity levels if wage rates are too low are also problems40. 
 
Another important difference between LB and LI is that the former offers a long-term 
sustainable approach to the construction, rehabilitation and maintenance of assets with the 
benefits of local employment creation and cost-effectiveness. In the Cambodia context, 
scope for the LB approach is large since past evidence has demonstrated that it could be 
cheaper than the equipment-based approach for constructing, rehabilitating and maintaining 
rural roads and other infrastructure works. Mahmood (2005) summarises evidence on the 
cost effectiveness of the LB approach in Cambodia from evidence on ILO projects and 
studies. In 2000, the unskilled wage rate for rural gravel road construction was equivalent to 
US$1.00 per day and at that rate the construction cost was US$5,700 per km while the cost 
of equipment based construction was US$8,600. The break-even wage rate, i.e. the wage 
rate at which the LB and equipment based costs are the same, was US$3.8 per day. The 
break-even rate is likely to be higher now because of the greater cost escalation of the 
equipment based approach. 
 
EG and LI approaches provide short-term income support through employment though of 
course such support may be continued over some years if the situation requires it. The LB 
approach is consistent with and appropriate for addressing chronic poverty and 
underemployment. The more labour intensive approach may also be effective in asset 
creation and maintenance for small community projects if adequate technical support and 
non-labour inputs are provided. The public works component of the SSN in Cambodia 
combines two objectives: (a) provision of emergency relief for the poor and vulnerable where 
and when it is needed, and (b) a LB approach to infrastructure works which provides a base 
level of social protection where it is needed. While the LB approach performs a social 
protection function, since it is cost effective, it would be undertaken for planned infrastructure 
projects irrespective of the safety net function. A simulation (del Ninno, Subbarao and 
Milazzo, 2009) showed that the cost of transferring $1.0 to poor people through public works 
in a low income country with an average poverty rate of 50 per cent would be $2.5 if future 
gains from assets created are included and $3.6 if only current benefits are considered. If 
labour-based works are undertaken because they are the most cost-effective approach to 
implementing a planned programme of works and which would have been implemented 
irrespective of the SSN function they fulfil, the opportunity cost of delivering $1.0 to the poor 
would be lower.  
   
5.2 Labour intensive and labour-based approaches on the 
proposed programme: Wage rate differentiation 
 
The public works component of the proposed SSN is expected to include LI and LB 
components. The LI approach is proposed for smaller village level and sub district works 
(e.g. village roads and communal ponds) and the LB approach for larger rural infrastructure 
works (e.g. tertiary roads, small scale irrigation and flood protection) requiring more technical 
input (Edmonds, 2010). The LB component may require a higher “efficiency wage”41 
because LB workers will be required to work under closer supervision, work to more exacting 
                                                 
40
 International evidence on labour policies and practices and their effectiveness discussed by Tajgman and de 
Veen (1998) confirm this. 
41
 Efficiency wage is a wage rate above the market rate paid to ensure better performance in the form of higher 
productivity or efficiency and reduce labour turnover. 
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standards and achieve higher productivity42 than workers on LI projects. As noted earlier, 
international experience shows that the consequences of too low wages on LB programmes 
are: (a) high labour turnover and absenteeism, and (b) low productivity of workers who 
remain on the project (Tajgman and de Veen, 1998). Therefore, it is necessary to 
differentiate between LI and LB components with respect to the wage rate. For such 
differentiation to be acceptable, it should be shown to be clearly justifiable and defensible on 
the grounds of nature of work and implementation mode.  
 
One approach to wage setting where there are LI and LB components is to set a higher pay 
rate for LB projects reflecting the efficiency wage requirement. Underlying such an approach 
would be the premise that the distinction between LB projects creating assets and LI projects 
primarily providing social protection would prevail. However, the approach adopted by CARD 
for the public works based SSN is to use it as a vehicle for investment in rural infrastructure 
assets (Edmonds, 2010). In accordance with this approach, the aim is to strengthen the 
technical capacity for implementing LI projects and to provide the necessary non-labour 
inputs to create valuable local assets.  
 
Therefore, in setting the wage rate, considerations of: (a) requiring participants to work 
productively, and (b) reducing turnover and absenteeism are as relevant for LI projects as for 
LB projects. Further, in practice, differentiation between LI and LB wage rates would be 
difficult to maintain for projects being implemented under the SSN umbrella, especially 
where projects are in close physical proximity. Given the consistent investment approach 
taken by CARD with respect to LB and LI components and the pragmatic issue of 
comparability, a single uniform wage rate for LI and LB components seems reasonable.   
 
An element of differentiation between LI and LB projects, which does not have direct 
implications for wage setting is related to programming and planning. LB works will typically 
be planned development investment projects and maintenance undertaken by a number of 
ministries and local government agencies. As noted earlier, such planned investment and 
maintenance would have been implemented irrespective of the need for the SSN. It is 
assumed that these activities contribute to the SSN function at a lower resource cost since 
the projects would have been implemented irrespective of the SSN objective. However, if the 
planned activities are not sufficient to alleviate the chronic poverty and underemployment to 
the level desired, such activities would have to be expanded to meet the SSN objective.  
 
Another reason for considering wage rate differentiation is differences in labour market 
conditions in different locations and at different times of the year. In practice, for a number of 
reasons, a uniform SSN wage rate is desirable and is being envisaged for the proposed 
public works component of the SSN. A uniform wage rate would reduce competition between 
projects and programmes. It would also make it easier to communicate programme 
objectives and the related standard wage rate to different levels of government 
administration and programme beneficiaries.  Further, the emphasis on the investment 
aspect of public works combined with a single uniform wage rate to provide the safety net 
could strengthen the commitment to of different levels of government to the programme and 
stimulate donor support.   
 
One concern is that a single uniform wage rate may not be adequate to address variations in 
poverty incidence, and living standards and labour supply response between regions and 
locations within them. Based on CSES 2004, World Bank (2006) estimates that the rural 
areas of Tonle Sap and Mountain / Plateau regions experience both the highest poverty 
                                                 
42
 On LB projects and programmes, setting given tasks and making payment conditional on completion of the 
task has been found to be a good way of linking pay to performance since it is relatively simple to supervise and 
administer (Tajgman and de Veen, 1998). Task work is also generally preferred by participants, especially if it is 
close to home since it enables them to combine participation with other commitments. This is an especially 
important consideration for women.  
 80 
headcounts and the most pronounced poverty severity. Poverty headcount measures in rural 
Tonle Sap and rural Mountain/Plateau regions were, respectively, 45 and 56 per cent. 
Poverty severity measures in both regions were about twice the national average. While 
poverty will have reduced since CSES 200443, the rural areas in these two regions are likely 
to have higher poverty incidence and severity than the rest of Cambodia. Further, as 
evidence discussed in section 4.3 shows, there are variations in conditions within regions 
reflected in the labour supply response.  
 
Arguably, a uniform wage rate is equitable in that the same amount is paid for similar work 
and the targeting of poor people across the country is at the given uniform wage rate. The 
labour supply response for public works projects at a given wage rate is likely to be higher in 
poor areas. The level of public works activities will have to be responsive to these regional 
and local differences. On the balance of arguments, a single uniform wage rate for the public 
works component of the SSN is proposed.  
5.3 Setting the wage rate: Principles and issues 
 
Samson et al (2006) state that the “determination of the appropriate wage rate for a public 
works programme is a matter of balancing the practicalities of targeting with the objectives of 
social protection.” The wage rate plays a role in targeting the poor but, as evidence 
presented in section 4.2 and later discussion in this section demonstrate, the situation is 
rather more complex casting doubt on the wage rate as the sole targeting instrument. 
Further, if the wage rate and the amount of employment offered are too low, the social 
protection impact will be limited. There are also a number of other relevant aspects related to 
the level of the wage rate. The first is that if the wage rate is too low, it may not attract 
productive workers and provide sufficient incentive to work productively. This is especially 
important for LB works as noted in the previous section, but also relevant for LI works to 
achieve adequate levels of performance.  
 
On the other hand, if the wage rate is too high, it may draw away labour from farming and 
other productive activities. However, high wage rates on suitably phased public works would 
not have seriously disruptive effects. Further, if market wage rates for unskilled labour are 
too low and a cause of poverty for those who rely on wage employment for their livelihoods, 
a higher public works wage rate may provide a floor for wage rates especially if the public 
works programme is sufficiently large or an EG. There is evidence that on the Maharashtra 
Employment Guarantee Scheme (MEGS) and the National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Scheme (NREGS) have contributed to establishing a floor for wage rates for landless 
agricultural workers, the lowest paid and poorest group.44 
 
The evidence in Cambodia indicates that the rural labour market is well developed and there 
are additional rural and urban employment opportunities in and outside Cambodia. 
Therefore, on balance, during normal times (i.e. when there are no economic or natural 
shocks), it is not necessary for the SSN wage rate to perform the function of setting the floor 
for rural wage rates. During periods of economic or natural shocks which lead to a reduction 
in employment opportunities, disruption of livelihoods and fall in market wage rates, the SSN 
wage rate would provide a floor. Therefore in setting the SSN wage rate, it is necessary to 
ensure that the wage rate would provide an acceptable level of support to the vulnerable 
during and after crises.       
 
                                                 
43
 Poverty level estimates based on later data are not available because the CSES 2007 household sample is too 
small to make such estimates reliably.   
44
 It should be noted that MEGS and NREGS are employment guarantee schemes (EGS) to which all households 
have access. The SSN in Cambodia is not intended to be an EGS.   
 81 
Another consideration related to the targeting objective is the role of the wage rate in 
ensuring effective and efficient use of a given amount of resources to target the poor and 
vulnerable. The conventional recommendation is to use the wage rate as the main if not the 
sole targeting device. The underlying assumption is that all economically active members of 
poor households have lower opportunity costs of labour than all members of better-off 
households. If this supposition holds, in principle, the wage rate could be used as the sole 
targeting device. For a given programme budget, the wage rate could be set at a level which 
would attract just sufficient labour from the poorest households within the available budget 
though such a wage rate level is unlikely to offer sufficient incentive for participants to work 
productively. 
 
Empirical evidence put forward to support the role of the wage rate as the principle or sole 
targeting device include Teklu (1994) who found that where the public works wage rate is 
increased, non-poor inclusion errors also increase, and Ravallion, Datt and Chaudhuri 
(1993) who found that non-poor participation increased significantly after the upward revision 
of the wage rate on the Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme (MEGS). While these 
studies and other similar evidence support the plausible general proposition that with higher 
wage rates the labour supply response will be higher and there will be a tendency for more 
members of better off households to participate, they do not make the case for the wage rate 
as the sole targeting device to ensure participation by the poor and exclusion of the non-
poor.  
 
This is not merely a theoretical issue but an important point for policy making and wage 
setting. If the premise that the wage rate is a highly effective targeting device is accepted, 
any participation by members of non-poor households is assumed to be because the wage 
rate is too high or that the programme is poorly implemented. The recommendation resulting 
from such a conclusion on the wage rate would be to lower it to improve targeting. In 
practice, perfect targeting based on the wage rate is rarely achieved and the reasons for this 
are not simply too high wage rates or poor management. 
 
There could be sound economically rational reasons for members of non-poor households to 
participate in public works at low wage rates and for members of poor households to hold 
out for higher wages (McCord, 2004 and 2005 and Barrett and Clay, 2003). Based on 
evidence from a study of participants on FFW projects in Ethipoia, Barrett and Clay (2003) 
show that the value of labour varies considerably within and between households, 
depending on the amount of labour available in the household and access to productive 
assets such as land. Members of poor households may face more severe time constraints 
and have higher opportunity costs than some members of better-off households who are 
willing to work for lower wages to make their contribution to the household budget. This 
variation in the value of labour renders public works employment at a given wage attractive 
to surplus labour in less poor households in some cases but unattractive to poorer 
households with limited access to labour. 
 
There are clearly implications of the above discussion and evidence from the CARD / ILO 
survey described in section 4.2 for the role of the wage rate as a targeting device. The wage 
rate does perform a targeting function and setting it at or below the market wage rate to 
target the relatively poor and to reduce potential adverse effects on other economic activities 
is sound. However, the targeting effectiveness of the wage rate should not be overstated. 
Reduction of the wage rate to a lower level is unlikely to make significant improvements in 
targeting and any improvement is likely to be at the cost of reducing the welfare impact for 
participating households.     
 
An important practical question is whether the wage rate should be supplemented with other 
instruments. A problem with introducing additional targeting instruments is that if they require 
collection of information about households’ living standards and assets and use of 
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administrative procedures for selecting households and giving them access to the 
programme, the targeting costs would be high and ensuring efficient administration without 
leakages would be a challenge. Further the advantages of the wage rate as a low cost self-
targeting mechanism would be lost. 
 
One possible option is to ration employment to a maximum number of days. This approach 
has been used on public works programmes to limit costs but it does not improve targeting. 
An alternative is to make use of information from the ID Poor program to select participants 
where such information is available. Additional filtering and selection using local community 
participation may be required if the number of ID Poor willing to participate exceeds 
programme capacity or to include households which might have fallen into poverty after the 
identification of the ID Poor. An approach to rationing which is relatively simple and 
inexpensive to administer and can be open and transparent is random selection from those 
wishing to participate. However, this approach is not effective in discriminating between 
those from poor and non-poor households among those willing to participate.           
     
In summary, if the SSN wage rate is too high (i.e. significantly above the relevant market 
wage rate), especially on large scale employment intensive programmes the consequences 
are: 
 fewer jobs created and therefore fewer persons and  households benefiting; 
 less effective targeting of poor if the wage rate is the only targeting mechanism, and 
 possible distorting effects on other sectors (though in the rural context, if the works 
are phased in the slack agricultural season and other employment opportunities are 
limited in the slack season, the distorting effects may not be serious).  
 
Possible implications of wage rates being too low are: 
 insufficient welfare impact (especially if contributing to the livelihoods of participants 
is an important objective), and 
 low morale, high turnover and low productivity on LB and LI programmes and 
projects.  
 
An important conclusion from the brief review of relevant principles and some international 
evidence is that while the wage rate has a role to play in targeting the poor in the provision of 
social protection, setting the wage rate at the appropriate level is not the silver bullet which 
will achieve perfect targeting at low cost. The aspects to be considered and balanced in 
setting the wage rate are: 
 targeting effectiveness; 
 any disruptive effect of the wage rate on other economic activities (labour shortages 
or high wage) which are influenced by the wage rate as well as the timing and scale 
of public works; 
 whether there is a need for the social protection wage rate to set the floor for wage 
rates; 
 provision of sufficient incentive to achieve adequate productivity levels for LB and LI 
operations, and 
 the available budget and other resources are being used effectively for the provision 
of social protection and asset creation and maintenance. 
 
The general observations and recommendations on wage setting in this section, which are 
applied below to make the more specific recommendations. An important aspect not 
addressed so far is the labour supply response to alternative wage rates. This has 
implications for the size of the programme and its welfare impact. In section 5.4 we review 
the relevant evidence and make recommendation on the LI wage rate. Section 6 goes on to 
examine the estimated labour supply responses at the recommended and selected 
alternative wage rates and their implications for the programme budget and welfare impact.   
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5.4 Evidence on relevant wage rates and the recommended wage 
rate 
 
In this section we briefly review the relevant evidence on wage rates from the CARD / ILO 
study and other sources before making recommendations on the wage rate. Most of the 
evidence has been discussed above but some additional material from recent reports and 
practice has been added. 
 
Table 5.2 summarises the evidence. Rows 1 and 2 in the table indicate the views expressed 
at the CARD / ILO FGDs. The first row provides information on agricultural wage rates and 
the second on acceptable wage rates for public works. According to FGD participants, the 
rural wage rate in agriculture close to the villages and further afield was in the 10,000 to 
12,000 riel per day range with some regional variations. The FGD participants in three out of 
the four locations (the exception was the village in the Plateau / Mountain region) also felt 
that a wage rate similar to the agricultural wage rate or a little lower would be acceptable for 
public works.  
 
At first sight, the FGD evidence is not fully compatible with the evidence in row 3 on actual 
earnings of those in the ILO / CARD sample who had been engaged in paid employment or 
self-employment during the reference week. For almost 50 per cent of those who had cash 
earnings, the equivalent pay per day was 9,000 riel or lower (Table 3.17). However, the 
mean earnings were 11,000 riel and the median was 10,000 (Tables 3.17 and 3.18). The 
cash earners included those in self-employment including petty trading and selling farm 
produce. It is also not clear whether the pay per day relates to a full day’s work. Almost 18 
per cent of those engaged in economic activity during the seven day reference period had 
worked for less than 10 hours. For some it may include conversion of monthly pay in regular 
employment where daily equivalent pay rates are typically at the low end and there may be 
in kind supplements such as food (e.g. for someone in domestic service paid monthly). 
Therefore some of the activities and earnings are not comparable with casual daily paid 
wage labour requiring manual work with the expectation of meeting productivity targets. 
 
In response to the question on acceptable pay for public works employment requiring 
manual work, 9,000 riel or lower was indicated as an acceptable wage rate by 12.5 per cent 
of economically active respondents45, for 22 per cent of the economically active, 10,000 riel 
or lower was acceptable and for 34 per cent of the economically active 12,000 riel or less 
was acceptable (row 4 in Table 5.2). However, as noted in section 4.3, there were 
substantial differences between villages in this respect with larger percentages finding 5,000 
and 9,000 riel per day acceptable in villages with larger numbers engaged in cash earnings.   
 
In all 1074 persons in the sample declared availability for public works employment at some 
wage rate, i.e. an average of almost 2.5 persons per household. Limiting participation to one 
person per household is not being contemplated at present. Nevertheless, it is useful to 
examine the labour supply response if access to programme employment is limited in this 
way since such a limitation is one option if those wishing to participate exceed labour 
requirement and resources are limited. The analysis also provides insights into the targeting 
effectiveness of the wage rate and labour supply response to a given wage rate. 
 
  
  
                                                 
45
 Those who had engaged in an economic activity for at least one hour during the reference period or were 
available for work (see section 3.3.4). 
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Table 5.2: Summary of evidence on wage rates and earnings 
 Source Wage rates and earnings Comments 
1. CARD / ILO FGD 
Rural wage rates 
 
 
Agricultural wage rates in 10,000 to 
12,000 riel per day range. 
Some regional variation with 
somewhat higher wage rates in 
Mekong and Plateau / Mountain 
locations. 
Pay on a daily basis, normally 
related to performance.  
Pay could be lower – 5,000 to 
7,000 riel per day if in advance.  
2. CARD / ILO FGD 
Acceptable public works 
wage rate 
Wage rate comparable to agricultural 
wage rates thought to be acceptable.   
More specifically, at the lower end 
of the agricultural wage rate range 
and even a little lower. 
3. CARD / ILO actual 
earnings (all activities – 
wage employment, self-
employment and 
subsistence production) 
For 48% of those with cash earnings, pay 
was equivalent to 9,000 riel or lower.  
Earnings are 10,000 riel per day or less 
for 16.5% of the economically active. 
Mean: 11,200 riel. 
Median: 10,000 riel.  
  
There is a wide distribution of 
earnings rates (less than 1,000 to 
100,000 riel per day). 10,000 riel is 
the mode with 18% of the sample 
earning this wage rate.  
Wages and earnings may be 
somewhat lower than normal 
because of financial crisis. 
4. CARD / ILO stated 
acceptable wage rate for 
public works employment 
– all respondents 
9,000 riel per day or less acceptable for 
12.5% of economically active. 
10,000 riel or less acceptable for 22% of 
economically active. 
12,000 riel or less acceptable for 35% of 
economically active. 
With stated acceptable wage rate, 
there is a possibility of a 
bargaining element or unrealistic 
expectations especially in villages 
with limited cash earning as 
reference.  
5. CARD / ILO stated 
acceptable wage rate for 
public works employment 
– all respondents – 
“unrealistic” locations 
taken out 
9,000 riel per day or less acceptable for 
18.4% of economically active. 
10,000 riel or less acceptable for 26.9% of 
economically active. 
12,000 riel or less acceptable for 31.4% of 
economically active. 
Stated acceptable wage rate 
adjusted by eliminating 
observations from two villages with 
limited cash earning experience.  
5. CARD / ILO stated 
acceptable wage rate for 
public works employment 
– only one per household 
9,000 riel per day or less acceptable for 
6.6% of economically active and 23% of 
households. 
10,000 riel or less acceptable for 11% of 
economically active and 38.5% of 
households. 
12,000 riel or less acceptable for 15.2% of 
economically active and 53% of 
households. 
 
For households with more than 
one person available for public 
works employment, the wage rate 
is for the person with the lowest 
acceptable wage rate. 
At least one person per household 
available for public works 
employment in 436 out of 600 (72 
per cent) households at some 
wage rate. 
6. 2008 survey of 
households cited in 
World Bank / UNICEF 
(2010)  
Agricultural wage rates in May-June 2008: 
Transplanting rice: $2.50 (10,500 riel) per 
day. 
Harvesting, weeding and transplanting: 
$2.75 (11,600 riel) per day. 
Land clearing: $3.25 (13,700 riel) per day. 
Construction: $3.38 (14,200 riel) per day. 
% increase in wage rates in 
nominal terms ranging between 35 
and 67% since mid-2007. Some 
reduction likely since then because 
of the financial crisis (see row 7 
below). 
7. CDRI vulnerable workers’ 
surveys 
About 10,300 riel per day for rice field 
workers in the February and May 2009 
surveys. Down to 8,800 riel per day in 
August 2009. 
Unskilled construction workers (Phnom 
Penh) 14,400 riel in May, small fall by 
August 2009.  
Small sample. Sharp increase in 
rice field workers’ wage rates since 
November 2007 because of higher 
rice prices. Fall in August 2009 
possibly because of the financial 
crisis and fall in rice prices from 
the peak in 2008. 
8. WFP Payment in rice equivalent to about 
10,000 riel.  
3.5kg of medium quality rice given 
for 1 cu m of earthworks (value 
about 1,800 riel). Estimated cash 
value of rice per day assumes 
productivity of 1.5cu m per day. 
9. ADB  Emergency Food 
Assistance Project 
Payment in cash equivalent to WFP 
payment. 
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For households with more than one person willing to participate, a household member with 
the lowest declared wage rate is included46. At least one person declared availability for 
public works employment in 437 of the 600 households in the sample. Table 5.2 (row 5) 
shows that at least one person from 23 per cent of households would be willing to participate 
at a wage rate of 9,000 riel per day or lower. The corresponding percentages of households 
for 10,000 riel and 12,000 riel are 38.5 per cent and 53.0 per cent respectively. 
 
The comparison of rows 3 and 4 shows that for 50 per cent of those with cash earnings, pay 
was equivalent to10,000 riel or lower while only 22 per cent of the economically active 
indicated that10,000 riel was acceptable pay for public works employment. There are also 
differences in percentages at lower and higher wage rates. These differences between the 
actual earnings and stated acceptable wage rates (rows 3 and 4 in Table 5.2 and Tables 
3.17 and 4.1) need to be considered in more detail. There are three possible explanations: 
 The actual earnings include earnings from a range of activities, including petty 
trading and domestic service which are not comparable with physical work 
requirements on public works projects. 
 The actual earnings in November 2009 when the survey was undertaken may include 
some distress effects as a consequence of the financial crisis and other 
circumstances. Kimsun, Chan Hang and Socheth (2009) cited in section 2.1 found a 
fall in household non-farm income for a sample of 90 rural households across all 
regions of between 45 and 50 per cent.  
 An element of bargaining and unrealistic expectations (section 4.3) in the FGDs and 
the responses to the questions on acceptable pay in the CARD / ILO questionnaire 
cannot be ruled out. There were some high stated acceptable wages. About 32 per 
cent of those indicating availability for public works indicated a minimum acceptable 
wage rate of 15,000 riel and just under less than 10 per cent wanted more than 
20,000 riel. Therefore, in setting the wage rate, judgement is required to balance the 
actual earnings in November 2009 affected by the distress caused by the global 
financial crisis and aspirational stated acceptable wage rates based on pre-crisis 
wage rates and an element of bargaining. 
 
It should also be noted that since 33 per cent of economically active are engaged in cash 
earnings, those with earnings below10,000 riel as a proportion of the economically active in 
the sample is much lower (16.5 per cent, row 3 in Table 5.2) and lower than comparable with 
the per cent who stated this level of wage rate to be acceptable for public works 
employment. The reservation wage concept has been used below to interpret the evidence 
and reconcile the observed distribution of earnings and stated acceptable wage rates. 
 
Rural wage rates for unskilled labour rose sharply in nominal terms between mid-2007 and 
mid-2008. According to a survey of over 2200 households cited in World Bank / UNICEF 
(2010), wage rates rose between 35 and 67 per cent over this period depending on the type 
of activity. In May-June 2008, they were $2.50 or 10,500 riel per day for transplanting and 
higher for other activities (row 6 in Table 5.2). For the small samples from the vulnerable 
workers’ surveys, Kimsun and Dorina (2009) find the average wage rates of rice field 
workers and unskilled construction workers to be approximately 10,300 and 14,400 riel per 
day respectively in May 2009 (row 7 in Table 5.2). Rice field workers’ wage rates had 
apparently fallen sharply to 8,800 riel per day by August 2009 while construction workers’ 
wage rates had fallen slightly (to 14,300 riel).  
 
The WFP Food for Work (FFW) programme provides participating households employment 
for some 30 days47 for which each household receives the equivalent in food of some $70 or 
                                                 
46
 See section 4.2 for further details. 
47
 CARD estimates reported in Edmonds (2010). 
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$2.25 per working day (about 9,500 riel)48. Figures for the ADB cash for work programmes 
are not yet available although as they follow the WFP procedures it is estimated that the 
wage rate and duration of employment are similar to the Food for Work programmes.  
 
It is reasonable to conclude from the above evidence from the CARD / ILO wage rate study 
and other sources that 10,000 riel per day has been the base going rural wage rate in 
agriculture and other comparable economic activities. While the situation is more complex 
with a spread of wage rates for different activities and there are seasonal and regional 
variations, taking account of rural wage and earnings rates and efficiency wage 
considerations, 10,000 riel is a good benchmark for setting the wage rate for the public 
works component of the proposed SSN.  
 
Making the final recommendation requires an element of judgement based on the principles 
summarised at the end of section 5.3 and a number of other factors including: 
 the location of work; 
 the nature and conditions of work; 
 the need to strike a balance between any element of distress in the wages and 
earnings reported and aspirational stated acceptable wage rates, and 
 the impact of the wage rate and amount of employment offered on participants’ 
households. 
 
Typically, public works employment will be close to the homes of potential workers in the 
less busy agricultural season and will be of relatively short duration (1 to 3 months). Whether 
it is LI or LB, to ensure that it is effective in asset creation or maintenance, it will be on a task 
rate basis and physical in nature. The work requirement will therefore not be nominal and 
therefore needs to be rewarded on a basis comparable with other similar work. For such 
employment in rural areas, the wage rate in agriculture and other manual work is a suitable 
comparator with two qualifications. The first is that the wage rate should not be so high as to 
disrupt other economic activities. The second is that recent wage rates and earnings may 
have been depressed by the impact of the global financial crisis.  
 
The task rate basis also offers attractions for participants since they can combine the work 
with other economic and non-economic tasks, especially if the work is close to home. 
Therefore, location of public works employment is another consideration. Evidence from 
CARD / ILO FGDs and other sources indicates that there are higher costs and risks of being 
“cheated” by employers away from home and concerns about falling sick away from home. 
There is also preference for women to work closer to home because they can combine such 
work with other tasks and the higher risks associated with work further away.            
 
There is evidence from CDRI vulnerable workers surveys and other sources that wage rates 
have fallen since mid 2008 as a consequence of the global financial crisis and deterioration 
in relations with Thailand (Kimsun and Dorina, 2009; Kimsun, Chan Hang and Socheth, 
2009). These “distress” wage rates and earnings are not a satisfactory basis for setting the 
public works wage rate since they do not reflect the normal labour market situation and their 
social protection impact on households would be low. On the other hand, there is likely to be 
an element of bargaining in the declared acceptable wage rates. They may also be 
aspirational based on the higher wage rates and earnings before the impact of the financial 
crisis.  
 
Based on the above evidence and balancing the considerations set out above, a daily wage 
rate of10,000 riel (i.e. the rural benchmark wage rate) is proposed as the public works SSN 
                                                 
48
 The cash equivalent pay depends on the price of rice, World Bank / UNICEF (2010) arrives at higher estimates 
of cash equivalent pay from FFW work based on higher productivity and price of rice assumptions. 
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wage rate. This wage rate would be roughly equivalent to $57 perMonth49 and is comparable 
with the only minimum wage of $50 plus the monthly living allowance of $6 currently in place 
in Cambodia (for garment workers). Section 2 shows that with all allowances, the actual 
average pay of garment workers has been substantially higher than $56 per month. Since 
jobs in the garment sector are close to Phnom Penh and a large proportion of workers are 
migrants, living costs are higher. 
 
An important implication of the proposed uniform public works wage rate for the country is 
that the wage rate cannot be used as a specific targeting mechanism for matching local 
requirement for EGPWP employment and programme activity. Tables 4.14 and 4.15 show 
variations in stated labour supply response and earnings which suggest that the labour 
supply response is likely to be much higher in the Mekong and Coastal regions. This is 
somewhat counterintuitive since based on the latest evidence, Tonle Sap and Plateau / 
Mountain regions are the poorest (World Bank, 2004). However, within regions, there are 
likely to be substantial variations between villages. Table 5.3 shows the mean consumption 
per head for the sample households in the CARD / ILO study villages. The table shows that 
the three villages in Tonle Sap are the poorest, followed by a village in Mekong and then one 
of the Plateau / Mountain region villages (Khhan Chor). The two villages with the highest 
consumption per head are in the Plateau / Mountain (Dang Kdar) and Mekong (Prek 
Khmeng) region respectively50. 
     
Table 5.3: Consumption per head of sample households by village 
 
    Consumption per head 
Region Village Mean Minimum Maximum 
Tonle Sap Khsach Chiros 3,625 1,203 35,788 
Tonle Sap Andong Trach 3,672 1,323 9,153 
Tonle Sap Tuol Krasaing 4,461 1,379 10,840 
Mekong Babaong 5,052 1,826 33,945 
Plateau / Mountain Kanhchor 5,083 1,698 16,952 
Coastal Kompong Thnoat 5,326 1,141 15,080 
Plateau / Mountain Dang Kdar 8,627 1,447 72,578 
Mekong Prek Khmeng 10,869 1,891 86,267 
  Total 5,983 1,141 86,267 
  Source: MOPS database 
 
Further the number of persons who reported being engaged in cash earnings and level of 
cash earnings are not clearly related to the level of consumption. Table 4.15 shows that Prek 
Khmeng (the village with the highest consumption per head) has a much larger proportion of 
persons engaged in cash earning at a wider range of earnings than Dang Kdar, the village 
with the second highest consumption per head. This difference in earnings is also reflected 
in stated willingness to undertake public works (Table 4.15). The Coastal village of Kompong 
Thnoat has greater similarities with Prek Khmeng in terms of cash earning activity and stated 
willingness to take up public works than the other village Mekong village (Babaong).   
 
From the examination of evidence at the village level, it appears that local conditions 
(agricultural labour requirements, land ownership and alternative employment opportunities) 
are more important in determining labour supply response than broader regional 
characteristics. For the public works based SSN, the implication is that the SSN needs to be 
responsive to local needs. This will require forward planning in the form of a stock of 
                                                 
49
10,000 riel for an average of 24 working days per month amounts to 240,000 riel which converts to $56.9 at the 
$1.00 = 4,215 riel exchange rate.  
50
 This comparison does not take account of differences in cost of living which are likely to be somewhat higher in 
the Plateau / Mountain region. 
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appropriately designed LI and LB projects, implementation capacity, funding provision and 
procedures for registering demand for public work employment. During periods of crisis, it 
would be preferable to increase the number of days of employment offered than to raise the 
wage rate to reduce any disruptive effects on other economic activities. 
 
Arguably, under a single uniform wage rate, as long as there are no large variations in the 
costs of living between parts of the country, a low response in a region or a locality reflects 
less need for social protection and therefore the wage rate will act as a reasonable 
mechanism for regional targeting. The recommended wage rate is based on evidence and 
judgement on the prevailing situation at the time of the study. The initial assessment is 
based on a sample and therefore may have to be modified when evidence from actual 
experience at the pilot and early stages of implementation become available. Studies of the 
labour supply response and the welfare impact of employment on households should be 
included at these stages. The wage rate should be kept under review and adjusted 
periodically if necessary because of changes in labour market conditions and cost of living. 
NIS intends to conduct CSES on a large sample every five years and smaller samples every 
year. The surveys include questions on economic activity and wage rates. A bi-annual 
review of the LI wage rate based on CSES evidence on rural wage rates and changes in the 
cost of living is recommended. 
 
There should be no difference between the wage paid to men and women undertaking 
similar work. A uniform wage rate for LI work would clearly avoid such differentiation. The 
principle of non-discrimination between men and women (equal pay for work of equal value) 
should also apply to LB employment. Measures may be needed to remove obstacles to 
women participating in EGPWPs though the CARD / ILO evidence indicates that if the wage 
rate is 10,000 riel per day, the number of men and women willing to participate will be about 
equal. 
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6. Labour availability estimates, programme costs and 
household level welfare impact 
6.1 Wage rates and labour supply response 
 
Important aspects to be addressed before finalising recommendations on the wage rate are 
the relationship between the wage rate and the labour supply response and its implications 
for programme costs and the welfare impact of employment. As Figure 6.1 shows the wage 
bill part of the programme is determined by the wage rate, the labour supply response to it 
and any additional rationing rules applied. Based on earlier assessment of the targeting 
effectiveness of the wage rate, it is assumed that while the number of persons available at a 
given wage rate will be a response to the wage rate offered, the wage rate by itself will not 
be sufficient to limit the programme to the level affordable within the programme budget. It 
will therefore be necessary to apply additional rationing rules (e.g. limiting access to one 
person per household) or additional selection criteria for participants.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 shows that the level of protection provided and its targeting also depend on the 
combination of the wage rate, the labour supply response and the rationing and participant 
selection rules and procedures applied. Likely labour supply response as indicated by stated 
availability for public works employment and the distribution of cash earnings of CARD / ILO 
survey respondents were considered in proposing the wage rate of10,000 riel per day. 
Labour supply response to this wage rate and alternative wage rates and their implications 
for programme costs and the social protection level provided and have been presented in 
this section to assess the soundness of the wage rate recommendation and to enable 
calculations of programme costs and social protection under alternative assumptions to 
consider options and to conduct sensitivity analysis. 
 
As noted in section 4.1, the wage rates at which respondents indicated their availability for 
public works could be interpreted as their stated reservation wage rate (RWR). The labour 
supply for a given wage rate is the total number of persons who are available for 
employment at that and lower wage rates. This was identified as the stated labour supply 
response in Tables 4.1. Column 6 in Table 4.1 showed the stated labour supply as a 
proportion of the total number of persons in the 15 plus age range.  
No of days of 
employment or 
other rationing rule
Labour supply
Number of persons
Wage rate
Planning and 
operations
Wage bill and 
programme 
costs
Social 
protection 
level
Figure 6.1: Wage rate, labour supply, programme costs and social protection
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A problem with stated intentions is that response to actual employment opportunities may be 
very different from response to a hypothetical question. In section 4.3, it was noted that at 
the village level, the distribution of stated acceptable wage rates reflected the distribution of 
cash earnings and in the villages in which the number of persons engaged in cash earnings 
was limited, the stated wage rates tended to be high. Therefore, the stated labour supply 
response has been compared with two alternatives. The first is the stated labour supply with 
adjustments to eliminate evidence from the villages in which the stated labour supply 
response was judged to be unrealistic. The second is the revealed labour supply response 
based on earnings rates. 
 
In section 4.3 it was noted that in two villages, Khsach Chiros (Tonle Sap) and Dang Kdar 
(Plateau / Mountain), the number of persons engaged in cash earnings was low (Table 14.5) 
and the stated wage rates for public works were very high. According to Table 5.3, Khsach 
Chiros is the village with the lowest consumption per head. Dang Kdar has the second 
highest consumption per head though Prek Khmeng, with higher consumption per capita had 
much higher proportions of persons available at lower wage rates. Therefore, in the adjusted 
stated labour supply, these two villages have been eliminated and for comparison with the 
unadjusted labour supply, the response rates have been scaled up (see Table 6.1).  
 
Comparison of stated intentions with actual earnings would provide a better insight into the 
labour supply response and a more reliable basis for estimating the labour supply response. 
Further, under certain assumptions, evidence on cash earnings can also be interpreted as 
the “revealed” reservation wage rate. More precisely, the distribution of the earnings rates for 
those with cash earnings in the CARD / ILO sample (Table 3.17) can be used to broadly 
represent the revealed labour supply curve under the following assumptions: 
 The RW for those who have undertaken the activity which yielded the cash earnings 
is at or below their earnings rate. 
 Therefore, the distribution of the observed earnings rates is the distribution of the 
upper limits of RWs for the persons engaged in these activities. 
 The distribution of the earnings rates and upper limits of RWs of those with cash 
earnings during the reference period are broadly representative of the upper limits of 
RWs of the economically active. 
 
There is a qualification to comparing the stated and revealed labour supply. As noted earlier, 
the revealed labour supply is based on earnings in a range activities which may not be 
comparable to public works employment and the earnings are during a period influenced by 
the financial crisis. These factors have been taken into account in interpreting the results and 
making estimates of labour supply response. Further, the total number of persons engaged 
in cash earnings is smaller than those who stated availability for pubic works employment at 
some wage rate. Therefore, for comparison, the labour supply response has been scaled up. 
This is reasonable if the number of persons who would be engaged in cash earning is limited 
by the number of such activities available as implied in the assumptions above. 
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Table 6.1: Labour supply response - all respondents - alternative assumptions 
     Stated - all locations Stated - "unrealistic" locations taken out 
Central assumption 
Distribution of cash earnings in 
seven day reference period 
Distribution of cash earnings 
in seven day reference period 
- scaled up for comparison 
High assumption 
Minimum 
acceptable 
pay for 
public 
works (riel 
per day) 
Number of 
respondents 
Cum % of all 
in 15+ age 
range in 
sample 
households 
Number of 
respondents 
Number of 
respondent
s scaled up 
Cum % of all in 
15+ age range 
in sample 
households 
 
Number of 
respondents 
Cum % of all in 
15+ age range in 
sample 
households 
Number of 
respondents 
scaled up 
Cum % of all 
in 15+ age 
range in 
sample 
households 
5000 124 5.3 124 182 7.8 174 7.5 277 11.9 
9000 263 11.3 263 386 16.6 332 14.2 528 22.6 
10000 465 19.9 384 564 24.2 458 19.6 729 31.2 
12000 723 31.0 449 660 28.3 496 21.3 789 33.8 
15000 982 42.1 648 952 40.8 550 23.6 875 37.5 
20000 1067 45.7 726 1067 45.7 617 26.4 982 42.1 
30000 1072 45.9 731 1074 46.0 653 28.0 1039 44.5 
30000+ 1074 46.0 731 1074 46.0 675 28.9 1074 46.0 
Total 
population 
15+ years in 
sample 
2333 
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Table 6.2 shows labour supply responses under alternative assumptions and Figure 6.2 
shows the comparison graphically. The shapes of the labour supply curves are broadly 
similar and the curves remain close to each other with the exception of “Earnings 
distribution” which diverges sharply from the stated labour supply curves above 10,000 riel. 
The divergence could be explained by a shortage of higher paying employment and earning 
opportunities to match the RWs of the rest of the economically active. 
 
While the shapes of the curves are broadly similar, examination of Figure 6.2 and Table 6.1 
shows that there are substantial differences in the labour supply response indicated by the 
evidence at the wage rate of 10,000 riel ranging between 19.9 per cent of the population in 
the 15 plus age range for “Stated – all locations” and 31.2 per cent for “Earnings distribution 
scaled up”. “The Stated – unrealistic locations excluded” and “Earnings distribution” are 
close to each other at this wage rate. Arguably, at higher wage rates, “Earnings distribution” 
is constrained by availability of opportunities rather than supply of labour. Therefore, it 
seems reasonable to use “Stated – unrealistic taken out” as the central assumption for 
estimating the labour supply response and the wage bill with “Earnings distribution scaled 
up” providing a high labour supply estimate.  
 
Table 6.1 and Figure 6.2 represent labour supply responses where there is no limit on the 
number of persons from a household who may participate. Figure 6.2 compares the labour 
supply response with no limit on the number of persons from a household and participation 
limited to one person per household. As noted earlier, a person from a household who stated 
the lowest wage rate among all respondents from the household was selected, with 
additional criteria to eliminate all but one if more than one members of the household stated 
availability at that wage rate (section 4.1).  
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Labour supply response as % of population in 15 + age range 
Figure 6.2: Labour supply response, stated and revealed 
Stated Stated - unrealistic locations excluded 
Earnings distribution Earnings distribution scaled up 
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As Table 6.2 shows, of the 600 households in the sample, at least one person was willing to 
participate from 437 households (i.e. about 73 per cent all sample households) and the rate 
of participation of households at each wage rate level is higher than the rate of participation 
by individuals. Figure 6.3 shows that the labour supply response restricted to one per 
household is lower than the unrestricted labour supply response at each wage rate. This 
limits the labour supply response under the one per household restriction to just under 19 
per cent of the population.  
 
Table 6.2: One per household restricted labour supply as per cent of 15+ population 
 
Minimum acceptable pay for 
public works (riel per day) 
Number of households 
with at least one person 
available for public works 
% of all 
sample 
households 
% of 15+ population 
in sample 
households 
5000 73 12.2 3.1 
9000 137 22.8 5.9 
10000 222 37.0 9.5 
12000 313 52.2 13.4 
15000 404 67.3 17.3 
20000 434 72.3 18.6 
30000 437 72.8 18.7 
30000+ 437 72.8 18.7 
All sample households 600     
Population in sample 15+ 
age range 
2333     
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Figure 6.3: Labour supply response, all and one per household
Stated Stated - 'unrealistic' locations excluded One per household restriction
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6.2 Balancing programme costs and welfare effects 
 
Following the selection of labour supply response under three alternative cases, the (central 
assumption” and a “high” estimate (see section 6.1 and Table 6.1) for the all respondents 
case and the one per household restriction case, some illustrative calculations on 
programme costs are provided in Tables 6.3 to 6.5. The tables assume a public works based 
SSN for an area with a population of 100,000 persons, equivalent to four average sized 
districts. Table 6.3 shows that under the central assumption, if the wage rate is riel10,000, 
about 24 per cent of those in the 15+ age group will be willing to participate. If each person 
is provided 50 days of public works employment, the annual wage bill part of programme 
costs51 will be about $1.84 million.  
 
Table 6.4 shows that if the labour supply response is “high”, the wage bill cost at the wage 
rate of 10,000 riel per day will be about 30 per cent higher. Under the one per household 
restriction, at 10,000 riel per day, one member from about 37 per cent of households would 
participate52. If 50 days of employment per person is offered, the wage bill would be about 
$950,000, about half of the wage bill under the “central assumption” where all respondents 
at the given wage rate are provided employment. Therefore the one per household 
restriction could be an attractive option if the objective is to reach the largest number of 
households though the administrative burden could be high.  
 
Tables 6.3 to 6.5 also show the wage bill costs as per cent of GDP and public sector 
expenditure. For a small programme, the costs are small in relation to the GDP and public 
expenditure. Table 6.6 shows estimates of the wage bill for a national level public works 
based SSN with a wage rate of 10,000 riel. Under the central assumption, the annual wage 
bill would be 2.1 per cent of GDP and 13.5 per cent of public sector expenditure. Under the 
one per household restriction, the wage bill would be much lower. 
 
An Excel workbook (WageRate-LabourSupply-WageBill-Model-Version3) has been used to 
generate the wage bill estimates discussed above. It has been provided to generate 
estimates of programme wage bill costs under alternative assumptions on wage rates, 
labour supply response, the number of days of employment offered and the scope of public 
works activities. The workbook can also be used to assess the welfare impacts in the form of 
earnings from public works employment for households with different levels of living 
standards represented by their levels of consumption. 
          
  
  
                                                 
51
 50 days of public works employment has been used in the calculations for illustration. The workbook used for 
making calculations has been provided for making alternative estimates. Only the wage bill part of programme 
costs have been shown. There will clearly be additional non-labour costs which are likely to be the 30 to 60 per 
cent of total programme costs depending on types of projects and labour intensity.   
52
 Though as noted earlier, such a restriction does not limit programme employment to a specific person but to a 
given number of days of employment per household. 
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Table 6.3: Wage rate, labour supply response and labour cost of programme – all 
respondents, central assumption 
 
Population    
 Cambodia rural total 100,000 
 Cambodia rural 15+ 64,300 
 Persons willing and able to participate at given wage 
rate as proportion of 15+ population    
 5000 7.8 
 9000 16.6 
 10000 24.2 
 12000 28.3 
 15000 40.8 
 Total available at   
5000 5,021 
9000 10,650 
10000 15,549 
12000 18,181 
15000 26,240 
Number of days of employment per person offered   
 50   
 Exchange rate   
 4215   
 Wage bill at Riel US$ 
5000 1,255,292,206 297,815 
9000 4,792,381,697 1,136,983 
10000 7,774,713,018 1,844,535 
12000 10,908,894,204 2,588,113 
15000 19,679,742,328 4,668,978 
    
   Riel US$ 
Wage bill as % of GDP 40,354,410,000,000 9,574,000,000 
5000 0.00 
 9000 0.01 
 10000 0.02 
 12000 0.03 
 15000 0.05 
     
   Riel US$ 
Wage bill as % of public sector expenditure 6,229,770,000,000 1,478,000,000.00 
5000 0.0 
 9000 0.1 
 10000 0.1 
 12000 0.2 
 15000 0.3 
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Table 6.4: Wage rate, labour supply response and labour cost of programme – all 
respondents, high assumption 
 
Population    
 Cambodia rural total 100,000 
 Cambodia rural 15+ 64,300 
 Persons willing and able to participate at given wage 
rate as proportion of 15+ population    
 5000 11.9 
 9000 22.6 
 10000 31.2 
 12000 33.8 
 15000 37.5 
 Total available at   
5000 7,630 
9000 14,559 
10000 20,085 
12000 21,751 
15000 24,119 
Number of days of employment per person offered   
 50   
 Exchange rate   
 4215   
 Wage bill at Riel US$ 
5000 1,907,594,228 452,573 
9000 6,551,599,486 1,554,353 
10000 10,042,277,659 2,382,510 
12000 13,050,575,682 3,096,222 
15000 18,089,255,608 4,291,638 
    
   Riel US$ 
Wage bill as % of GDP 40,354,410,000,000 9,574,000,000 
5000 0.00 
 9000 0.02 
 10000 0.02 
 12000 0.03 
 15000 0.04 
     
   Riel US$ 
Wage bill as % of public sector expenditure 6,229,770,000,000 1,478,000,000.00 
5000 0.0 
 9000 0.1 
 10000 0.2 
 12000 0.2 
 15000 0.3 
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Table 6.5: Wage rate, labour supply response and labour cost of programme – one per 
household restriction 
 
Population    
 Cambodia rural total 100,000 
 Cambodia rural 15+ 6,932,604 
 No of rural households 21,739 
     
 Per cent of households with at least one person willing 
to participate at or below the given wage rate    
 5000 12.2 
 9000 22.8 
 10000 37.0 
 12000 52.2 
 15000 67.3 
 Total available at   
 5000 2,645 
 9000 4,964 
 10000 8,043 
 12000 11,341 
 15000 14,638 
     
 Number of days of employment per person offered   
 50   
 Exchange rate   
 4215   
 Wage bill at Riel US$ 
5000 661,231,884 156,876 
9000 2,233,695,652 529,940 
10000 4,021,739,130 954,149 
12000 6,804,347,826 1,614,317 
15000 10,978,260,870 2,604,570 
  Riel US$ 
Wage bill as % of GDP 40,354,410,000,000 9,574,000,000 
5000 0.00 
 9000 0.01 
 10000 0.01 
 12000 0.02 
 15000 0.03 
     
   Riel US$ 
Wage bill as % of public sector expenditure 6,229,770,000,000 1,478,000,000 
5000 0.0 
 9000 0.0 
 10000 0.1 
 12000 0.1 
 15000 0.2 
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Table 6.6: Wage bill cost as per cent of GDP and public sector expenditure at 10,000 
riel per day wage rate: SSN at national level 
 
  Wage bill as:  
  % of GDP % of public sector 
expenditure 
Central assumption 2.1 13.5 
High estimate 2.7 17.4 
One per household  1.1 7.0 
 
 
Table 6.7 shows the welfare impact or the level of social protection provided by earnings 
from public works employment. The top of the table shows the calculation of average annual 
consumption for households in each consumption per head quintile based on an average 
adult equivalent family size of 4.7 persons. Under the central assumption, the table shows 
the contribution of one person’s participation in the public works SSN programme for 50 
days at alternative wage rates. At a wage rate of 10,000 riel, the contribution made by 
earnings from the SSN would be about 11.5 per cent of the total consumption for an average 
household in the bottom expenditure per capita quintile. If payment is in cash, the 
contribution as a proportion of cash income would be higher. The contribution would 
evidently be lower for households with consumption in the higher quintiles. If more than one 
person from a household participates, the contribution at the household level would clearly 
be higher.  
 
Evidently, during the period when one or more members of a household are participating in a 
public works project, the contribution to the livelihood of the household will be much higher. 
Table 6.8 compares the proposed wage rate of 10,000 riel per day with the consumption per 
head and the consumption per household for households with different living standards. The 
average daily consumption per head of households in the bottom quintile (i.e. the bottom 20 
per cent of households for consumption) in the CARD/ILO survey sample is 2,528 riel. As 
column 4 in the table shows, the wage rate of 10,000 riel is about four times the average per 
capita consumption. Therefore, a household member employed on a public works project at 
the wage rate of 10,000 riel per day would support him or herself and make a very 
substantial contribution to the household livelihood. As would be expected, the contribution 
is smaller in the higher quintiles. Nevertheless, in all except the highest quintile, the 
contribution is well in excess of a single person’s consumption expenditure. 
 
Next we compare the daily earnings from the proposed public works programme with the 
total expenditure of a household. Based on an average adult equivalent household size of 
4.7, the average daily consumption of a household in the bottom quintile is 11,882 riel. 
Therefore, as Table 6.8 shows, the wage rate of 10,000 riel per day is about 84 per cent of 
the daily consumption of an average sized household in the bottom consumption quintile. 
For the second and higher quintiles, the wage rate is a lower per cent of the consumption of 
households as would be expected. Therefore, while the public works wage at 10,000 riel per 
day, if one household member only is engaged in the programme, would not be sufficient to 
meet all the consumption needs of the household, for the bottom two quintiles, it would meet 
a very substantial proportion of the basic needs of households.  
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Table 6.7: Wage rate and welfare impact on households 
 
Average annual hh consumption
1
 Riel US$ 
1st quintile (bottom 20%) 4,353,415 1033 
2nd quintile (next 20%) 5,925,540 1406 
3rd quintile (middle 20%) 7,608,504 1805 
4th quintile (above average 20%) 10,073,875 2390 
5th quintile (top 20%) 26,600,426 6311 
 Number of days of employment per person  50   
   
Pay per day 9,000   
PW wage contribution as % of hh consumption - 1 hh 
member      
1st quintile (bottom 20%) 10.3   
2nd quintile (next 20%) 7.6   
3rd quintile (middle 20%) 5.9   
4th quintile (above average 20%) 4.5   
5th quintile (top 20%) 1.7   
      
Pay per day 10,000   
PW wage contribution as % of hh consumption - 1 hh 
member     
1st quintile (bottom 20%) 11.5   
2nd quintile (next 20%) 8.4   
3rd quintile (middle 20%) 6.6   
4th quintile (above average 20%) 5.0   
5th quintile (top 20%) 1.9   
      
Pay per day 12,000   
PW wage contribution as % of hh consumption - 1 
member     
1st quintile (bottom 20%) 13.8   
2nd quintile (next 20%) 10.1   
3rd quintile (middle 20%) 7.9   
4th quintile (above average 20%) 6.0   
5th quintile (top 20%) 2.3   
      
Pay per day 15,000   
PW wage contribution as % of hh consumption - 1 
member     
1st quintile (bottom 20%) 17.2   
2nd quintile (next 20%) 12.7   
3rd quintile (middle 20%) 9.9   
4th quintile (above average 20%) 7.4   
5th quintile (top 20%) 2.8   
      
Note: 
1 - Assumptions are average household size in adult equivalent of 4.7. The average 
consumption per head of riel 2,528 per person for the 1
st
 quintile (bottom 20%), riel 
3,427 per person for the 2
nd
 quintile, riel 4,401 per person for the 3
rd
 quintile, riel 5,827 
per person for the 4
th
 quintile and riel 15,386 per person for the 5
th
 quintile (top 20%) 
derived from MOPS data on household consumption. 
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Table 6.8: Comparison of the wage rate with household consumption 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Household 
consumption per 
head quintiles 
Average 
consumption 
per adult 
equivalent 
household 
member 
Total 
consumption 
per household 
of average 
size 
1
 
Wage as 
multiple of 
daily 
consumption 
per person 
Wage rate as % 
of daily hh 
consumption 
1st quintile 2,528.00 11,881.60 3.96 84.16 
2nd quintile 3,427.00 16,106.90 2.92 62.09 
Poverty line 3,166.43 14,882.21 3.16 67.19 
3rd quintile 4,401.00 20,684.70 2.27 48.34 
4th quintile 5,827.00 27,386.90 1.72 36.51 
5th quintile 15,386.00 72,314.20 0.65 13.83 
Note: 1  - Household size is 4.7 adult equivalent persons. Persons in the household below 
the age 15 years are counted as half. 
 
A further issue is that while comparison with consumption expenditure in the lower quintiles 
shows the impact for poor households, it does not indicate whether earnings from public 
works employment provide an acceptable level of income. The living wage concept and its 
applicability in the rural context were discussed in section 2.3. The assumption underlying 
the living wage concept is that a single source of income for a worker should provide an 
adequate standard of living for the worker and his / her dependents. The concept cannot be 
applied in this context without adaptation for two reasons. The first is that rural households 
typically rely on a combination of subsistence production and a number of other income 
sources. The second reason, more specific to the proposed programme, is that employment 
for workers will be of relatively short duration.  
 
Determining what constitutes a living wage in the rural context with varying levels of 
contribution from subsistence production between household would be complex. Therefore, 
the rural poverty line has been proposed as a proxy for the living wage. While the poverty 
line is not precisely the same as the living wage, it represents the minimum acceptable level 
of consumption53 required for a household not to be categorised as poor. Therefore being 
just above the poverty line represents a barely adequate standard of living. Earnings from 
public works employment at the wage rate of 10,000 riel have been compared with the rural 
poverty line to appraise the contribution of public works employment to households attaining 
an adequate livelihood level.    
 
The poverty line for rural Cambodia for 2007 was daily consumption equivalent to 2,367 riel 
per head at current prices (Conway and Samsen, 2009, and World Bank, 2009). Based on 
this poverty line, in 2007 34.7 per cent of the rural population was estimated to fall below the 
poverty line. The 2007 poverty line at 2007 prices cannot be compared with the consumption 
expenditure levels of sample household for 2009 and the proposed wage rate of 10,000 riel 
in early 2010 without making adjustments for inflation which has been substantial during 
2008. NIS data on consumer price inflation (CPI) up to 2008 and CDRI estimates of later 
inflation (Kimsun and Dorina, 2009) have been used to rebase the 2007 poverty line to 2009 
prices. On this basis, the 2007 rural poverty line in broadly comparable 2009/10 prices is 
about 3,166 riel per day of consumption per person.  
                                                 
53
 Food poverty lines have also been recently estimated for Cambodia. The rural food poverty line is about 17 per 
cent below the all consumption poverty line. 
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Since rural poverty incidence is 34.7 per cent, the poverty line falls within the second 
consumption quintile. The inflation adjusted poverty line at 3,166 riel is broadly consistent 
with the average consumption level for the second quintile of 3,427 riel (see Table 6.8). 
Table 6.8 also shows that for an average sized household on or close to the poverty line, the 
daily contribution of 10,000 riel per day for 50 days is equivalent to about 67 per cent of 
household consumption. Thus, while one person’s daily public works wage would not be 
sufficient to meet all the daily basic needs of a household, it would meet a large proportion of 
them. The supplementary income would be especially valuable if public works projects are 
phased during agriculturally slack periods and coincide with the time of year when many 
rural households face food shortages54. 
 
The above estimates of welfare impact based on the assumption of participation by one 
person per household for a period of 50 days should be taken to be indicative and 
illustrative. The workbook supplied can be used to make estimates of welfare impact under 
alternative assumptions to aid programme design. If a larger welfare impact is required and 
resources permit, programme scale and the number of days of employment could be 
extended. At least 1 person from 37 per cent of sample households stated availability for 
public works employment at a wage rate of 10,000 riel per day or lower and for these 
households, on average just over 2 persons were willing to participate at these wage rates. 
Therefore, if there is no restriction on the number of persons from a household participating, 
on average the welfare effect for public works employment would be about twice as large as 
those indicated in Table 6.7.  
 
Another way of looking at the welfare impact on a household of public works employment is 
to compare the earnings from it with the cost imposed by shocks and how households cope 
with them. The CARD / ILO survey included questions on whether the household suffered 
any shocks in the past six months. Examples of shocks include family shocks (31 per cent) 
such as death of a family member, illness in the family and fire. Natural shocks (26 per cent) 
included crop failure, crop damage by flooding and death of livestock. Economic shocks (17 
per cent) included loss of a family member’s job or less than expected earnings.  About two-
thirds of all households had suffered at least one type of shock during the last six months.  
 
Respondents were also asked about the estimated cost of the shocks. The average 
monetary cost of each type of shock estimated by households was 360,000, 240,000 and 
264,000 riel respectively for family, natural and economic shocks. Earnings from fifty days of 
public works employment for a household with one public works participant for 50 days at 
the wage rate of 10,000 riel would be 500,000 riel which would clearly more than 
compensate for the average monetary cost of the shock. In response to a question on how 
households coped with shocks, largest amounts were raised by households from sale of 
assets followed by seeking help from friends, relatives and others, borrowing and spending 
savings. Looking for jobs was also an option. Clearly, access to local public works 
employment would reduce the need to sell assets, borrow and draw down savings.   
 
On this basis, the level of support provided by 10,000 riel per day for 50 days appears to be 
reasonable. However, the shocks reported by households are for a period of six months. If 
the incidence and cost of shocks over 12 months are double the quantities of those for six 
months and the aim of the SSN is to enable households to cope with shocks, a higher level 
of benefits from public works may be justified though the provision of higher benefits would 
have to be balanced against the additional cost. 
                                                 
54
 The most acute food shortages are typically between July and November (Edmonds, 2010). According to 
FGDs undertaken as part of this study, availability for public works is greatest during October to April, hence the 
partial overlap. Further, cash earnings during periods when food shortages are less acute could be used to 
purchase food during periods of shortage.  
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The focus above is on the contribution of the public works SSN to the livelihoods of poor 
households and a case for setting the wage rate at a lower level is to target poor 
households. However, based on targeting evidence (sections 4.2 and 5), if the wage rate is 
used as a targeting device, a significant proportion of public works participants are likely to 
be from average and better off households. Based on access to land for cultivation as a 
proxy for household living standards, at the wage rate of 9,000 riel per day, 55 per cent of 
those willing to participate are from households in the bottom two quintiles (including 
landless households) implying that 45 per cent are in the top three quintiles (calculated from 
Table 4.11). The targeting according to access to land indicator is somewhat weaker at the 
wage rate of 10,000 riel per day with 46 per cent of households in the bottom two quintiles.   
 
Based on consumption expenditure per head, about 60 per cent of households are from the 
top three quintiles (calculated from Table 4.8). If the data are reliable, this implies no 
targeting at all and the situation is not improved by lowering the wage rate still further. At the 
wage rate of 10,000 riel per day, the targeting appears to be slightly better with 44 per cent 
of households of those wishing to participate in the bottom two quintiles. This evidence 
suggests slightly better targeting at the higher wage rate.    
 
While data problems cannot be completely ruled out, they are unlikely to be fully responsible 
for poor targeting. The most likely explanation is that variation in the value of labour within 
households, implying imperfectly functioning local labour markets, renders public works 
employment at a given wage attractive to surplus labour in less poor households in some 
cases but unattractive to poorer households with limited labour.   
 
Evidence on cash earnings shows that poorer households tend to have fewer cash earners 
with high and low cash earnings and smaller amounts of land while better off households 
either have more land or a number of household members with high and low cash earnings. 
The immediate implications for the programme are to use additional targeting instruments 
which can be applied transparently with low administrative burden. In view of the poor 
targeting effectiveness of the wage rate, recommendations on targeting are included in 
section 6.3.   
 
It is also possible that members of poor households were more cautious about indicating 
availability for a public works programme on a hypothetical basis especially if it implied 
relinquishing parts of their existing livelihood strategy and established relationships with 
employers. Indicating availability at higher wage rates could be one indicator of this caution. 
If the programme becomes established and employment on it can be accommodated 
alongside other economic activities, there may be greater willingness to participate by 
members of poorer households. 
 
It is clear that there are a number of unanswered questions regarding the effectiveness of 
the wage rate as a targeting instrument and the efficacy and effectiveness of using other 
instruments in conjunction with the wage rate. Apart from the pragmatic recommendations 
made above, it is necessary to investigate targeting effectiveness during the early stages of 
programme implementation to monitor and improve targeting performance. It should also be 
noted that family, natural and economic shocks are suffered by poor as well as better off 
households. Therefore, the benefit to average and better off households of earnings from 
participation in public works SSN to compensate for the monetary costs of shocks and 
possibly to prevent them from slipping into poverty, fulfils a valuable SSN function.         
 
6.3 Conclusions and recommendations 
 
The main conclusions on findings and recommendations on wage rates are put forward 
here. The Cambodian rural labour market offers a range of farm and non-farm opportunities 
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locally and further afield and labour supply is responsive to these opportunities. However, 
there is still substantial underemployment and low productivity employment leading to high 
poverty incidence. The public works based SSN would provide income support through 
short-term employment in creating or preserving infrastructure assets. The CARD / ILO 
study shows that members of a large proportion of households in the sample (73 per cent) 
would participate in public works at some wage rate to supplement livelihoods.  
 
The number of persons willing to participate is responsive to the wage rate offered indicating 
that the rural economically active have choices between taking up public works employment 
and other commitments and economic activities. Therefore the public works SSN should be 
seen as an additional income opportunity to supplement the livelihoods of rural households.     
Specific recommendations on public works SSN wage rate and related aspects with brief 
comments are set out below: 
 
Balancing the objectives of providing a reasonable level of social protection, targeting poorer 
sections of the population to the extent possible through the wage rate, minimising adverse 
impacts on other economic activities, ensuring that the wage rate offers incentive to work 
productively and practical aspects of setting wage rates, a uniform wage rate of 10,000 riel 
per day across the country is recommended as the public works SSN wage rate.  
 
Coincidentally, the proposed wage rate is roughly equivalent to the current minimum wage 
rate plus living allowance for garment workers but below average earnings in garment 
making. At a uniform wage rate, there will be substantial differences between localities and 
regions in the numbers wishing to participate in public works. Levels of programme activity 
will have to be responsive to these differences between localities and regions. A uniform 
wage rate is equitable in that the same amount is paid for similar work as long as variations 
in living costs are not large. 
 
A number of other aspects which will need attention at the programme design and early 
implementation stages have been identified below. 
 About equal numbers of men and women stated willingness to participate at a daily 
wage rate of 10,000 riel. There should be no discrimination between men and women 
with respect to access to LI and LB public works employment and men and women 
should be paid equally for work of equal value.  
 The wage rate by itself is not an effective device for targeting the poor let alone for 
targeting specific groups. Additional targeting could be: 
o geographical, of poor areas and those affected by natural or economic shocks. 
o giving priority to the ID Poor. 
o more specific targeting for the poorest, youth, veterans and IDPs though 
elaborate targeting usually entail additional administrative efforts and costs and 
introduces potential for abuse. 
 Public works employment should be provided in less busy agricultural periods to 
reduce disruption of other productive activities. This is especially important since the 
targeting effectiveness of the wage rate is weak and a large proportion of rural 
households rely on off-farm cash earning during the slack agricultural season to 
supplement their livelihoods.   
 Where those wishing to participate exceed labour requirement or resources are not 
sufficient to provide employment to all those willing to participate, some form of 
rationing will be required.  
o One approach is specific targeting of those identified as being in greatest need. 
This could be through objective criteria such as those used for identifying the ID 
Poor or community level subjective appraisals.  
o Limiting the number of days of participation per household is another rationing 
device though this would require additional administrative effort and expenditure. 
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It will not improve targeting effectiveness but will make access to the SSN 
equitable between households wishing to participate while facilitating control of 
the wage bill by limiting the number of participants and number of days of 
participation.  
o Another rationing mechanism which is easier to implement administratively and 
could be made transparent is random selection from those wishing to participate. 
Random selection is likely to be more appropriate for LB projects while specific 
targeting or limiting the number of days of participation is likely to be more appropriate 
for smaller local community based LI projects.    
 In section 5.2 it has been argued that for equity, a uniform wage rate should be offered 
across the country and public works activities should be responsive to regional and 
local need for SSN support. However, an issue arises with respect to the wage rate to 
be paid by contractors and whether a distinction may be needed between the 
proposed wage rate and the wage rate on LB projects in some localities. For projects 
being implemented through contractors, they would be responsible for setting wage 
rates and paying workers subject to the stipulation that the wage rate cannot be below 
the recommended public works wage rate. Therefore, effectively, the proposed public 
works wage rate would be the minimum wage rate for contractor operation. The 
question is whether contractors would be permitted to pay higher than the proposed 
wage rate if local labour market and efficiency wage considerations require it. The 
same issue may arise for LB projects implemented by direct labour in similar areas55. If 
it is necessary to pay higher than the proposed public works wage rate on some LB 
projects, it will be necessary to ensure that it does not cause any discontent among 
participants on other projects being paid the standard public works wage rate. 
 The public works wage rate would need to be revised periodically in response to 
changes in labour market conditions and cost of living. The wage rate should be 
reviewed every two years (unless the need for more frequent reviews is apparent 
because of economic circumstances). The review should be based on monitoring the 
labour supply response to programme activities, evidence on rural wage rates from the 
annual CSES surveys being undertaken by NIS and evidence on cost of living. 
 The proposed SSN aims to combine provision of a level of protection through public 
works during normal times targeted at poor areas and provision of support for the poor 
and vulnerable in response to shocks. With the latter, public works activities would 
have to be initiated and their scale determined when the need arises. In order not to 
disrupt labour supply, if a higher level of support is required because of the severity of 
the shock, it is preferable to adjust the number of days of employment offered rather 
than the SSN wage rate. 
 
Some important conclusions and recommendations are based on stated responses to 
hypothetical questions posed in the CARD / ILO survey. It will be necessary to review the 
findings and related recommendations in the light of experience during the early stages of 
programme implementation. The aspects which would need further investigation are the 
actual labour supply response and the role of the wage rate in targeting. When 
implementation starts, there should be a sample survey of participants and monitoring of the 
labour supply response. Evidence from the survey and monitoring of numbers willing to 
participate should be used to make adjustments to the wage rate, investigate the targeting 
effectiveness of the wage rate and investigate additional targeting and rationing rules as 
necessary. 
 
 
                                                 
55
 Since LI projects will typically be planned to match the local need for SSN support, the need to pay a higher 
wage rate to ensure adequate labour supply does not arise. 
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Annex I: CARD / ILO Survey Questionnaire 
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Household Number:………………………… 
 
HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE - Draft 
 
PART 1 
1. Household Information - Location Identification Code 
1.1. Province 
 
  
1.2. District 
 
  
1.3. Commune 
 
  
1.4. Village 
 
  
1.5. Name of Head of Household 
 
 
 
2. Enumeration Particulars 1. Enumerator 2. Supervisor 
2.1. Name   
2.2. Date of interview and supervisor check 
(day/month/year: i.e. 08/10/2009) 
  
2.3. Signature   
 
3. Data Entry   
3.1. Name  
3.2. Date of data entry (day/month/year: i.e. 08/10/2009)  
3.3. Signature  
 
4. Number of persons in household
56
 (all members including children aged 0-14)  
4.1. Male  
4.2. Female  
4.3. Total  
 
 
 
                                                 
- 56 A household is defined as a group of persons who commonly live together and would take their meals from a common kitchen unless the need to be away from the 
household for work prevented any of them from doing so. “Regular” households exclude institutional households (e.g. boarding houses, hotels, pagodas and jails), 
homeless households or other transient households (such as people living on boats).  
- MOP: “Household” refers to living in the same house and sharing the same food. If they live in the same house but cook and eat separately, they should be considered as 
different households .In order to be counted as a household member the person has to have been present in the household in the last six months. If the person has not 
been present in the house at all since the last 6 months, then he/she is not counted as a household member. 
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PART 2 
People who normally live in this household
57
 (15 years old and above) 
 
 
2.1. Person 
number 
2.2. Name 2.3. Age 
On last birthday (years) 
2.4. Sex 
Male = 1 Female = 2 
2.5. Relationship to the head 
of household
58
 
1    1 
2     
3     
4     
5     
6     
7     
8     
9     
10     
11     
12     
13     
14     
15     
Code: Question 2.5:  1= Household head, 2= Husband/wife, 3= Sister-/brother-in-law, 4= Son or daughter, 5= Son-/daughter-in-law, 6= Grandchild, 7= Stepchild , 8= Parent, 
9= Grandparent, 10= Niece/Nephew, 11= other (specify)  
This question is needed to identify all those who are currently in the hh and especially those who are 15 years old or older. We need to ensure that each person’s age and other 
characteristics can be directly linked with each person’s economic activities in the later questions.  
(Note: There are some economic activity questions on the MOPS questionnaire but I am assuming that it will not be possible to make a link at the individual level in this study and 
the previous data. However, some descriptive on economic activities of hh members from the previous data would be useful when I am working on the report.) 
 
 
                                                 
57
 See definition on page 1. 
58 Person 1 to be the head of hh. Definition of head of household for the 1998 population census: “a person who is recognised as such in a household. He or she is 
generally the person who bears the chief responsibility for the management of the household and takes decisions on behalf of the household. Head of household is not 
necessarily the eldest male member, but may be a female member or a younger member of either sex.” 
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PART 3: This section covers activities of household members aged 15 and above in the last seven days, unemployment and non-economic activities. Ask for all household 
members aged 15 and above (preferably, each person should answer questions the questions about his/her economic activities in section 3).   
Read out: Now I am going to ask some questions about activities in the last seven days for each household member aged 15 and above. 
 
3.0 Start with the first person 15 years old or older, put in that person’s 
number from the first column on previous page (Part 2) and get responses 
to 3.1 to 3.20 for that person. Then do the same with the second person 15 
years or older and so on until responses have been received for each person 
in the household 15 years old or older.  
      
3.1 In the last seven days, did …[Name]… do any of the following activities, even for 
only one hour? Show prompt card 1. 
Yes=1 
No =2 
Yes=1 
No =2 
Yes=1 
No =2 
Yes=1 
No =2 
Yes=1 
No =2 
Yes=1 
No =2 
3.1.1 Run or do any kind of business, big or small, for himself / herself or with one 
or more partners? 
      
3.1.2 If the answer to (3.1.1) is “Yes”, indicate number of hours during the last seven days.       
3.1.3 Do any work for a wage, salary, commission or any payment in kind?       
3.1.4 If the answer to (3.1.3) is “Yes”, indicate number of hours during the last seven days.       
3.1.5 Help unpaid in a household business of any kind?       
3.1.6 If the answer to (3.1.5) is “Yes”, indicate number of hours during the last seven days.       
3.1.7 Do any work on his/her own or the household’s farm, growing farm 
produce or in looking after animals for the household? 
      
3.1.8 If the answer to (3.1.7) is “Yes”, indicate number of hours during the last seven days.       
3.1.9 Do any construction or major repair work on his/her own home, farm or 
business, or those of the household?  
      
3.1.10 If the answer to (3.1.9) is “Yes”, indicate number of hours during the last seven days.       
3.1.11 Catch any fish, prawns, shells, wild animals or other products for sale or household 
use? 
      
3.1.12 If the answer to (3.1.111) is “Yes”, indicate number of hours during the last seven days.       
3.1.13 Other. Please specify in the space below.       
3.1.14 If the answer to (3.1.13) is “Yes”, indicate number of hours during the last seven days.       
3.1.15 Brief explanation of “(3.1.13) Other” 
 
      
 
If “YES” for a person to any part of Question 3.1  Go to Q 3.4 for that person.  If “NO” to all options for a person, continue with next question.  c   
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 Number for each person 15 years old or older to be entered from 
Part 2 (see 3.0 above). 
      
3.2 If the answer is  “NO” to all parts of Question 3.1 for a person, ask: 
Even though ..[Name].. did not do any of these activities in the last 
seven days, does he/she have a job, business, or other economic 
or farming activity that he/she will definitely go to?  
  1 = YES    
  2 = NO   Go to Q 3.8 
      
3.3 What was the main reason ..[Name].. was absent from this activity 
in the last seven days? Mark only one reason. 
 01 = OWN ILLNESS OR INJURY 
 02 = CARING FOR FAMILY OR OTHERS 
 03 = OTHER FAMILY/COMMUNITY OBLIGATIONS (E.G. FUNERALS, 
MEETINGS) 
 04 = PROBLEMS WITH TRANSPORT 
 05 = BAD WEATHER 
 06 = VACATION, LEAVE  
 07 = STUDY OR TRAINING  
     08 = OTHER REASON 
      
 Brief explanation of “08 = OTHER REASON”       
3.4 What is the type of ..[Name]..’s main place of work? 
    01= GOVERNMENT (INCLUDING POLICE, MILITARY, TEACHER) 
    02= UN ORGANISATION 
    03= NGO (PAID OR VOLUNTARY) 
    04= EMPLOYMENT IN PRIVATE SECTOR 
    05= SELF EMPLOYMENT – WORKING IN OWN BUSINESS INCLUDING      
PARTNERSHIP 
    06= SUBSISTENCE FARMING, FISHING OR OTHER  
    07= LOOKING FOR WORK AND AVAILABLE TO START WORK  
    08 = OTHER REASON 
      
 Brief explanation of “08 = OTHER REASON”       
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 Number for each person 15 years old or older to be entered from 
Part 2 (see 3.0 above). 
      
3.5.1 What is ..[Name]..’s daily pay or earnings at his/her main job 
or business?  (Note: Normally, such information will not be 
available for some activities, e.g. work on family farm.)  
 
 
Amount 
 
 
 
 
 
      
3.5.2 Give amount in figures indicating units (Riel or $ for cash, 
commodity and amount if payment is in kind). 
Units       
 If reluctant to answer or not sure about the exact amount       
 Go to Q 3.7 
No 
answer 
      
3.6 Ask only if an amount  is given in Q 3.5 
Is the pay …. 
 1= PER DAY 
     2 = PER WEEK 
 3 = PER MONTH 
      
3.7 Ask only if reluctant to answer or not sure about the exact amount 
in Q 3.5. 
Show the categories. Make sure the respondent points at the correct 
income column (daily, weekly or monthly) on prompt card 2 and mark 
the applicable code. 
      
  Daily Weekly Monthly       
 01 
02 
03 
R 0 - 3000 
R 3001 - 6000 
R 6001 - 9000 
R 0 – 15000 
R 15001 - 30000 
R 30000 - 45000 
R 0 - 66000 
R 66001 - 132000 
R 132001 - 198000 
      
 04 
05 
06 
R 9001 - 12000 
R 12001 - 15000 
R 15001 - 18000 
R 45001 - 60000 
R 60001 - 75000 
R 75001 - 90000 
R 198001 - 264000 
R 264001 - 330000 
R 330001 - 396000 
 07 
08 
09 
R 18001 - 21000 
R 21001 - 24000 
R 24001 - 27000 
R 90001 - 105000 
R 105001 - 120000 
R 120001 - 135000 
R 396001 - 462000 
R 462001 - 528000 
R 528001 – 594000 
 10 
11 
R 27001 - 30000 
MORE THAN R 30000 
R 135000 – 150000 
MORE THAN R 150000 
R 594001 – 660000 
MORE THAN R 660000 
 Go to Q 3.16
 113 
The following questions cover unemployment and non-economic activities followed by employment seeking and last employment. 
Ask for all household members aged 15 and above who did not work and were not absent from work in the last seven days (i.e. for all those whose answer on Q 3.2 = 2). 
 Number for each person 15 years old or older to be entered from 
Part 2 (see 3.0 above). 
      
3.8 Why did ..[Name].. not work during the past seven days? 
 01 = HAS FOUND A JOB, BUT IS ONLY STARTING AT A DEFINITE DATE IN THE 
FUTURE Go to Q 3.16 
 02 = SCHOLAR OR STUDENT AND PREFERS NOT TO WORK 
 03 = HOUSEWIFE/HOMEMAKER AND PREFERS NOT TO WORK 
 04 = RETIRED AND PREFERS NOT TO SEEK FORMAL WORK 
 05 = ILLNESS, INVALID, DISABLED OR UNABLE TO WORK  
 06 = TOO YOUNG OR TOO OLD TO WORK 
 07 = LACK OF SKILLS OR QUALIFICATIONS FOR AVAILABLE JOBS 
 08 = CANNOT FIND ANY WORK  
 09 = CANNOT FIND SUITABLE WORK (SALARY, LOCATION OF WORK OR 
CONDITIONS NOT SATISFACTORY) 
 10 = OTHER REASON 
      
 Brief explanation of “10 = OTHER REASON” 
 
      
3.9.1 During the past four weeks, has ..[Name].. taken any action 
     TO LOOK FOR ANY KIND OF WORK 
        1=YES 
        2=NO 
      
 3.9.2 During the past four weeks, has ..[Name].. taken any action 
     TO START ANY KIND OF BUSINESS 
        1=YES 
        2=NO 
      
3.10 Has ..[Name].. ever worked before for payment in cash or kind 
(other than on the family farm)? 
 1 = YES 
 2 = NO   Go to Q 3.15 
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 Number for each person 15 years old or older to be entered from Part 2 
(see 3.0 above). 
      
3.11 How long ago was it since ..[Name].. last worked (other than on the family 
farm)? 
 01 = 1 week - less than 1 month 
 02 = 1 month - less than 3 months 
 03 = 3 months - less than 6 months 
 04 = 6 months - less than 12 months (1 year) 
 05 = 1 year - less than 3 years 
 06 = 3 years or more  
 888 = Don't know 
      
3.12.1 What is ..[Name]..’s daily pay or earnings at his/her previous 
job or business?  (Note: Normally, such information will not be 
available for some activities, e.g. work on family farm.)  
Amount 
 
 
 
 
 
      
3.12.2 Give amount in figures indicating units (Riel or $ for cash, 
commodity and amount if payment is in kind). 
Units       
 If reluctant to answer or not sure about the exact amount       
 Go to Q 3.14 
No 
answer 
      
3.13 Ask only if an amount  is given in Q 3.12. 
Is the pay …. 
 1= PER DAY 
     2 = PER WEEK 
 3 = PER MONTH 
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 Number for each person 15 years old or older to be entered from 
Part 2 (see 3.0 above). 
      
3.14 Only if reluctant to answer or not sure about the exact amount  in 
Q 3.12 
Show the categories. Make sure the respondent points at the correct 
income column (daily, weekly or monthly) on prompt card 2 and mark 
the applicable code. 
      
  Daily Weekly Monthly       
 01 
02 
03 
R 0 - 3000 
R 3001 - 6000 
R 6001 – 9000 
R 0 – 15000 
R 15001 - 30000 
R 30000 - 45000 
R 0 - 66000 
R 66001 - 132000 
R 132001 - 198000 
      
 04 
05 
06 
R 9001 - 12000 
R 12001 - 15000 
R 15001 – 18000 
R 45001 - 60000 
R 60001 - 75000 
R 75001 - 90000 
R 198001 - 264000 
R 264001 - 330000 
R 330001 - 396000 
 07 
08 
09 
R 18001 - 21000 
R 21001 - 24000 
R 24001 – 27000 
R 90001 - 105000 
R 105001 - 120000 
R 120001 - 135000 
R 396001 - 462000 
R 462001 - 528000 
R 528001 – 594000 
 10 
11 
R 27001 - 30000 
MORE THAN R 30000 
R 135000 – 150000 
MORE THAN R 150000 
R 594001 – 660000 
MORE THAN R 660000 
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Number for each person 15 years old or older to be entered from 
Part 2 (see 3.0 above). 
      
3.15.1 How does …… support him/herself? 
 a. DID ODD JOBS DURING THE PAST SEVEN DAYS  
       1 = YES            2 = NO   
      
3.15.2 How does …… support him/herself? 
 b. SUPPORTED BY PERSONS IN THE HOUSEHOLD 
     1 = YES            2 = No   
      
3.15.3 How does …… support him/herself? 
 c. SUPPORTED BY PERSONS NOT IN THE HOUSEHOLD 
     1 = YES            2 = No   
      
3.15.4 How does …… support him/herself? 
 d. SUPPORTED BY CHARITY, CHURCH, WELFARE, ETC. 
     1 = YES            2 = No   
      
3.15.5 How does …… support him/herself? 
 e. SAVINGS OR MONEY PREVIOUSLY EARNED 
     1 = YES            2 = No   
      
3.15.6 How does …… support him/herself? 
     f. BORROWING  
      1 = YES            2 = No   
      
3.15.7 How does …… support him/herself? 
 g. OTHER SOURCES 
    1 = YES            2 = No   
      
 Brief explanation of “g = OTHER SOURCES”       
 If “YES” to response 3.15.1.a 
 Go back to Q 3.1 for that person since response implies that some work 
was done by the person in the last seven days.  
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 Number for each person 15 years old or older to be entered from 
Part 2 (see 3.0 above). 
      
3.16 If a suitable job at acceptable pay becomes available, will ..[Name].. 
accept it? 
 1 = YES 
 2 = NO    
 888 = DON'T KNOW   
 IF “2 = NO” OR “888 = DON’T KNOW”  Go to Q 3.18 
      
3.17 If ..[Name].. takes up new employment, what will happen to work and 
other activities he/she is currently doing? 
    01 = NO ACTIVITIES OR PAID WORK AT PRESENT 
    02 = COMBINE NEW EMPLOYMENT WITH CURRENT ACTIVITIES 
    03 = GIVE UP CURRENT PAID EMPLOYMENT 
    04 = OTHER FAMILY MEMBERS TO DO MORE HOUSEHOLD CHORES 
AND WORK ON FARM 
    05 = ANOTHER FAMILY MEMBER TO TAKE UP CURRENT PAID 
EMPLOYMENT 
    06 = OTHER 
(Note: More than one response possible, though 01 is not consistent with 02 
to 06.)  
      
 Brief explanation of “06 = OTHER REASON” 
 
      
3.18 If manual work in road improvement, such as digging earth or 
hauling it, is offered locally at R5000 per day, would …[Name]… 
be willing to take it up? 
     1 = YES  
 Go to Q3.0 for next person in household 15 years or older. Go 
to 5.0 if section 3 has been completed for all persons 15 years or 
older. 
     2 = NO 
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 Number for each person 15 years old or older to be entered 
from Part 2 (see 3.0 above). 
      
3.19 If manual work in road improvement, such as digging earth or 
hauling it, is offered locally at R9000 per day, would …[Name]… 
be willing to take it up? 
     1 = YES  
 Go to Q3.0 for next person in household 15 years or older. 
Go to 5.0 if section 3 has been completed for all persons 15 
years or older. 
     2 = NO 
      
3.20.1 What is the minimum acceptable pay for such work (i.e. manual 
work in road improvement, such as digging earth or hauling it, 
for …[Name]… 
Give amount in figures, indicating whether it is per day, per week or 
per month. 
      
3.20.2 If the response is “NO PAY ACCEPTABLE”, “REFUSE TO ANSWER” or 
“DON’T KNOW”, INDICATE BELOW.    
     1 = NO PAY ACCEPTABLE 
    2 = REFUSE TO ANSWER 
    888 = DON’T KNOW 
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Part 4 
4.1. Since May 2009, have you faced any of the following crises? (Household-Level) 
 
  1=YES   2=NO If YES, how much was 
spent? (ten thousand 
riels) 
Remarks 
4.1.1 Loss of household member (number:………………….)    
4.1.2 Household member became very sick/was badly injured    
4.1.3 Fire    
4.1.4 Crop failure    
4.1.5 Crop damage due to flooding    
4.1.6 Other damage due to flooding    
4.1.7 Animal deaths/theft    
4.1.8 Theft or being cheated    
4.1.9 Household member lost waged employment    
4.1.10 Household member earned money less than before due to losing job or less 
hours of work available 
   
4.1.11 Business shutdown    
4.1.12 Land Conflict    
4.1.13 Other (specify:………………………….)    
 
Note: If all answers 2= No; end of interview 
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4.2. How did your family cope with the incident(s) above? (Multiple answers permitted) 
 
  
1=YES   2=NO 
If yes, how much was 
spent? (ten thousand 
riel) 
Remarks 
4.2.1 Spent savings 
 
 
  
4.2.2 Reduced consumption 
 
 
  
4.2.3 Borrowed money (including gold) 
 
 
  
4.2.4 Sold cattle 
 
 
  
4.2.5 Sold transport, farm or household equipment 
 
 
  
4.2.6 Rented out land  
 
 
  
4.2.7 Sold residential land/house 
 
 
  
4.2.8 Sold agricultural land 
 
 
  
4.2.9 Got help from relatives/friends 
 
 
  
4.2.10 Got help from NGOs 
 
 
  
4.2.11 Household member(s) migrated to look for jobs 
 
   
4.2.12 Placed children in labour service 
 
   
4.2.13 Other (specify: ..................................) 
 
   
 
End of interview: Thank the respondent!   
Interviewer 
5 Indicate the column number(s) of the person(s) 
who answered all or most of the questions. 
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Annex II: CARD / ILO study FGD discussion topics 
 
Topic Clarification and Issues to be discussed 
1.  Importance of unskilled waged 
employment and other sources 
of cash income for hhs in the 
village  
Clarification 
Waged employment could be any work undertaken in return for payment in cash and/or kind 
outside the household and family farm. It could be for another household, a commercial 
farm, a business, public sector employment, employment in construction work in or near the 
village or further away.  
 
Self-employment singly or in partnership or fishing, hunting and harvesting common 
resources are not waged employment. However, they are sources of cash income which are 
alternatives to waged employment and therefore have a bearing on the demand for waged 
employment.    
 
Issues to be discussed 
Main sources of cash income for hhs.  
 
Importance of waged employment vs other sources of cash income for households. This 
may be different for poor, average or rich households. Other differences may also be 
significant, e.g. hhs with no or very little land and large households may have greater need 
for such employment. The aim in this and other questions would be to encourage the 
participants to come up with responses but it may also be necessary to provide prompts if 
responses are not forthcoming.  
 
Main uses of additional income by poor, average and better off hhs (e.g. to purchase more 
food, more non-food items, education, health, purchasing inputs or investment for farm or 
business or repaying debt). Typically, poorer households may need to spend more of the 
additional income on food and other essential household items and may have to repay debt 
while better off households may have enough income to spend on education, health and 
investment. But we want to get local insights on this. 
    
2. Types and location of unskilled 
waged employment taken up 
(currently or in the past) by 
people from the village. 
 
We want to know from the direct experience and knowledge of the participants, the types of 
jobs which are taken up by local people within or near the village, in nearby towns, larger 
towns and cities further away within Cambodia or outside the country.    
 
3.  Wage rates and payment Clarification 
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Topic Clarification and Issues to be discussed 
arrangements  Reference here is to wage rates for unskilled labour, though if participants provide 
information on wage rates for semi-skilled or skilled labour, this should be noted along wioth 
the types of skills.  
 
The payment arrangements include three main aspects. The first is whether payment is 
made on a daily, weekly or monthly basis. The second is whether it is related to days of 
attendance at work or amount of work done (e.g. piece rate or task rate). The latter is either 
related to the amount of work done (piece rate) or subject to satisfactory completion of a 
specified task (task rate). The third aspect is whether payment is in cash, in kind or 
combination of cash and kind. 
  
Participants may not know the wage rates in locations away from the village unless they 
have taken up such employment in the past or know someone who has. They will generally 
have a better idea of wage rates in the village or nearby areas. 
 
Issues to be discussed 
The issues to be discussed have been clarified above. Wage rates may vary depending on 
the type of employment, working conditions and the time of the year. Any such variations 
should be brought out in the discussion and should be noted. 
 
Any differences in wage rates between men and women which may be related to differences 
in the type of work undertaken by men and women should also be noted.   
 
4.  Exchange of labour between hhs 
 
Whether there is a tradition of labour exchange between hhs in the village or between 
villages, how it works (i.e. which hhs exchange labour and with whom), how widely prevalent 
it is, and whether it is purely on a reciprocal basis or if there is payment in cash or kind 
involved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.  Seasonality of labour availability The issue here is seasonal variations in labour requirements in agriculture and other 
activities (e.g. harvesting common resources) and therefore the times of the year when local 
people are available for waged employment and when there is a need for waged 
employment. We should note the types of activities for which labour requirements are heavy 
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Topic Clarification and Issues to be discussed 
and the times of the year when these activities have to be undertaken.  
 
This is relevant for understanding features of the local labour market and for scheduling any 
future public works programmes. 
  
 
6.  Public works employment – local 
experience and views of 
participants   
This topic is concerned with finding out about any current or recent experience of 
employment on public works (including WFP Food for Work) in or near the village and views 
of participants’ on public works employment irrespective of whether they have direct 
experience of such employment. Therefore, contributions by FGD participants may be based 
on their participation in such projects or general observations.  
 
If there have been public works projects in or near the village, it would be useful to know 
roughly how many people or hhs from the village participated, which type hhs benefited from 
participation. Whether participants were predominantly young or across the age range and 
whether women participated. 
 
If there have not been such projects in the area, it would be useful to know whether in the 
opinion of the participants, such projects would help and at which times of the year.  
 
 
7.  Acceptable wage rates for public    
works and employment 
conditions    
This is concerned with seeking the views of participants on the appropriate wage rate for 
public works programmes and how it relates to wage rates and earnings in other activities. 
We also want to know the reasons why a particular wage rate is thought to be reasonable, 
especially in relation to wage rates and earnings in other activities.  
 
Whether participants prefer payment in cash or kind is also another question. 
   
 
 
 
8.  Waged employment, opportunity 
cost and household burden  
 
 
 
 
 
There are two aspects here. The first is the alternative income earning opportunities 
foregone by taking up waged employment and the second is the additional burden of work 
which may fall on the other members of the household if one member takes up waged 
employment. Therefore, we want to know what is being sacrificed when members of a hh 
take up waged employment on a public works programme or other types of employment and 
also whether hhs have sufficient capacity to do more and therefore accommodate a hh 
member taking up waged employment without loss of other hh income or farm production.  
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Topic Clarification and Issues to be discussed 
  
One question here is whether the situation is better if the waged employment is local, i.e. 
members of hh taking up local employment can also devote some time to other activities 
important for the household. 
 
 
 
 
9.  Pros and cons of local vs 
employment further away. 
 
In relation to 8 above, whether local employment is preferable to seeking employment 
further away or higher pay further away is enough compensation for the increased burden 
for the remaining members of the hh. Also, whether local employment is more advantageous 
for some groups of people e.g. women. 
 
What is reasonable pay on a local job as opposed to one further away is a related question. 
 
10.  Female participation in waged 
employment and public works 
and participation by the young  
Women should have opportunities to participate in waged public works or other employment. 
Therefore, the discussion should obtain understanding of whether women are willing to 
participate in such activities, how easy it is for them to participate and any barriers against 
such participation.  
 
Whether there is a problem of youth unemployment in the village and whether public works 
employment would help is another topic to be discussed in the FGD. 
  
